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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the impact of Fyodor Dostoevsky and Friedrich Nietzsche on 
the development of Albert Camus’ political philosophy.  The innovation of the present 
study is in the attempt to offer a substantive examination of Camus’ dialogue with 
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  To the extent that connections between these writers have 
been discussed, it has been in the general context of modern thought or it has focused on 
overlapping literary themes.  This project emphasizes the political dimensions of these 
connections.  In addition to re-interpreting Camus’ political thought, the aim is to clarify 
Camus’ struggle with transcendence and to bring renewed attention to his unique 
understanding of the relationship between nihilism, ideology, and political violence in the 
twentieth century.  I focus on Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky for three 
reasons.  First, these are the thinkers with whom Camus is most engaged.  Indeed the 
problems and themes of Camus’ work are largely defined by Dostoevsky and Nietzsche; 
a full account of this dialogue will therefore enhance our understanding of Camus while 
also reinforcing the enduring importance of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  Second, it allows 
me to recast Camus’ political philosophy as both a synthesis of and a response to 
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s projects.  Finally, I believe this approach allows for a re-
assessment of Camus’ broader political significance, which I contend has been 
undervalued in the literature.  Ultimately, I argue that Camus remains among the most 
important moral and political voices of the twentieth century.  Although limited, his 
philosophy of revolt offers a humane portrait of justice and articulates a meaningful 
alternative to the extremes of ideological politics.
 1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
“In the spectacle of death, in the endurance of intolerable pain, and in the 
irrevocableness of a vanished past, there is a sacredness, an overpowering awe, a feeling 
of the vastness, the depth, the inexhaustible mystery of existence, in which, as by some 
strange marriage of pain, the sufferer is bound to the world by bonds of sorrow. In these 
moments of insight, we lost all eagerness of temporary desire, all struggling and striving 
for petty ends, all care for the little trivial things that, to a superficial view, make up the 
common life of day by day; we see, surrounding the narrow raft illumined by the 
flickering light of human comradeship, the dark ocean on whose rolling waves we toss 
for a brief hour; from the great night without, a chill blast breaks in upon our refuge; all 
the loneliness of humanity amid hostile forces is concentrated upon the individual soul, 
which must struggle alone, with what of courage it can command, against the whole 
weight of a universe that cares nothing for its hopes and fears.” – Bertrand Russell 
More than fifty years after his death, Camus remains a critical voice for political 
justice and human rights.  Writing in the midst of World War II, Camus engaged the 
problem of nihilism with urgency and moral clarity.  As an artist, Camus felt obliged to 
confront injustice and to tell the truth about its origins.  Through his journalism, fiction, 
and philosophical essays, he sought ways to confront a world without meaning while 
avoiding the ideological extremes of the twentieth century.  Given his task and historical 
moment, it is not surprising that Camus continues to receive attention from scholars and 
the public. 
Camus’ early notoriety was largely the result of his journalism.  Unable to join the 
military because of his tuberculosis, he moved to Paris in 1940 to write for the French 
newspaper the Paris-Soir.  With the help of his long-time friend Pascal Pia, Camus was 
introduced to Gaston Gallimard, whose family operated publishing houses in France at 
the time.  This connection would lead to the publication of Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus 
and The Stranger.  Although he hoped to publish these works in conjunction with 
Caligula, the Nazi occupation of Paris forced him to return to his native Algeria.  Having 
 2 
fled France, Camus sent his manuscripts to Pia, who forwarded them to Andre Malraux.  
Although he had reservations about Caligula and The Myth of Sisyphus, Malraux was 
impressed by The Stranger.  Malraux sent the manuscript to Gallimard and recommended 
immediate publication.  In June of 1942, Gallimard published The Stranger.  After a few 
months and several revisions, The Myth of Sisyphus was also published.  Although 
Camus’ first works did not initially garner widespread acclaim, among the French elites 
they were embraced with unusual enthusiasm.
1
  In 1942, then, Camus’ literary life was 
permanently altered.   
Later that year, as Allied forces landed on the North African coast, Camus 
became separated from his wife Francine, who arrived in Oran shortly before the 
occupation.  In Paris and unable to return to Oran, Camus began working with Gallimard 
as a literary reviewer.  He quickly emerged as a key figure in the French Resistance 
movement.  Around this time he helped to establish the underground newspaper Combat, 
which was arguably the most significant publication during the Nazi occupation.  As an 
editor and writer, Camus captured the public’s attention, eventually becoming one of the 
leading voices of the movement.   
Camus’ experiences at Combat were critical to his development as an artist and 
political thinker.  Having risked his life as a member of the resistance, giving shelter to 
colleagues and working with various underground groups, Camus became increasingly 
aware of his responsibilities as an artist.  Nihilism was no longer an abstraction; it was a 
political reality that demanded action.  As his influence increased in post-war France, 
Camus’ resistance activities also expanded.  His struggles against Nazism in particular 
                                                 
1
 Herbert Lottman, Albert Camus: A Biography (New York: Doubleday and Company, 
Inc., 1979), p. 255. 
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sharpened his understanding of the threat of violence and ideological terror.  Henceforth 
his writing assumed an increasingly moral hue.  Even in the aftermath of the Allied 
victory, Camus continued to defend human dignity, both in France and abroad.  The spirit 
of revolution persisted in Europe after the defeat of Nazism, and Camus perceived a 
lingering nihilism at the root of it.  Against this nihilism Camus and his colleagues at 
Combat advocated a new kind of political morality.  Herbert Lottman described this 
attitude in the following terms: 
The moral bias of Camus's Combat, or more accurately the Combat of 
Camus, Pia, Altschuler, Paute-Gimone, Ollivier, and their colleagues, was 
the newspaper's single distinguishing feature, making concrete the vague 
and often unexpressed hopes of the younger generation. . . .  It guaranteed 
that there would not be a moral vacuum during the scramble for power 
that was taking place the first few months of liberated Paris.  Camus and 
Combat were a new morality or they were nothing.
2
 
 
Lottman’s observation here is important because it reflects Camus’ post-war view of his 
role as a thinker and a political actor.  The moral urgency of Camus’ subsequent writings, 
therefore, is unsurprising.  
Camus’ next major work, The Plague, was published in 1946.  The book was a 
tremendous success.  Exploring exile and rebellion in an explicitly absurd context, The 
Plague was a uniquely relevant work in Europe’s post-war climate.  It was also the first 
work of fiction in which Camus tried to articulate his philosophy of revolt.  For that 
reason, it helped to cement Camus’ reputation as one of the most important moral 
thinkers of his generation.  Following The Plague, Camus emerged as an international 
figure, giving talks throughout Europe and the United States. 
In the post-war years, however, the ideological rift between the United States and 
Russia defined international politics.  The Allied victory gave rise to a new world order, 
                                                 
2
 Ibid, p 335. 
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with capitalism and communism dominating political life.  An opponent of both 
ideologies, Camus’ moderation become a source of increasing tension.  On the one hand, 
Camus rejected the economic injustices of capitalism, which he believed perpetuated a 
system of force and domination.  On the other hand, Camus was unable to accept the 
totalizing claims of communism, which justified violence on pseudo-historical grounds.  
In the leftist climate of post-war France, however, Camus’ moderate stance was 
vehemently condemned.  This culminated when Camus released his most significant 
political work The Rebel.  Published in 1951, The Rebel articulated Camus’ theory of 
revolt as well as his critique of ideology, particularly socialism and Marxism.  Following 
its release, leading intellectuals like Andre Breton and Jean-Paul Sartre publicly criticized 
the work, dismissing it has vague and incoherent.  Breton, for instance, called Camus’ 
moderate notion of revolt a meaningless “artifice . . . a case of keeping the word and 
eliminating the thing itself.”3  Although Camus was wounded by the backlash, he 
continued to denounce ideologues on both the left and right.  But his refusal to choose 
sides damaged his reputation among French intellectuals and the public.  Furthermore, 
Camus’ nuanced position concerning France’s occupation of Algeria (to which I return 
later) only reinforced the view that Camus’ moralism was politically naïve.   
Although he remained firm in his convictions, Camus suffered immensely from 
the criticisms of his work, many of which were deeply personal.  There was an extended 
period, in fact, in which Camus questioned his vocation as a writer.
4
  Unable to create, 
                                                 
3
 Andre Breton, “The Second Surrealist Manifesto,” in Manifestoes of Surrealism, trans. 
Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1969), 
p. 178. 
4
 Camus’ notebooks during this period reflect his frustration. Particularly in the first few 
years after The Rebel, Camus continually references his writer’s block, suggesting at one 
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Camus failed to produce a major work of fiction for roughly five years.  In 1956, Camus 
published his final novel The Fall, and in the following year he released a collection of 
short stories entitled Exile and the Kingdom.  In 1957, moreover, Camus was awarded the 
Nobel Prize for Literature at the age of forty-three.  Tragically, just as Camus seemed 
ready to begin the next phase of his literary career, he died in a car accident in 1960. 
Despite his early death, Camus produced a number of influential works, and his 
thought continues to stimulate debate in the academic literature.  In the political science 
scholarship, there is considerable doubt as to Camus’ importance as a political thinker.  
Focusing mostly on his essay The Rebel, critics like Michael Harrington claim that 
Camus “could find nothing more than a romantic syndicalism to counterpose against his 
own corrosive skepticism.”5  But critiques such as this tend to view Camus’ thought 
through too narrow a prism and, consequently, undervalue his importance as a political 
thinker.  While it is true that Camus was not a systematic theorist, it is a mistake to 
assume he had nothing significant or concrete to say about political life.  Camus analyzed 
politics not as a social scientist or a philosopher but as an artist and existentialist; and he 
sought understanding of human reality through psychological analysis and experience.  
For Camus, this was best done through art and fiction.  The difficulties involved in 
classifying Camus have been addressed well by Germaine Bree:  
Philosophical and ethical systems, as such, did not interest him, and he 
himself on several occasions stated that he was not a philosopher . . . [But] 
if we think of a writer whose essential effort is directed toward elucidating 
                                                                                                                                                 
point that he may have exhausted his creative potential (Notebooks 1951-1959, pp. 111-
12). 
5
 Michael Harrington, The Accidental Century (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), 
p. 169. 
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his own experiences through an effort of his intelligence as a philosopher, 
then Camus most certainly is a philosopher.”6 
It is true that Camus was primarily a fiction writer, but this did not prevent him from 
exploring serious political problems; on the contrary, it enabled him to examine them on 
a variety of levels and to articulate them in a multiplicity of ways.  John Cruickshank has 
argued persuasively, in fact, that Camus’ use of fiction should be understood in the larger 
historical context.  In the wake of World War II, Cruickshank notes, “The general move 
in philosophy was to move away from abstractions and general theories and grapple with 
concreteness and particulars.  Novels are a perfect vehicle for just such a move.”7  To 
account for his thought, therefore, we must give equal attention to all of his writings, 
particularly the fiction, where his philosophical themes and political ideas are most 
developed.  To this end, I examine the development of Camus’ thought in his political 
and philosophical writings as well as his novels and plays.   
Before continuing, it is essential to explain why Dostoevsky and Nietzsche are of 
such importance to Camus’ thought.  First, these are the thinkers with whom Camus is 
most engaged.  Indeed the problems and themes of Camus’ work are largely defined by 
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche; an account of this dialogue is therefore critical to a larger 
understanding of Camus.  Second, analyzing Camus’ thought from this perspective helps 
to elucidate the ways in which Camus responds to Dostoevsky and Nietzsche.  Camus 
regards these thinkers as prophets of modernity; his works seek to clarify this fact.  
Although Camus engages them in different ways and for different reasons, he is almost 
always responding to them in one way or another.  Finally, I believe this approach allows 
                                                 
6
 Germaine Bree, Camus, Revised Edition, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 
1964), p. 9. 
7
 John Cruickshank, Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1959), p. 63. 
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for a re-assessment of Camus’ broader political significance, which I argue has been 
undervalued. 
The Appeal of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky 
Nietzsche was a figure of enduring interest to Camus.  Indeed one of Camus’ first 
published essays is a laudatory analysis of Nietzsche’s aesthetic philosophy.8  Among the 
many reasons for Camus’ attraction to Nietzsche was Nietzsche’s peculiar place in the 
history of philosophy.  Neither an academic philosopher nor a conventional writer, 
Nietzsche spent the bulk of his productive life in solitude, critiquing his age and culture 
from afar.  Nietzsche thus appealed both to Camus’ artistic and critical disposition.  More 
importantly, Nietzsche was a lucid thinker who directly engaged the nihilism of his time 
– given his historical moment, Camus likely found this aspect of Nietzsche admirable.  
While Camus would later concede that Nietzsche was partly responsibility for this crisis, 
he nonetheless recognized the urgency of Nietzsche’s admonitions.   
As a thinker, then, Nietzsche was deeply engaged with the problem of nihilism.  
Unable to dismiss it, Camus writes, “Nietzsche accepts the entire burden of nihilism.”9  
Nietzsche’s philosophical courage was a kind of model for Camus.  In his notebooks, for 
example, Camus writes 
It is said that Nietzsche, after breaking with Lou, entered into a final 
solitude, walked at night in the mountains that dominate the Gulf of Genoa 
and lit immense fires there that he watched smolder.  I’ve often thought of 
these fires and their gleam has danced behind my entire intellectual life.  
So even though I’ve sometimes been unjust toward certain thoughts and 
                                                 
8
 The article, entitled “Essay on Music,” was published in June 1932 in the Algerian 
review Sud. Camus wrote this during his first year of college, during which he was 
introduced to Nietzsche by his mentor and professor, Jean Grenier. 
9
 Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), p. 
67. 
 8 
certain men whom I’ve met in this century, it is because I’ve unwillingly 
put them in front of these fires and they were promptly reduced to ashes.
10
 
 
Camus’ admiration for Nietzsche is apparent, as is his tendency to judge himself and 
others by Nietzschean standards.  Camus’ writing room, moreover, as Herbert Lottman 
notes, was “decorated with portraits of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche.”11  It is important to 
emphasize these details at the outset, as they speak to Nietzsche’s lasting influence on 
Camus.   
 As an intellectual influence, Dostoevsky was equally important to Camus.  Indeed 
among Camus’ literary models, Thomas Epstein has claimed that “Dostoevsky was the 
most important case, the inspiration, idol, and obstacle needed by Camus in order to 
define himself.”12  With Dostoevsky, however, there are some biographical parallels that 
help to explain Camus’ fascination.  To begin, Camus and Dostoevsky experienced 
comparable intellectual evolutions.  Both, for instance, were initially drawn to socialist 
ideologies.  In 1849, in fact, Dostoevsky was arrested and exiled in Siberia for conspiring 
with members of the Petrashevsky Circle, a literary group of progressive intellectuals.  
Dostoevsky’s memories of this period would later serve as the basis for his political novel 
The Possessed.  Camus similarly joined (albeit reluctantly and not for long) the 
Communist Party during his college years in Algeria.
13
  Shortly after joining, however, 
both Camus and Dostoevsky rejected the doctrinal inflexibility of these movements.   
                                                 
10
 Albert Camus, Notebooks 1951-1959, trans. Ryan Bloom (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 
2008), p. 89. 
11
 Albert Camus: A Biography, p. 580. 
12
 Thomas Epstein, “Tormented Shade: Camus’ Dostoevsky,” in The Originality and 
Complexity of Albert Camus’ Writings (New York: Palgrave, 2012), p. 146. 
13
 Ibid, pp. 88-90. 
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There is also an aporetic quality to Camus and Dostoevsky’s thought that warrants 
discussion.  Neither thinker was able to resolve the contradictions in their life and works.  
Dostoevsky, for instance, as Camus points out in The Myth of Sisyphus, understood the 
absurd problem, yet posited a solution wholly inconsistent with it.
14
  Dostoevsky thus 
acknowledges the absence of meaning in human history, but persists in his faith.  Camus’ 
thought is also antagonistic.  His philosophy of revolt rejects foundationalism, for 
example, while preserving a sense of foundations.  Camus also denies the existence of 
God, but insists that he is not an atheist.
15
  Much of Camus’ later thought also revolves 
around a contradiction: affirming limits and values in a world in which limits and values 
are not given; as the chapter on revolt will demonstrate, this affirmation of contradiction 
was the guiding theme of Camus’ political thought. 
The persistence of contradictions in Camus and Dostoevsky’s writings is related 
to a more fundamental commonality.  Dostoevsky was plagued by doubt his entire life.
16
   
Indeed the most powerful arguments in Dostoevsky’s novels are often those with which 
he disagrees.  The clearest example of this is Ivan’s atheistic pronouncements in The 
Brothers Karamazov.  Camus shared Dostoevsky’s self-questioning nature.  Born a 
French Algerian, Camus struggled to reconcile his European and Mediterranean 
identities.  Camus’ cultural ambivalence is reflected in his writings.  His dissertation and 
                                                 
14
 Camus writes that Dostoevsky undergoes a “complete metaphysical u-turn” (The Myth 
of Sisyphus, p. 111) when he posits God and belief in immortality as the only solution to 
the absurd.  Camus also questions the veracity of Dostoevsky’s religious conviction.  “It 
is hard to believe,” he writes, “that a novel [The Brothers Karamazov] sufficed to 
transform into joyful certainty the suffering of a lifetime.” 
15
 In a response to a question about the religious tone of one of his plays, for instance, 
Camus is quoted by his biographer Todd as saying “It’s true that I don’t believe in God, 
but that doesn’t mean I’m an atheist” (Albert Camus: A Life, p. 356). 
16
 Dostoevsky was quite candid about the extent of his self-doubt.  Indeed he referred to 
himself as a “child of disbelief and doubt” (Correspondence of Dostoevsky, I, p. 157). 
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first formal philosophical work, for example, tries to integrate Greek and Christian 
thought.  And while Dostoevsky’s Christianity existed in perpetual tension with doubt, 
Camus’ secular humanism was shrouded in Christian symbolisms.17  In any event, the 
abundance of aporias in Camus and Dostoevsky is an important point of convergence.  
On the one hand, it reflects their resistance to absolutism.  But it also explains their 
preference for art and fiction.  Formal philosophy demands order and coherence.  Camus 
and Dostoevsky wanted their art to reflect reality, which is tensional and uncertain.  
Hence their art and ideas attempt to express this uncertainty.  Understanding this is 
essential to any effort to make sense of Camus and Dostoevsky’s thought. 
Camus’ Dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky 
For most of his adult life Camus was directly engaged with the works of 
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  This was partly the result of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s use 
of art as a medium for the exploration of social problems.  But it was also because Camus 
shared their thematic interests and political concerns.  In his notebooks, novels, plays, 
political journalism, and essays, Camus takes up specific motifs he first encountered in 
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  The cardinal themes of Camus’ thought, for instance, are 
absurdity and revolt, and the terms of these problems are defined by Nietzsche and 
Dostoevsky; indeed the resulting tension between them eventually crowns Camus’ 
political thought.
18
  To illustrate this as well as the larger significance of Nietzsche and 
Dostoevsky to Camus’ art and political philosophy, this study follows Camus’ attempts to 
                                                 
17
 There is a considerable literature on Camus’ tenuous relationship to Christianity, as 
well as his use of Christian imagery.  As I will deal in greater detail with this in the 
following chapters, it suffices here to note that Camus’ thought is never entirely divorced 
from the Christian vision to which it is often opposed. 
18
 This will be examined in detail in chapter five, where Camus’ philosophy of revolt is 
analyzed. 
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develop and respond to their ideas.  Particular attention is paid to direct references to 
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky in Camus’ notebooks and non-fiction, as these will help to 
corroborate more general claims concerning Camus’ fictional works.  Although 
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s influence on Camus has received sporadic attention in the 
literature, the significance of this dialogue has not been fully elucidated.  Consequently, 
the nature and motivating concerns of Camus’ thought (as well as its political import) are 
not entirely understood.   
To help frame Camus’ dialogue Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, three conceptual 
periods of Camus’ writing are delineated.  The first is Camus’ sensualist period, which 
begins with Camus’ college years in the early 1930s and extends roughly until the 1940s.  
This cycle of works is largely apolitical.  Camus’ inquiries are chiefly metaphysical, 
focusing on the role of aesthetics and meaning in human life.  Camus’ encounter with 
Nietzsche begins in the sensual period, as questions of affirmation and purposelessness 
are explored in a variety of contexts.  The second period, which emerges around 1942, is 
concerned with the metaphysics of absurdity.  Here Camus is interested in man’s relation 
to the world and in deducing the moral and epistemological consequences of absurdity 
for human life.  Accordingly, his analyses are more existential than political, more 
solipsistic than social.  During this period, Camus continues to engage Nietzsche, but his 
dialogue with Dostoevsky begins to take shape as well, particularly when Camus 
develops a psychology of the absurd.  Camus’ third and final period coincides with the 
publication of his novel The Plague in 1947.  Here Camus develops a positive philosophy 
of revolt and, not surprisingly, his interaction with Dostoevsky becomes paramount.  
Camus tries to map the lessons of the absurd onto the social-ethical sphere, and his 
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dialogue with both Dostoevsky and Nietzsche begins to crystallize.  Henceforth, Camus’ 
thought reflects his postwar concerns and we discover what Thomas Hanna aptly calls a 
“positive attack on the ethical-political problems of the twentieth century.”19  Throughout 
his revolt period, moreover, Camus formulates an ethos that is uniquely his own.  For this 
reason, this period will be instrumental to establishing the final significance of Nietzsche 
and Dostoevsky to Camus’ thought. 
In terms of his broader dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, Camus’ 
transition from absurdity to revolt is particularly significant.  For the first time, Camus 
appears to reject Nietzsche on ethical grounds.  Camus’ desire to affirm life on absurdist 
terms is weighed against his desire to impose limits on action.  As Camus wrestles with 
this dilemma, his engagement with Dostoevsky increases.  More precisely, absurdity and 
political action are seen as problematic in a world without transcendence.  It is thus in 
these works that Camus responds most directly to Dostoevsky’s essential claim: that 
without God and belief in immortality life becomes not only impossible to love but 
“something unnatural, an unbearable nonsense.”20   
Ultimately, Camus’ thought will be understood in terms of its engagement with 
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  Nietzsche shapes Camus’ conception of modern nihilism.  As 
his notebook entries suggest, Nietzsche becomes the catalyst for Camus’ understanding 
of nihilism as a crisis of culture; he challenges Camus to identify the proper attitude one 
ought to adopt towards an absurd world.  Nietzsche’s psychology also informs much of 
Camus’ absurdist thought in The Myth of Sisyphus.  Dostoevsky awakens Camus to two 
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existential realities.  First, Dostoevsky’s Christianity profoundly alters Camus’ beliefs 
concerning the social utility of unifying ideas (such as the Christ-ideal).  While Camus 
does not accept Dostoevsky’s Christianity, he is clearly affected by Dostoevsky’s 
understanding of the sources of order in society.  Hence Camus’ dialogue with 
Dostoevsky intensifies during the absurd and revolt periods; in works such as The 
Plague, The Fall, and The Rebel, this is most apparent.
21
  Dostoevsky also awakens 
Camus to the connections between individual crime and collective revolution.  Indeed in 
his notebooks Camus sums up Dostoevsky’s argument as follows: “Dostoevsky’s Thesis: 
The same paths that lead the individual to crime lead the society to revolution.”22  This 
Dostoevskyian insight anchors Camus’ analysis of historical rebellion, and is central to 
his broader conception of revolt.   
To sum up, the approach of this study is to identify the substantive foundations of 
Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky in Camus’ non-fiction and to examine 
the ways in which Camus engages these thinkers in his fictional works.  I argue that 
Nietzsche’s thought is more significant in Camus’ early works while Dostoevsky’s is 
more important in Camus’ later writings.  In both cases, however, the influence is more 
of a dialogue, in which and through which Camus grapples with various conceptions of 
absurdity and rebellion. 
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Previous Literature 
 Much of the scholarship on Camus, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky has ignored the 
philosophical implications of their dialogue and instead focused on overlapping literary 
themes.  Given the significance of these thinkers to Camus’ thought, this dearth in the 
literature is surprising.  However, several studies are exceptional in this respect.  Fred 
Willhoite’s Beyond Nihilism: Albert Camus’ Contribution to Political Thought, for 
example, briefly examines the substantive importance of Nietzsche to Camus.  As the 
title implies, Willhoite is primarily interested in Camus’ importance as a political 
philosopher.  Sensitive to what he calls Camus’ “existential method,” Willhoite begins by 
acknowledging Camus’ deliberate avoidance of systematic thinking.23  On his account, 
which this work adopts, Camus’ overarching concern was to confront nihilism and to re-
establish “norms for human conduct in the political realm.”24  Willhoite’s contribution to 
Camus scholarship is critically important mostly because of its emphasis on experience.  
In particular, he elucidates Camus’ attempts to move beyond the “inadequate choices of 
positivism and idealism,” neither of which captures the essence of lived experience for 
Camus.
25
  Building on this insight, I try to explain Camus’ “existential method” by 
considering it in the light of his engagement with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  
   In terms of Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche, Willhoite argues persuasively that 
Nietzsche’s creative nihilism was central to Camus’ philosophical development.  As I 
argue in subsequent chapters, Willhoite’s claims are borne out in Camus’ absurd and 
revolt periods, where the creation and affirmation of values are seen as absurd 
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imperatives.  Despite its many insights on the Camus-Nietzsche dynamic, however, 
Willhoite’s analysis is limited in that it does not adequately address the reasons for 
Camus’ divergence from Nietzsche.  For instance, Willhoite explores the Nietzschean 
roots of Camus’ early momentist works, but there is little discussion of Camus ’humanist 
alternative to Nietzsche or of Camus’ attempts to develop a political philosophy within an 
explicitly Nietzschean framework.   
While several scholars have examined Nietzsche and Camus’ foundational 
inquiries, David Owen’s Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity is among the few to 
comparatively analyze them.  Owen is particularly insightful in his analysis of 
Nietzsche’s critique of Western metaphysics, which he rightly identifies as a precursor to 
Camus’ absurdist thought.26  However, Owen’s study does not examine Camus’ critical 
engagement with Nietzsche’s ideas, particularly Nietzsche’s ubermensch doctrine.  This 
project examines Camus’ critique of Nietzsche and explains why Camus ultimately 
remains faithful to Nietzsche’s fundamental vision.  Perhaps most importantly, I explore 
Camus’ interaction with Nietzsche against the backdrop of Dostoevsky’s thought.  In 
addition to clarifying Camus’ political resistance to Nietzsche, this will also help to 
crystallize the importance of Dostoevsky to Camus’ mature philosophy of revolt. 
One of the more recent studies of Camus’ political thought is Jeffrey Isaac’s 
Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion.  Emphasizing Camus’ rejection of traditional 
grounds for action, Isaac ably distinguishes Camus as uniquely “antifoundational” 
                                                 
26
 David Owen, Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1995), p.  
95. 
 16 
thinker.
27
  This aspect of Camus’ thought is an enduring concern of this work.  Unlike 
Isaac, however, I try to account for Camus’ antifoundationalism by understanding it 
primarily as a reaction to Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  Camus’ broader interest in “the 
pathos of modernity,” Isaac also notes, was in part due to the influence of Nietzsche, 
whose writings seemed to prophesize twentieth-century politics.
28
  The pathos to which 
Isaac refers corresponds to the modern experience of exile, the dominant theme of 
Camus’ absurdist writings.  Isaac identifies an important parallel between Camus and 
Nietzsche, which points to the enduring influence of Nietzsche during Camus’ revolt 
period: 
“Like Nietzsche, Arendt and Camus view the condition of modernity as 
one of homelessness and estrangement in which men, having dethroned 
God, hopelessly and dangerously seek through their own efforts the 
certainty and solidity that only a God can provide.  Like Heidegger, they 
see modern subjectivity as engendering an unbridled, Promethean will to 
power.
29
 
The persistent search for certainty and meaning, as Isaac notes here, was central to 
Camus’ view of the modern condition.  Indeed when Camus criticizes ideologies in The 
Rebel, these are seen as the animating impulses of all modern historicist movements.  
Isaac is thus right to emphasize the Nietzschean origins of this insight.   
Isaac also makes a critical observation concerning Camus’ complicated departure 
from Nietzsche.  Nietzsche’s account of nihilism, Isaac contends, was deeply influential 
to the young Camus.  Given his historical moment, Camus could not help but accept 
Nietzsche’s diagnosis of modernity.  However, as Isaac notes, Camus could not embrace 
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Nietzsche’s response to nihilism, which precluded a ground for solidarity or limits.30  In 
the analysis of Camus’ philosophy of revolt, I build on Isaac’s limited analysis by 
showing how Camus’ antifoundationalism tries to go beyond Nietzsche’s amoral 
individualism.  Additionally, I try to better elucidate the positive characteristics of 
Camus’ antifoundationalism, which become clearer when contrasted with Nietzsche’s 
creative nihilism and Dostoevsky’s conception of active love. 
 Isaac’s study is also instructive in its emphasis on Camus’ commitment to action.  
Isaac sees Arendt and Camus as unique among the postmoderns because of their desire to 
engage politics in a more concrete way.  Unlike contemporary theorists such as Derrida 
or Adorno, Isaac contends, Camus and Arendt recognized the urgency of the moment and 
“sought to get to the bottom of the civilizational crisis of the twentieth century.”31  This 
meant avoiding the pitfalls of doctrinaire thinking (particularly Marxism) and “helping to 
reconstitute political thought in a nihilistic age.”32  The modern civilizational crisis was 
anticipated and explained with remarkable clarity in the nineteenth century by Nietzsche 
and Dostoevsky; it is therefore not surprising that Camus remained in constant dialogue 
with these thinkers.  Isaac notes the influence of Nietzsche on Camus in general terms, 
but he does not discuss Dostoevsky at all.  A fuller account of this dialogue will both 
advance our understanding of Camus and reinforce the enduring importance of Nietzsche 
and Dostoevsky. 
Camus’ engagement with Dostoevsky has also generated a fair amount of 
scholarly interest.  Particular focus has been given to Dostoevsky’s psychological account 
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of metaphysical revolt.  Hanna’s The Thought and Art of Camus is notable in this regard.  
Indeed Hanna comments extensively on Camus’ ideas concerning Ivan Karamazov’s 
place in the history of metaphysical revolt.
33
  By explaining the appeal of Ivan’s peculiar 
humanism to Camus, Hanna lays the groundwork for much of this study, which claims 
that Camus imbues Ivan’s revolt with an explicitly positive content.  Unlike Hanna, 
however, I include key Dostoevsky texts such as The Possessed in a broader discussion 
of Camus’ experiential alternative to Dostoevsky’s foundationalism.  By drawing on 
additional Camus texts such as The First Man (which was unpublished at the time of 
Hanna’s study), I also develop a more comprehensive account of Camus’ dialogue with 
Dostoevsky. 
Although it is somewhat dated, Maurice Friedman’s Problematic Rebel remains 
among the most penetrating studies of rebellion and modern literature.  While Friedman 
is not directly concerned with the relationship between Camus and Dostoevsky, he does 
identify some key points of contrast.  In particular, Friedman’s discussion of The Plague 
points to what I consider a vital distinction between Camus and Dostoevsky.  Referring to 
the protagonist Rieux, for instance, Friedman writes: “Camus portrays a number of 
genuinely different images of man, to each of which he lends validity, yet he commits 
himself in The Plague to one image above all others – that of the dialogical rebel Dr. 
Rieux.
34
  The notion of the dialogical rebel is especially significant.  As Friedman 
observes, it emphasizes Camus’ momentist concern with dialogue, solidarity and 
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suffering, as well as his “commitment to the concrete demands of the hour.”35  By 
developing Camus’ notion of dialogical rebellion, Friedman accounts for the ethical 
importance of Dostoevsky to Camus while contextualizing the dispute between Camus 
and Dostoevsky concerning transcendence and experience.  In the chapter on revolt, I 
extend Friedman’s analysis by contrasting Rieux’s revolt with Ivan and Father Zossima 
from Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov.  This will help to distinguish Camus’ 
experiential humanism from Dostoevsky’s religious mysticism. 
Friedman’s study is also noteworthy for its insight into Camus’ uniqueness as a 
political thinker.  Like Willhoite and Bree, Friedman emphasizes Camus’ interest in the 
social implications of man’s ontological and epistemological situation.  Recognizing the 
limits of reason, Friedman asserts, Camus sought a more authentic politics in the realm of 
human experience.  Although Friedman does not explore this aspect of Camus’ thought 
as exhaustively as Willhoite, he nonetheless treats Camus as an artist seeking to recover a 
moral ground beyond the confines of transcendent religion and positivist science.
36
  In his 
discussion of dialogical rebellion in particular, Friedman skillfully connects Camus’ 
political morality to his existential account of the human condition.  This part of 
Friedman’s will be discussed at length when I examine the Dostoevskyian roots of 
Camusian revolt. 
More recently, Mark Orme has explored the significance of Dostoevsky’s Ivan 
Karamazov to Camus’ experiential humanism.  In The Development of Albert Camus’s 
Concern for Social and Political Justice, he suggests that Camus discovered in Ivan 
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Karamazov a more concrete ground for action.  Ivan’s moral outrage combined with his 
refusal “of the divine,” Orme writes, marked an essential moment in the history of 
rebellion for Camus.
37
  Although Ivan falls into negation as a result of his revolt, the 
moral impulse behind it was an affirmation of human solidarity.  Emphasizing this 
moment, Orme points to the increasing importance of suffering and solidarity to Camus’ 
political thought.  While it never went beyond the realm of abstraction, Ivan’s 
identification with human suffering represented one the animating impulses of Camusian 
revolt.  In several works, notably The Plague, Camus suffuses his fictional rebels with 
this sentiment, and in other texts such as The Rebel Camus identifies Ivan’s 
humanitarianism as a starting point for a more authentic mode of revolt.  In any case, by 
examining Camus’ enduring interest in Ivan, Orme offers important insights into Camus’ 
fascination with one of Dostoevsky’s most enigmatic characters.  
Perhaps the most comprehensive study of the Camus-Dostoevsky relationship is 
Ray Davison’s Camus: The Challenge of Dostoevsky.  Focusing on the importance of 
Dostoevsky’s fiction to Camus, Davison provides an excellent overview of Camus’ 
literary dialogue with Dostoevsky.  In the context of this study, Davison’s analysis of 
Dostoevsky’s absurd fiction is particularly instructive.  Indeed Davison offers a richly 
detailed account of Camus’ engagement with Dostoevsky’s literary characters.  “The 
world of Dostoevsky’s rebels,” he writes, “is well tuned . . . to the aspirations of the 
young Camus.  They, like himself, want to live according to the dictates of logic and 
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absurdity.  They wish to deny nothing and to face the truth of existence.”38  Here Davison 
elucidates the fundamental appeal of Dostoevsky’s fiction to Camus.  By exposing the 
individual’s inner confrontation with absurdity, Dostoevsky defines the absurd problem 
for Camus.  Davison is thus most insightful when discussing Camus’ fascination with 
specific Dostoevsky characters.  For this reason, I draw extensively on his text when 
discussing Camus’ interaction with Dostoevsky’s absurd psychology.  If there is a 
difference, it is that I view the Camus-Dostoevsky dialogue through a distinctly political 
prism.  Dostoevsky’s psychology is critical, to be sure, but the central task is to explain 
how Camus deals with the political implications of Dostoevsky’s thought.  
Although he does not develop the connection, Davison does discuss Camus’ 
political interest in Dostoevsky’s absurdism.  However, as Davison is concerned mostly 
with Dostoevsky’s problematization of the absurd, he does not adequately address 
Camus’ humanist extension of Dostoevsky’s absurdism.  For instance, Davison points to 
Ivan Karamazov’s “everything is permitted” as the essential theme of Camus’ absurd and 
revolt writings.  It is certainly true that Ivan (as well as Nietzsche) help to define the 
problem of nihilism for Camus, but equally important is Camus’ response to Ivan.  Ivan’s 
“everything is permitted” was merely a point of departure for Camus.  In his notebooks, 
for example, Camus writes: 
The truly free person is the one who accepting death as it is, accepts 
simultaneously the consequences – namely the overturning of all 
traditional notions of values in life.  Ivan Karamazov’s ‘Everything is 
Permitted’ is the only expression of coherent freedom.  But it is imperative 
to get to the bottom of the statement.
39
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Here Camus’ desire to move beyond Ivan is clear.  As with Nietzsche, Camus regards 
Ivan’s diagnosis of nihilism as an injunction to create and affirm new values.  To accept 
Ivan’s negation as final, moreover, is to sanction crime and fail to see the creative 
potential of rebellion.  Camus speaks directly this in a 1946 Combat article: 
Terror can be legitimized only if one adopts the principle that the end 
justifies the means. And this principle can be embraced only if the efficacy 
of an action is taken to be an absolute end, as in nihilist ideologies 
(everything is permitted, success is what counts) or philosophies that take 
history as absolute.
40
   
 
Wresting a moral imperative from Ivan’s “everything is permitted” is thus a central aim 
of Camus’ political thought.  Davison recognizes Camusian revolt as a response to 
“Ivan’s dilemma,” but he does not resolve the question of whether revolt works as a 
political solution to this dilemma.
41
   
 Beyond his engagement with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, Camus’ political thought 
has received considerable scholarly attention.  As mentioned, the works of Thomas 
Hanna, Germaine Bree, Jeffrey Isaac, and Fred Willhoite are notable examples.  Before 
continuing, however, mention must also be made of David Sprintzen’s Camus: A Critical 
Examination.  Sprintzen insists that despite his fame, “few have adequately appreciated 
Camus’ cultural significance.”42  For Sprintzen, this has to do with a failure to understand 
the nature of Camus’ project.  After diagnosing “those interior forces seemingly 
propelling us toward destruction,” he argues, Camus sought to instantiate a different way 
of thinking, what Sprintzen calls a “cultural rebirth.”43  Sprintzen’s analysis is insightful 
                                                 
40
 Albert Camus, Camus at Combat, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), p. 262. 
41
 The Challenge of Dostoevsky, p. 124. 
42
 David Sprintzen, Camus: A Critical Examination, (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1988), p. xiii. 
43
 Ibid. 
 23 
mostly because of its focus on Camus’ concern with foundations.  Recognizing that 
“metaphysical problems plague the modern world as never before,” Camus was always in 
search of a new ground, one that did not point beyond.
44
  Aware of this, Sprintzen 
evaluates Camus’ thought in terms of its possibilities for more authentic politics, not as a 
system or blueprint for action. 
 Like Friedman, Sprintzen understands Camus’ emphasis on “dialogue and 
community” as essential to his political pragmatism.  Indeed Sprintzen makes a strong 
case (which I corroborate in subsequent chapters) that Camus’ political thought 
privileged experience as the only means of affirming limits and avoiding ideological 
abstractions.  This was the impetus, Sprintzen claims, for “Camus’ exploration of the 
preconditions for the creation of dialogic communities.
45
  While Sprintzen is not alone in 
pointing this out, he is unique in describing Camus’ dialogical rebellion as an attempt to 
wrest “us out of the metaphysical isolation to which the experience of the absurd bears 
witness.”46  This is a crucial point as it draws an important connection between absurdity 
and revolt.  One of the few imperatives to emerge from Camus’ absurd analysis, for 
example, is acceptance of ambiguity.  As Sprintzen notes, Camus emphasizes experiential 
sharing as a way of encouraging mutual respect and undercutting “any claim of a right to 
suppress the views and oppress the person of the Other.”47  To engage others in this way 
is to accept, on mutual terms, the impossibility of absolute truth and the necessity of a 
politics wherein no perspective is privileged over another.  The absurd, in other words, 
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negates absolutist claims and revolt aspires to build a dialogic community in which 
values can be affirmed on relative terms. 
Although Sprintzen is later critical of Camus’ efforts to establish a new 
experiential ground for politics, his insights into Camus’ metaphysical and ontological 
projects are an important contribution to Camus scholarship.  In the final chapter on 
revolt, I respond to Sprintzen’s critique of Camus, which resembles those of Sartre and 
other Marxist-oriented contemporaries of Camus.  In brief, Sprintzen contends that 
Camus fails to account for concrete historical processes.  Failing to see man as trapped 
“within an engulfing history,” Camus falsely assumes he can transcend his historical-
technical existence.  By misunderstanding man’s relation to the world, Sprintzen 
concludes, Camus’ theory of revolt fails to go “beyond the tragic-tension-dualism that 
counterposes nature against history.”48  Worse still, it exaggerates man’s capacity (via 
revolt) to practically transform his world.  While Sprintzen’s critique is not altogether 
wrong, this study suggests that it is based on a flawed conception of Camus’ 
philosophical anthropology.  As chapter three argues, Camus’ ontology implies that 
human beings can order their existence and orientation to others through symbols and a 
commitment to concrete action. 
While Sprintzen seems to understand Camus’ concern for foundations, he does 
not adequately address Camus’ central political aim: imposing limits on action.  It is 
untrue, for instance, that Camus neglects man’s historical situation or even the material 
origins of revolution; on the contrary, he concedes that “if rebellion exists, it is because 
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falsehood, injustice, and violence are part of the rebel’s condition.”49  Camus, moreover, 
does not assume the rebel can escape or transcend this condition.  Instead the question 
was always how to avoid the temptation to use history “to legitimize murder.”50  From 
Camus’ perspective, the tragedy of twentieth century ideology was its urge to serve 
history by hastening its climax.  Against this destructive attitude Camus taught a new 
political morality, one tethered to experience and accepting of limits.  Sprintzen and other 
commentators fail to fully explore Camus’ efforts in this respect.  This work aims to fill 
this void, and to show how instrumental Nietzsche and Dostoevsky were to the evolution 
of Camus’ thought. 
 To accomplish this task, several questions must be addressed.  In the following 
chapter, I examine Camus’ sensualist literature, which begins in the early 1930s and ends 
around 1940.  Although this is the most apolitical of Camus’ conceptual periods, it is 
critical to establishing the initial importance of Nietzsche to Camus.  The primary claim 
here is that Camus’ early absurdist orientation was shaped in large part by Nietzsche.  
While Camus’ mature political thought diverges in crucial ways from this period, the core 
insights he borrows from Nietzsche remain fundamental to his subsequent writings. 
 In chapter three, Camus’ absurdist writings are explored.  Here Camus’ early 
thought is challenged as a result of his engagement with Dostoevsky’s absurd literature.  
As Camus considers the social implications of absurdity, he confronts more directly the 
links between individual and political disorder.  Such themes as solipsism, self-
affirmation, and estrangement are all problematized within a distinctly Dostoevskyian 
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framework.  During this period, Camus struggles to reconcile his early affirmative 
response to absurdism with the inner nihilism of Dostoevsky’s characters.   
 Chapter four explores the political implications of Camus’ absurdist inquiries.  
Here Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky reaches its climax.  Camus draws 
an explicit connection between absurdity and the apotheosis of reason; and political 
ideologies are seen as extensions of man’s essentially religious pursuit of totality.  The 
core claim is that Camus’ epistemological skepticism and metaphysical account of 
totalitarian ideologies are deeply informed by Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.   
 The fifth chapter addresses Camus’ revolt period.  Here the central theme is 
Camus’ attempt to ground a political morality in a world defined by absurdity.  In this 
period, Camus’ chief concerns are values and limits.  He accepts Nietzsche’s relativism, 
but Dostoevsky’s emphasis on transcendence and foundations continues to loom large.  
As a result, Camus formulates a philosophy of revolt that affirms moral limits while 
avoiding the problem of metaphysical essentialism.  The chapter makes two broad claims.  
First, that Camus replaces transcendent foundations with an experiential ground, which 
takes the agonism of revolt as a tensional source of order.  Second, that Camus’ 
philosophy of revolt can be seen as an amalgamation of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s 
thought. 
 In the final chapter, I sum up Camus’ philosophical dialogue with Nietzsche and 
Dostoevsky and comment briefly on the political import of Camus’ project.  I also ask 
what is unique and enduring about Camus’ thought?  What, if anything, can Camus’ plea 
to moderation and dialogue teach us today?  Does Camus resolve the problem of 
foundationalism?  What are the practical implications of revolt?  And finally, how does 
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an examination of Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky add to our 
understanding of all three?  
 The works of Camus that are given considerable attention in this study include the 
following: the two philosophical essays, The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel; the 
collections of essays on general topics, Lyrical and Critical Essays and Resistance, 
Rebellion, and Death; the novels A Happy Death, The Stranger, The Plague, The Fall, 
and The First Man; the collection of short stories, Exile and the Kingdom.  Finally, as 
mentioned, all of Camus’ published notebooks are consulted for additional insight into 
his thought and intentions
 28 
CHAPTER TWO 
CAMUS’ SENSUALIST LITERATURE  
Camus’ sensualist writings are concerned primarily with metaphysical and 
aesthetic questions.  The ethical and political problems that pervade his later texts are not 
yet visible.  During this period, Camus is engaged almost exclusively with Nietzsche, and 
the central motif of his work is the problem of happiness in a world without apparent 
meaning.  This chapter begins with a brief examination of Camus’ early non-fiction, 
paying particular attention to the Nietzschean roots of Camus’ early anti-foundationalism.  
I then discuss Camus’ interaction with Nietzsche’s metaphysics and aestheticism in such 
fictional works as A Happy Death and Caligula.  I argue that several Nietzschean 
concepts (acceptance and creative affirmation in particular) guide much of Camus’ early 
thought. 
In light of the significance of Nietzsche’s aestheticism to Camus, it will help to 
first summarize Nietzsche’s thesis in The Birth of Tragedy.  Nietzsche’s task is to 
associate the decline of tragedy with the rise of Socrates and his disciple Euripides.  He 
argues that Euripides’ mania for logic reduced tragedy to a kind of contrived intellectual 
exercise.  Before Euripides, tragedy was life-affirming, the “truly metaphysical activity of 
man.”1  Tragedy also spoke to the anguish and nobility of human living.  It denied the 
comforts of reason, Nietzsche writes, and said yes “to life even in its strangest and 
hardest problems.”2  For Nietzsche, then, pre-Euripidean tragedy embraced the 
contradictions of life without attempting to resolve them on stage.  Under the sway of 
Socrates, however, tragedy was altered; it became reasonable.  Worse still, Euripides 
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upsets the balance between Apollo and Dionysus, the two Greek gods of art.  Set in 
opposition to one another, Apollo represents beauty, individuation and reason.  Dionysus 
stands for the community or tribe; it symbolizes the bursting of boundaries and the loss of 
self.  The antagonism of these deities gives birth to tragic art, according to Nietzsche.  
Under the sway of Socrates, however, this tension was lost and virtue was redefined as 
knowledge.
3
  Following this turn, it became the business of philosophers and artists alike 
to know and to explain rather than to create and to affirm.  Henceforth tragedy required 
not only that the “virtuous hero must be a dialectician” but that there also “be a 
necessary, visible connection between virtue and knowledge, faith and morality.”4  This 
is this sense in which Nietzsche believes Socratism destroyed tragic art. 
As Joseph McBride has noted, Nietzsche is concerned with this movement in 
tragic art because it paved the way for the modern apotheosis of reason, or what 
Nietzsche often called the will to truth.  Nietzsche, he writes, believed “this decline . . . 
begun with advent of Socratic philosophy and . . . culminated in Christianity.”5  In his 
early writings, Camus appears to adopt Nietzsche’s attitude concerning the relationship 
between Socrates, tragedy, and reason.  The first indication of this can be seen in 1932, 
when Camus published his first essay.
6
  Entitled “Nietzsche and Music,” the article 
examines Nietzsche’s aesthetic and tragic philosophy.  The essay is mostly a restatement 
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of the central arguments in The Birth of Tragedy.
7
  The impact of Nietzsche’s work, 
however, can be seen as late as 1955.  That year Camus was asked to speak about the 
future of tragedy.  In his remarks, Camus reveals his continued fidelity to Nietzsche.  Of 
Euripides, for instance, Camus says: he “upset the tragic balance by concentrating on the 
individual and on psychology.  He is thus a forerunner of individualistic drama, that is to 
say, of the decadence of tragedy.”8  Camus then depicts Descartes as the philosophical 
equivalent of Euripides.  Specifically, Camus argues that Descartes reduced man’s 
relationship to experience by encouraging a shift from passionate ritual to “individual 
reason.”9  To emphasize his resistance to reason, Camus insists that a renaissance in 
tragic art is possible only because 
The world that the eighteenth-century individual thought he could conquer 
and transform by reason and science has in fact taken shape, but it’s a 
monstrous one.  Rational and excessive at one and the same time, it is the 
world of history.  But at this degree of hubris, history has put on the mask 
of destiny.  Man doubts whether he can conquer history; all he can do is 
struggle within it.
10
 
These parallels are worth noting as they suggest that Camus developed his aestheticism 
against the backdrop of Nietzsche.  They also suggest that Camus’ epistemological 
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skepticism, which is not apparent until later, was shaped early on by Nietzsche’s critique 
of reason.
11
 
This aspect of the Camus-Nietzsche relationship has received considerable 
attention in the literature.  Germaine Bree, for instance, mentions this in her study of 
Camus: 
Camus draws on his conception of the fundamental nature of tragedy from 
the Greeks, but within the Nietzschean perspective: tragedy is born of the 
conflict between two equally strong, equally valid antagonistic forces, 
man’s passionate assertion of his freedom and will to live, and the 
irreducible natural order to which he must first submit.  Since there can be 
no real final reconciliation between these forces, man inevitably goes 
down to his doom.  But tragedy contains a revelation: in the tragic 
universe man, the victim of a fate incomprehensible to him in rational 
terms, becomes through his struggle with death and suffering the 
conscious participant in a higher order of greatness which surpasses him.  
The hour of death in which tragedy culminates is, therefore, for hero and 
audience alike, the hour of truth. Camus is quite familiar with the Apollo-
Dionysus opposition.”12 
 
Bree offers an important insight here, but it remains undeveloped.  Of the few studies that 
do pursue this facet of Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche, two in particular stand out.  The 
first is James Arnold’s analysis of Camus’ play Caligula.  Arnold’s work is notable for its 
exposition of the evolution of the Caligula manuscript, which Camus began in 1938 and 
presented on stage in 1944.  Concerning Caligula Arnold makes two general claims.  
First, that Camus attempted to work out an aesthetic of modern tragedy and “that this 
aesthetic derives directly from Nietzsche.”13  Second, that the changes Camus made to 
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the manuscript reflect his growing concern with absurdity.
14
  Arnold’s study focuses on 
the dramatic structure of Caligula; much of it is therefore beyond the scope of the present 
inquiry.  However, Arnold’s findings support two claims I intend to develop over the 
course of this project.  The first is that Camus originally found in Nietzsche a justification 
for his early sensualism.  Indeed, Arnold writes that Camus discovers in Nietzsche “a 
confirmation of his own tendency toward a pagan mysticism.”15  Although Arnold 
discusses this in the context of Camus’ tragic aesthetic, it nevertheless speaks to 
Nietzsche’s influence on Camus’ early Mediterranean disposition.  By convincing Camus 
of the limits of reason and Western metaphysics more generally, Nietzsche stimulates 
Camus’ sensualist inclinations.  Arnold’s analysis also supports my larger claim that 
Camus begins to diverge from Nietzsche as he pivots to his absurdist period.  The 
thematic shift in Caligula, which Arnold rightly associates with the era’s political 
turmoil, signals an important transition in Camus’ intellectual life.  As noted, the specter 
of nihilism redirected Camus’ attention away from narrow existential concerns and 
towards the political realities of the mid-twentieth century.  Arnold’s study, if only 
obliquely, identifies the reasons for this shift. 
The second notable study is George Sefler’s comparative analysis of Nietzsche 
and Camus’ aesthetical theories.  Sefler’s inquiry focuses mostly on the relationship 
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between art and revolt.
16
  However, Sefler also touches upon Nietzsche’s early 
importance to Camus: “Both culturally and academically, Camus matured in a world 
tinged with Nietzschean hues.”17  Sefler’s conclusion is important, as it is consistent with 
the claim herein that from 1932 onwards Camus is defining his philosophical world in 
Nietzschean terms.  As for Camus’ aesthetics, Sefler writes: “Life is without structure, 
without design.  In art, it is given somewhat of a design, a style . . . this is Camus’ 
aesthetical theory.”18  Apart from its obvious indebtedness to Nietzsche, Camus’ 
aesthetics points to Nietzsche’s broader significance.  For one, as Sefler concludes, 
Camus clearly “built upon a Nietzschean foundation, altering, modifying, and rejecting 
elements of his thought.”19  Though Sefler is referring to Camus’ aesthetical theory, his 
conclusion applies equally to Camus’ absurd and rebellious thought.  That is to say, the 
notion that life is without structure or design informs all of Camus’ philosophical 
investigations.  In both The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel, for example, this 
Nietzschean premise is presupposed – and Nietzsche is often referenced.  Sefler explains 
the minor dissimilarities between Camus and Nietzsche’s aesthetics by pointing to the 
context in which they were developed: “Unlike Camus who develops his philosophy of 
art primarily in a context of social thought, Nietzsche propounds his in an essay of, 
among other themes, classical Greek culture.”20  To Sefler’s account I would add the 
following: the social context out of which Camus’ aesthetics emerged is also the context 
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out of which his moral and political thought emerged; therefore, to the extent that it 
explains Camus’ and Nietzsche’s diverging aesthetical theories, it also explains the 
incongruity among their moral and political philosophies.  That Camus never abandons 
his Nietzschean premises, despite drawing different conclusions, suggests two things: that 
Camus was determined to ground his thought within a Nietzschean framework and that 
Camus’ divergence from Nietzsche was more politically than philosophically motivated.  
There is yet another 1932 essay in which Camus appears to engage Nietzsche 
directly.  In “The Philosophy of the Century,” Camus critically examines the prominent 
French philosopher Henri Bergson.  A proponent of experience and intuition, Bergson 
appealed to Camus for similar reasons as Nietzsche.  Camus, in fact, describes Bergson’s 
philosophy as a “defense of direct knowledge, of intuition . . . It pleaded the case for the 
immediate givens of our awareness.  It also cautioned against the dangers of analysis; that 
is to say, against reason and the intelligence.”21  The exuberance with which Camus 
writes of Bergson is difficult to overstate.  “There is nothing more attractive than this 
idea: to set the intelligence aside as dangerous, to base a whole system of immediate 
knowledge and raw sensation . . . The philosophy was awaited and ought, in fact, to have 
been able to play the role of religion in our century.”22  The Bergson piece is notable for 
three reasons.  First, it illuminates Camus’ early anti-foundationalism, which is not anti-
reason so much as opposed to a certain species of rationalism.  At any rate, though 
undeveloped, Camus’ absurdism can already be seen in this refusal to rationalize the 
world.  Second, because Camus invokes Nietzsche in his dismissal of Bergson, it 
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suggests that Nietzsche helped to define the parameters of Camus’ philosophical 
worldview.
23
   Third, it helps to clarify Camus’ enduring interest in Nietzsche’s radical 
skepticism. 
Camus’ early engagement with Nietzsche points to a final parallel in terms of 
their larger projects.  Nietzsche constantly celebrates the affirmative character of tragic 
art.  In Ecce Homo, his final work, Nietzsche restates this conviction: “The highest art in 
the saying of yea to life, tragedy, will be born again when mankind has knowledge of the 
hardest, but most necessary of wars, behind it, without, however, suffering from that 
knowledge.”24  Here Nietzsche equates affirmation with acceptance.25  When Nietzsche 
condemns idealism and its various manifestations, moreover, it is really the consequences 
of these phenomena that he opposes.  By design they deny the sources of anguish – 
untruth, impermanence, irrationality, purposelessness.  However, to console they must 
conceal their illusory origins.
26
  For Nietzsche, this accounts for many of late modernity’s 
metaphysical conflicts.  The importance of these insights to Camus’ absurdism will be the 
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subject of subsequent chapters.  Here I want to suggest that Nietzsche’s emphasis on 
affirmation or acceptance influenced Camus long before his absurdist period. 
The connections between Nietzsche’s aestheticism and Camus’ sensualism 
become mores explicit in Camus’ 1935 dissertation on Christian metaphysics.  Here 
Camus rejects Gnosticism on both aesthetic and sensualist grounds.  In his defense of 
Plotinus, for instance, Camus echoes Nietzsche’s praise of the pre-Socratics in The Birth 
of Tragedy.
27
  As for Gnosticism, Camus regards it as life-denying and sides instead with 
Plotinus, whose “artist’s point of view” he admired.28  Here again Camus’ remarks are 
reminiscent of Nietzsche’s claims in The Birth of Tragedy.29  In any case, I note Camus’ 
refutation of Gnosticism because it reveals the increasingly Nietzschean prism through 
which Camus interprets the world.  Already suspicious of reason, Camus views the world 
largely in aesthetic terms; indeed, his critique of the Gnostics is rooted in his conviction 
that Gnosticism is itself an aesthetic (and negative) judgment of the world.  Such a view 
is consistent with (and indeed identical to) many of Nietzsche’s objections to 
Christianity.
30
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 In 1937, just two years after completing his dissertation, Camus gave a lecture at 
the Communist Party Cultural Center in Algiers in which he defended Mediterranean 
culture.  The lecture is noteworthy for two reasons.  First, in praising Mediterranean 
culture, Camus criticizes Christianity in Nietzschean terms.  Originally, Camus argues, 
Christianity was otherworldly, “a moving but hermetic teaching, primarily Judaic in 
character.”31  However, once Christianity entered the Mediterranean, it was naturalized.  
It was “Francis of Assisi, a Mediterranean, who turned Christianity from a religion of 
inner torment into a hymn to nature and naïve joy.”32  Camus’ depiction of Christianity as 
life-denying is mirrored in Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols, which we know Camus was 
reading at the time.
33
  In the section “Morality as Anti-Nature,” for example, Nietzsche 
condemns early Christianity for its “hostility to life” and its “extirpation of sensuality.”34  
Camus’ critique of Christianity’s “inner torment” is also prefigured in Nietzsche’s 
account of Christian “revengefulness.”35  The second noteworthy aspect of the lecture is 
Camus’ remarks on the Greeks and Romans.  Camus begins by condemning the Roman 
obsession with “puerile abstraction and reasoning,” which he says is too neglectful of 
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experience.
36
  The Greeks, on the other hand, were more appreciative of nature and the 
sensual life.  “What we take from Mediterranean culture,” therefore, “is not the taste for 
reasoning and abstraction but the life – the streams, the cypresses, the bouquets of color.  
It is Aeschylus, not Euripides, the Doric Apollos, not the copies in the Vatican.”37  
Camus also laments the decadence of post-Euripidean Greece, just as Nietzsche does in 
The Birth of Tragedy.
38
  In any case, Camus’ defense of Greek philosophy closely 
resembles Nietzsche’s.  And while the parallels are by no means conclusive, they do 
suggest that Nietzsche informed Camus’ early sensualist disposition. 
 Between 1937 and 1938, Camus wrote a series of essays that were published 
separately under the titles “The Wrong Side and the Right Side” (1937) and “Nuptials” 
(1938).  These works are dominated by sensualist and momentist themes.  As Philip 
Thody writes in the preface to Lyrical and Critical Essays, Camus is 
 exploring within the context of his own experience, the ideas of the 
absurdity of the world, the inevitability of death, and the importance of the 
physical life . . . The Camus that emerges from these pages is, on an 
intellectual level, the young pagan rejecting Christianity, and the 
Mediterranean sensualist already preparing that criticism of Northern 
metaphysics which informs The Rebel.
39
 
 
Thody’s emphasis on the early signs of Camus’ absurdist thought as well as his critique 
of metaphysics is especially important in this context.  Already Camus is attuned to the 
absurd and its implications for human life.  Nietzsche is a critical catalyst for Camus in 
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this respect.  Indeed, Camus was deeply troubled by the nihilistic implications of 
Nietzsche’s thought.  “The ambitions of a Lucien de Rubempre or a Julien Sorel often 
disconcert me in their naiveté and their modesty,” Camus writes in the introduction to 
“The Wrong Side and the Right Side,” but “Nietzsche’s . . . overwhelm me, precisely 
because of his failure.”40  Here Camus seems to be referring to Nietzsche’s inability to 
wrest meaning (beyond individual self-affirmation) out of his deconstruction of 
metaphysics.   
In “The Wrong Side and the Right Side,” Camus takes up a number of 
Nietzschean motifs, including beauty, creative affirmation, and worldliness.  In the 
opening essay, for example, Camus condemns idealists for their denial of life.  Man’s 
“kingdom is of this world,” he declares.41  Throughout this collection, Camus uses 
Nietzschean language to explore affirmative responses to absurdity.  As Thody 
suggested, Camus urges acceptance of life’s contradictions without illusion or false hope.  
As I argue below, this is a distinctly Nietzschean injunction.  
Camus’ early notebooks also suggest that he was constantly grappling with 
Nietzsche.  There is a particular entry in which Camus cites the following passage from 
Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols: “Nietzsche: It is to the most spiritual souls, assuming 
them to be the most courageous, that it is given to live out the most painful tragedies.  But 
it is for this reason that they honor life, because it is to them that it shows its greatest 
hostility.”42  That Camus was writing about the tragic nature of existence at the same time 
that he was reading Nietzsche is hardly surprising.  But what Camus is most influenced 
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by is Nietzsche’s affirmative ethos.  “The great courage,” Camus wrote in 1937, “is still 
to gaze as squarely at the light as at death.”43  Although there are critical differences 
between Camus and Nietzsche at this point, the momentism of Camus’ early thought is 
closely related to his embrace of Nietzsche.  Indeed one of the earliest imperatives Camus 
draws from Nietzsche is that the lack of transcendent purpose means one ought to be 
more attentive to present experience.  
Nietzsche’s influence persists in “Nuptials,” Camus’ second collection of essays.  
One of Camus’ most astute biographers, Germaine Bree, has argued that the four essays 
of Nuptials “constitute a simple but sumptuously orchestrated spiritual credo: there is no 
after-life; each man’s life is an end in itself with no significance in terms of a personal 
God; we die and our kingdom is of this earth.”44  Bree’s interpretation of “Nuptials” is 
more than justified, and the credo she identifies is equally applicable to Nietzsche’s texts.  
But more importantly, the themes of “Nuptials” reflect Camus’ continued dialogue with 
Nietzsche.  For example, the first essay, “Nuptials at Tipasa,” is replete with Nietzschean 
affirmations of life and nature.
45
  The same is true of “Wind at Djemila,” where Camus’ 
momentism is equally clear: “If I obstinately refuse all the later on’s of this world, it is 
because I have no desire to give up my present wealth.”46  In the final essay, “Summer in 
Algiers,” there is also a Nietzschean emphasis on beauty and the body, which can be seen 
in Camus’ admiration of Algerian life: 
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Intelligence does not occupy the same place here that it does in Italy . . . 
This race is indifferent to the mind.  It worships and admires the body . . . 
These people, wholly engaged in the present, live with neither myths nor 
consolation.  Investing all their assets on this earth, they are left 
defenseless against death.  The gifts of physical beauty have been heaped 
upon them.  And, also the strange greediness that always goes along with 
wealth that has no future.  Everything people do in Algiers reveals a 
distaste for stability and a lack of regard for the future.
47
 
 
There are numerous textual parallels in these essays, but those cited above suffice to 
establish the general tone of Camus’ early non-fiction.   
Camus’ Early Fiction 
 In his first novel, A Happy Death, Camus engages Nietzsche through the 
exploration of two key notions: acceptance and affirmation.  Nietzsche’s conception of 
affirmation and acceptance are best expressed through his doctrines of eternal recurrence 
and amor fati, both of which are at the core of Nietzsche’s affirmative ethos.  This section 
begins, therefore, with a brief explication of these doctrines.  This will help to connect the 
life-affirming sensualism of Camus’ fiction to its roots in Nietzsche’s metaphysics.   
 There are sporadic references to eternal recurrence throughout Nietzsche’s texts.  
The doctrine first appears in The Gay Science (1882), where Nietzsche introduces it in 
the form of a parable and a question: 
What, if some day or night, a demon were to steal after you into your 
loneliest loneliness and say to you” “This life as you now live it and have 
lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and 
there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every 
thought and sign and everything unutterably small or great in your life will 
have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence . . . Would 
you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse them demon 
who spoke thus?  Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment 
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when you have answered him: ‘You are a god and never have I heard 
anything more divine.
48
 
That Nietzsche introduces his theory of the eternal recurrence in this way is instructive.  
It speaks to his intent, which is to offer eternal return as a test of one’s relation to life.  
How one responds to the demon’s message, Nietzsche implies, will reveal to what extent 
one has affirmed one’s own existence.49   
 Of the texts in which Nietzsche writes of eternal recurrence, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra is the most important.  Indeed, Nietzsche later considered eternal return “the 
fundamental idea of the work.”50  This is evident in the text as well, as Zarathustra is said 
to be the definitive teacher of this doctrine.
51
  Concerning the meaning of the eternal 
return, Zarathustra says: 
 Behold, we know what you teach: that all things recur eternally, and we 
ourselves too; and that we have already existed an eternal number of 
times, and all things with us.  You teach that there is a great year of 
becoming, a monster of a great year, which must, like an hourglass, turn 
over again and again so that it may run down and run out again; and all 
these years are alike in what is greatest as in what is smallest; and we 
ourselves are alike in every great year, in what is greatest as in what is 
smallest.
52
 
Zarathustra’s description of eternal recurrence is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s account in 
The Gay Science.  In both texts eternal return functions as a test of one’s love of life.  
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There is also an implied cosmology according to which all things recur; however, this is 
intended to underscore the absence of a higher meaning or goal – it urges acceptance of 
life as it is, as pure becoming.  For this reason, Nietzsche’s cosmology should be seen as 
secondarily important.  This point has been made by Alexander Nehamas, who similarly 
argued that the philosophical “use Nietzsche makes of the eternal recurrence does not 
require that this highly doubtful cosmology be true or even coherent.”53  Nehamas also 
maintains that Nietzsche’s cosmological claims have in fact obscured the most important 
aspects of eternal recurrence, “which is the psychological consequences he draws from 
the recurrence.”54  By psychological consequences Nehamas means the behavioral 
imperative of Nietzsche’s doctrine.  Nietzsche is describing (in The Gay Science and 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra) the “attitude one must have toward oneself in order to react with 
joy and not despair to the possibility that the demon raises.”55  Following Nehamas, I 
regard this as the central aim of the eternal return.   
Additional support for this interpretation can be found in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.  
In the section “On the Vision and the Riddle,” Zarathustra likens eternal recurrence to a 
vision that recalls the demon’s message in The Gay Science.  Indeed, Zarathustra repeats 
the demon’s question to a dwarf he encounters in the wilderness:  
Behold . . . this moment!  From this gateway, Moment, a long, eternal lane 
leads backward: behind us lies an eternity.  Must not whatever can walk 
have walked on this lane before?  Must not whatever can happen have 
happened, have been done, have passed by before?  And if everything has 
been there before – what do you think, dwarf, of this moment?56 
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To this Zarathustra adds what the demon only implied: “Courage . . . is the best slayer – 
courage which attacks: which slays even death itself, for it says, Was that life? Well then! 
Once More!”57  Courage, then, is the willingness to face life (and death) without 
shrinking from it.  Whoever responds affirmatively (and creatively) to the demon’s 
message is courageous in precisely this sense.
58
  In his final text, Ecce Homo (1888), 
Nietzsche confirms his intent: 
The psychological problem presented by the type Zarathustra is, how can 
he, who in an unprecedented manner says no, and acts no, in regard to all 
that which has been affirmed hitherto, remain nevertheless a yea-saying 
spirit?  How can he who has the hardest and most terrible grasp of reality, 
and who has thought the most abysmal thoughts, nevertheless avoid 
conceiving these things as objections to existence, or even objections to 
the eternal recurrence of existence?
59
 
Nietzsche’s meaning is clear: one can either see in eternal recurrence an imperative to act 
and create or one can deny it on account of its implications for one’s own life.  For 
Nietzsche, however, only the former can be both happy and honest; for the latter, 
happiness demands delusion and resignation.   
 Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence has been subject to myriad interpretations in the 
literature.  Among the most influential is Walter Kaufmann’s.  For Kaufmann, eternal 
recurrence is the culmination of Nietzsche’s affirmative (and momentist) philosophy.  As 
a doctrine, eternal recurrence is a product of Nietzsche’s “supra-historical point of 
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view.”60  It was Nietzsche’s attempt to eternalize the moment and to describe the proper 
affective response to becoming.
61
  In a world of becoming, the moment is everything; 
there is no beginning or beyond: there is only the present.  In this way, Kaufmann regards 
eternal recurrence as a manifestation of Nietzsche’s opposition to teleological notions of 
progress or salvation.
62
  To support this claim Kaufmann points to a revealing passage in 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra: 
Pain too is a joy . . . Have you ever said yes to a single joy?  O my friends, 
then you said Yes too to all woe.  All things are entangled, ensnared, 
enamored; if you ever wanted one thing twice, if ever you said, You 
please me, happiness!  Abide, moment!  Then you wanted all back.  All 
anew, all eternally, all entangled, ensnared, enamored – oh, then you loved 
the world. Eternal ones, love it eternally and evermore; and to woe too, 
you say: go, but return! For all joy wants – eternity.63 
In this passage Nietzsche’s message of acceptance (this-worldliness) is apparent; it 
includes the embrace of suffering and joy, both of which are indispensable to life and 
growth.
64
  In the end, then, eternal recurrence is more than a divinization of the moment; 
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it is, as Kaufmann observes, “the most extreme repudiation of any deprecation of the 
moment, the finite, and the individual – the antithesis of any faith in infinite progress.”65 
Mostly concurring with Kaufmann, Arthur Danto has argued that eternal 
recurrence both denies telos and “entails the meaninglessness of things.”66  Like 
Kaufmann, Danto claims that Nietzsche’s intent was to posit eternal repetition as an 
imperative to will meaning and impose form.  This is also the sense in which Danto 
imagines eternal recurrence as a momentist imperative: “It does not matter that we pass 
away and return and pass away again.  What counts is what we eternally do . . . and the 
meaning we give to our lives.”67  The interpretation set forth here is entirely consistent 
with Danto’s momentist reading of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence. 
More recently, Maudemarie Clark has interpreted Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence 
as a “practical doctrine,” designed to help human beings “become the kind of person who 
. . . would consider the demon’s message divine.”68  Following Solomon (1993) and other 
commentators, Clark considers eternal recurrence a “device for articulating Nietzsche’s 
ideal of the life-affirming person.”69  For Clark, eternal recurrence is directed at two ends, 
both of which concern overcoming.  The first involves acceptance of life as an end unto 
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itself.  Eternal recurrence, in other words, means one must be willing “to engage in the 
same activities again and again, even if one had no hope of the goal being finally 
achieved.”70  The second end at which eternal recurrence aims is the overcoming of 
“moral condemnation.”71  Here Clark refers to the importance of conquering resentment, 
envy, and other forms of moral judgment.
72
  For the present inquiry, it is important to 
stress Clark’s focus on acceptance and affirmation as key aspects of Nietzsche’s eternal 
recurrence doctrine.  Much of the debate in the literature orbits around Nietzsche’s 
recurrence cosmology; however, this is largely unrelated to Camus’ interaction with 
Nietzsche.  Here it suffices to note the scholarly agreement regarding the life-affirming 
implications of eternal recurrence, as this is what most influenced Camus’ early fiction. 
Before turning to Nietzsche’s concept of amor fati, it is worth noting that the joint 
themes of eternal recurrence and affirmation appear on at least three occasions in 
Dostoevsky’s novels as well. First, in The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky introduces 
the concept when the devil tells Ivan that “our present earth may have been repeated a 
billion times” and “that the same sequence may have been repeated endlessly and exactly 
the same way to every detail.”73   
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Second, in The Idiot, Prince Muishkin expresses the idea while recounting a memory of 
an execution:  
The repugnance to what must ensure almost immediately, and the 
uncertainty, were dreadful . . . but worst of all was the idea, ‘What should 
I do if I were not to die now?  What if I were to return to life again?  What 
an eternity of days, and all mine!  How I should grudge and count up 
every minute of it, so as to waste not a single instance!’ He said that this 
thought weighed so upon him and became such a terrible burden upon his 
brain that he could not bear it.
74
 
 
 Lastly, in The Possessed, Kirilov experiences a brief vision of eternity, which he 
describes to Shatov as follows:  
There are seconds – they come five or six at a time – when you suddenly 
feel the presence of eternal harmony in all its fullness.  It is nothing 
earthly.  I don’t mean that it is heavenly, but a man in his earthly 
semblance can’t endure it…It is as though you suddenly apprehended all 
nature.
75
  
 
The question of whether and to what extent Dostoevsky influenced Nietzsche in this 
respect is beyond the present inquiry.  The focus here is on Nietzsche, as he was the first 
to formally develop these doctrines.  However, that these themes appear also in 
Dostoevsky only adds to the thrust of my larger claim concerning the influence of both 
writers on Camus’ intellectual development. 
 Nietzsche’s doctrine of amor fati (love of fate) is inextricably linked to eternal 
recurrence.  In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche describes amor fati thus: “My formula for 
greatness in man,” he writes, “is amor fati: the fact that a man wishes nothing to be 
different, either in front of him or behind, or for all eternity.”76  Previously, eternal 
recurrence was understood as an experiential test resulting from one’s awareness of the 
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repetition of things.  Amor fati is best understood as the attitude that corresponds to this 
experience; or, as Maudemarie Clark suggests, amor fati “the attitude of one who affirms 
eternal recurrence.”77  Amor fati is therefore a love of necessity, of the fact that, as 
Nietzsche writes in The Twilight of the Idols, one’s existence is bound to “the fatality of 
all that which has been and will be.”78  With amor fati, Nietzsche also points to the 
interrelatedness of things.  To love fate is to realize that one’s existence is the product of 
all that has happened, and that nothing in that chain of events is dispensable; Nietzsche 
considers this the highest affirmation of life possible.  Kaufmann’s account of amor fati 
captures the importance of interconnectedness well: 
The projection of one’s feeling toward oneself upon a cosmic scale may 
seem to hinge on a metaphysical premise, but it can be defended 
empirically.  That I am here, now, doing this – that depends on an awe-
inspiring series of antecedent events, on millions of seemingly accidental 
moves and decisions, both by myself and many others whose moves and 
decisions in turn depended on yet other people.  And our very existence, 
our being as we are, required that our parents had to choose each other, not 
anyone else, and beget us at the precise moment when we were actually 
begotten; and the same consideration applies to their parents, and to all our 
ancestors, going back indefinitely.  Thus any affirmation of the present 
moment points far beyond the present.
79
 
Understood in this way, it is apparent why Nietzsche thought amor fati such a life-
affirming attitude.  Additionally, Kaufmann’s explanation helps to clarify the connections 
between amor fati, eternal recurrence, and Nietzsche’s momentism.  These connections 
are emphasized here because together they inform so much of Camus’ early writings.  As 
I argue in the following section, this is particularly true of Camus’ novel A Happy Death.   
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A Happy Death 
Although unpublished until 1971, A Happy Death was written between 1936 and 
1938.  The story revolves around the life of a French Algerian clerk named Patrice.  Like 
Camus’ second novel, The Stranger, the narrative is divided into two parts, both of which 
explore the link between happiness and death.  Camus’ aim in A Happy Death is 
foreshadowed in the first part when Patrice experiences an epiphany of sorts: “If had the 
time, I would only have to let myself go.  Everything else that would happen to me would 
be like rain on a stone.  The stone cools off and that’s fine.  Another day, the sun bakes it.  
I’ve always thought that’s exactly what happiness would be.”80  This passage typifies the 
affirmative character of A Happy Death; it also points to the increasingly Nietzschean 
hue of the text.  As noted, sensualism, momentism, affirmation, and acceptance are 
interconnected in Nietzsche’s writings.  In A Happy Death, Camus incorporates these 
themes into a vision of worldly happiness.  Here Nietzsche’s influence can be seen in the 
language Camus uses to characterize Patrice’s evolution.  Considered alongside the 
concurrent (and previously examined) references to Nietzsche in Camus’ early notebooks 
and essays, this supports my contention that Nietzsche was a significant influence on the 
text.  
The two parts of A Happy Death are respectively titled “A Natural Death” and 
“Conscious Death.”  Both parts concern the pursuit of happiness, but it is not until the 
end, as Patrice nears death, that happiness is won.  In the first part, Patrice’s life is mired 
in routine; his job is tedious; his relationships are superficial; and his life bereft of 
meaning.  Initially, Patrice looks to nature for a model of happiness.  His hope, as 
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Germaine Bree notes, is “to achieve the impersonality of natural objects.”81  Increasingly, 
however, Patrice adopts a momentist orientation.  He seeks divinity in the most banal of 
encounters.  If Patrice “gave the usher too big a tip,” Camus writes, “it was because he 
did not know how else to pay for his joy, and because he worshipped, by making this 
everyday gesture, a divinity.”82  But this strategy is short-lived, as Patrice is continually 
undermined by his consciousness of death.  At this point sensualism emerges as a 
dominant theme. 
As the title implies, the second part of A Happy Death explores consciousness of 
death as both an impediment and a means to happiness.  In the first part, Patrice is unable 
to will happiness, and so falls into a state of ennui.  The story pivots when Patrice 
indifferently befriends Zagreus, a disabled neighbor.  In a series of conversations, 
Zagreus enjoins Patrice to embrace the sensual life.  “With a body like yours,” Zagreus 
says, “your one duty is to live and be happy.”83  Zagreus convinces Patrice to think less 
and to immerse himself in experience instead.
84
  Henceforth Patrice strives to live by this 
edict and, indeed, is annoyed when others speak of “ideas” as essential to happiness.85   
As the story shifts from the first to the second part, acceptance emerges as a 
dominant theme, and sensualism becomes the posture of one resigned to fate.  
Unsurprisingly, then, Nietzsche’s influence is most apparent in the second half of the 
novel.  For example, Patrice declares: 
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I know what kind of life I’d have.  I wouldn’t make an experiment out of 
my life: I would be the experiment of my life.  Yes, I know what passion 
would fill me with all its power.  Before, I was too young.  I got in the 
way.  Now I know that acting and loving and suffering is living, of course, 
but it’s living only insofar as you can be transparent and accept your 
fate.
86
   
Patrice’s emphasis on accepting fate seems to be an implicit allusion to Nietzsche.87  
However, it is not simply acceptance that Patrice urges, but acceptance of life “even in its 
thanklessness and filth.”88  Nietzsche, as we have seen, similarly exalted hardship and 
suffering.  Perhaps the clearest indication of Nietzsche’s influence can be seen near the 
end of the text, as he converses with his daughter, Catherine.  The conversation 
converges on the problem of happiness, and Catherine asks her father whether he is 
happy.  Unable to answer, Patrice says 
What matters to me is a certain quality of happiness.  I can only find it in a 
certain struggle with its opposite – a stubborn and violent struggle.  Am I 
happy? Catherine!  You know the famous formula – ‘If I had my live to 
live over again’ – well, I would live it over again just the way it has been. 
Of course you can’t know what that means.89 
Here the reference to Nietzsche is transparent.  For one, Patrice’s response restates the 
demon’s proposition in The Gay Science.  But even more suggestive are the words 
“famous formula.”  To what is Patrice (Camus) alluding if not Nietzsche’s eternal 
recurrence doctrine?   Moreover, in his final remarks, Patrice serenely affirms and 
accepts the world with a Nietzschean declaration of contentment:  
From his bed, Mersault received that impact, that offering, and he opened 
his eyes on the huge, curved, glistening sea irradiated with the smiles of 
his gods.  Suddenly he realized he was sitting on his bed, and that 
Lucienne’s face was very close to his. Slowly . . . there rose inside him a 
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stone which approached his throat.  He breathed faster and faster, higher 
and higher.  He looked at Lucienne.  He smiled without wincing, and this 
smile too came from inside himself.  He threw himself back on the bed, 
and felt the slow ascent within him.  He looked at Lucienne’s swollen lips 
and, behind her, the smile of the earth.  He looked at them with the same 
eyes, the same desire.  “In a minute, in a second,” he thought.  The ascent 
stopped.  And stone among the stones, he returned in the joy of his heart to 
the truth of the motionless world.
90
 
 
Here Patrice’s sensualist orientation to the world is clearly infused with a Nietzschean 
affirmation and acceptance of the earth.   
Lastly, Nietzsche’s influence is also evident in Camus’ thematic treatment of 
forgetfulness.
91
  In A Happy Death, forgetfulness is a means to momentist living as well 
as an essential part of happiness.
92
  “All the misery and cruelty of our civilization, “ 
Camus writes, “can be measured by this one stupid axiom: happy nations have no 
history.”93  As for Patrice, he does not so much accept suffering as learn to willfully 
forget it.  Part of happiness, he declares, is recognizing in oneself “that power to forget 
which only children have, and geniuses, and the innocent.”94  Forgetfulness is a recurring 
theme in Nietzsche’s writings.  In the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morality, 
Nietzsche writes 
Forgetfulness is no mere vis inertiae as the superficial believe; rather, it is 
an active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of suppression, and is 
responsible for the fact that whatever we experience, learn, or take into 
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ourselves enters just as little into our consciousness . . . To temporarily 
close the doors and windows of consciousness; to remain undisturbed by 
the noise and struggle with which our underworld of subservient organs 
works for and against each other; a little stillness, a little tabula rasa of 
consciousness so that there is again space for new things . . . that is the use 
of this active forgetfulness.
95
 
On Nietzsche’s account, forgetting quiets the pangs of consciousness so that one is 
continually open to the present.  In his essay on “The Use and Abuse of History,” 
Nietzsche praises forgetfulness by way of his distinction between historical and supra-
historical men.
96
  Historical men are oriented to the world such that 
Their vision of the past turns them towards the future, encourages them to 
persevere with life, and kindles the hope that justice will yet come and 
happiness is behind the mountain they are climbing.  They believe that the 
meaning of existence will be become ever clearer in the course of its 
evolution, they only look backward at the process to understand the 
present and stimulate their longing for the future.
97
 
Nietzsche sees the historical sense as a false disposition in which one’s absorption in the 
past and the future obscures the present.  For the supra-historical man, however, “the 
world is complete and fulfils its aim in every single moment.”98  Ultimately, Nietzsche 
commends the supra-historical attitude for its indifference to time and, more importantly, 
for its mastery of the “art of forgetting.”99  This Nietzschean attitude permeates Camus’ A 
Happy Death.  In addition to the more general sensualist motif, this text highlights the 
early influence of Nietzsche on Camus’ art and thought.   
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The Stranger 
Although The Stranger (1942) is generally considered an absurd work, I include it 
here for three reasons.
100
  First, A Happy Death is a precursor to The Stranger; for this 
reason, they ought to be examined jointly.  Second, The Stranger, perhaps more than A 
Happy Death, bears the stamp of Camus’ early sensualism.  Third, as Thomas Hanna 
reports, “The Stranger reflects a state of mind which was still exploring the ideas we see 
germinating in his [Camus’] early essays, Nuptials.”101  Additionally, although it is 
undeniably an absurd text, The Stranger does not reflect Camus’ mature absurdist 
thought.  Hanna has touched on the reasons for this: 
We can say with certainty that the hero of The Stranger [Mersault] is not 
exemplary of or explained by the principles later sketched out by Camus 
in The Myth of Sisyphus . . . The fact that Mersault lives with the 
indifference of an absurd hero but lacks the consciousness and revolt of 
the absurd hero, shows us that the philosophical clarity of The Myth of 
Sisyphus is not yet here present.
102
 
Hanna’s claim finds considerable support in the text.  The protagonist (Mersault) of The 
Stranger is closer to Patrice than to any other Camus character.  Mersault, for example, 
is not conscious of the absurd; he merely acts as though life is absurd; that is to say, 
instinctively.  In this way, he is an absurd character, but he is not yet an absurd hero.  
For these reasons, The Stranger is thematically similar to A Happy Death. 
Like A Happy Death, The Stranger explores happiness in an absurd context; its 
foremost themes are sensualism and momentism.  The central character of the story, 
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Mersault, is among Camus’ more mysterious figures.  He is an absurd man, but he also 
embodies innocence and a fidelity to a certain kind of life.  In a 1954 letter to a radio 
and television producer who was adapting The Stranger, Camus explains Mersault thus: 
“He simply exists, like the wind or a stone in the sun . . . If you interpret the book in this 
light, you will find in it a paean to sincerity and an at once ironic and tragic eulogy to 
worldly pleasure.”103  For Camus, then, Mersault is a model of sensualist living.  As he 
does in A Happy Death, Camus uses The Stranger to contrast sensualism (and 
happiness) with reflection.
104
  Indeed, Mersault is happy precisely in proportion to his 
immersion in immediate experience.  Several commentators, notably Robert Solomon, 
have noticed the anti-reflective themes in The Stranger.  For Solomon, The Stranger is 
principally a “book of phenomenology.”105  Mersault, he argues, illustrates the pitfalls 
of reflection: “to be aware of all the complexities of life is already to foreclose its 
simple, unreflective joys.”106  Solomon’s interpretation of Mersault is more than 
justified in the text.  Mersault is happiest when he is most attuned to physical existence.  
The sun, the sand, the sea, all of these he feels intensely.  Mersault, in other words, is 
completely unburdened by consciousness.  His momentist disposition is thus the source 
of his strength.   
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Even as Mersault awaits his execution and the Chaplain talks of the afterlife, he 
insists:   
 I don’t know why, but something inside me snapped.  I started yelling at 
the top of my lungs, and I insulted him and told him not to waste his 
prayers on me.  I grabbed him by the collar of his cassock.  I was pouring 
out on him everything that was in my heart, cries of anger and cries of joy. 
He seemed so certain about everything, didn’t he?  And yet none of his 
certainties was worth one hair of a woman’s head.  He wasn’t even sure he 
was alive, because he was living like a dead man.
107
 
Facing death, Mersault remains utterly indifferent to God or to thoughts of annihilation; 
instead, he can think only of sensual experiences (and memories).  He reacts violently to 
the Chaplain because he is overwhelmed by his desire to live again.  To Mersault, the 
Chaplain’s obliviousness to experience is revolting.  Mersault simply cannot understand 
the posture of the otherworldly man.  His final outburst [“none of his certainties was 
worth one hair of a woman’s head”] is an affirmation of Camus’ early momentism. 
 Thematically, The Stranger is similar to A Happy Death in its embrace of 
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence and amor fati doctrines.  For example, just before his 
death Mersault proclaims 
 For the first time in a long time I thought about Maman.  I felt as if I 
understood why at the end of her life she had taken a fiancé, why she had 
played at beginning again.  Even there, in that homes where lives were 
fading out, evening was a kind of wistful respite.  So close to death, 
Maman must have felt free then and ready to live it all again.  Nobody, 
nobody had the right to cry over her.  And I felt ready to live it all again 
too.  As if that blind rage had washed me clean, rid me of hope; for the 
first time, in that night alive with sings and stars, I opened myself to the 
gentle indifference of the world.
108
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Nearing death, as Solomon observes, Mersault finds peace in the thought “of an afterlife 
as a life merely repeated.”109  Mersault is also relieved by the realization that his is a 
common fate: 
I had lived my life one way and I could just as well have lived it another.  
I had done this and I hadn’t done that.  I hadn’t done this thing but I had 
done another.  And so?  It was as if I had waited all this time for this 
moment and for the first light of this dawn to be vindicated.  Nothing, 
nothing mattered, and I knew why.  So did he [the Chaplain] . . . What did 
other people’s deaths or a mother’s love matter to me; what did his God or 
the lives people choose or the fate they think they elect matter to me when 
we’re all elected by the same fate.110 
In both A Happy Death and The Stranger, joy begins with acceptance.  If Patrice and 
Mersault die happy deaths, it is because they accept death as part of life.  Indeed, as 
Germaine Bree points out, “life and death appear as one.”111  These absurd figures come 
to terms with death the moment they recognize it as inescapable and as an imperative to 
live.  Camus inherited this bit of wisdom from Nietzsche.  This is suggested in a March 
1942 notebook entry in which Camus writes: “The Eternal Return is easier to understand 
if it is imagined as a repetition of great moments – as if everything tended to reproduce or 
echo the climactic moments of humanity.”112   
 It will help to recapitulate what I have so far argued.  Concerning Camus’ early 
fiction, I have made two broad (and related) claims: first, that it is deeply informed by 
Nietzsche’s ideas regarding acceptance and affirmation of life; second, that Nietzsche’s 
affirmative ethos can be seen in Camus’ embrace of sensualism and momentism.  In 
support of these claims I have presented textual evidence as well as direct references to 
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Nietzsche by Camus.  We have seen the sensualism in Camus’ early fictional works, A 
Happy Death and The Stranger.  However, it appears most forcefully and dramatically in 
his play, Caligula.  Caligula is among Camus’ most fascinating works.  As mentioned, 
the text was revised over the course of several years and therefore reflects a thematic shift 
in Camus’ writings.  Because Caligula is a transitional work between Camus’ sensualist 
and absurd periods, it illuminates some of the reasons for his increasing interest in 
absurdity.  While Camus does not abandon his sensualism in Caligula, he does reveal its 
limitations. 
Caligula 
 Camus began work on Caligula around the same time he wrote A Happy Death.  
Caligula is the story of an emperor driven mad by the loss of his sister.  As the play 
begins, Caligula is announced missing.  We learn that he has gone “walking” for three 
days after hearing of his sister’s death.  Upon his return, Caligula is unrecognizable; but 
he appears to have discovered a truth, which is that “Men die, and they are not happy.”113  
With this declaration it becomes clear that Caligula has discovered the absurd by way of 
his sister’s death.  From this point forward Caligula institutes his reign of terror and the 
tragicomedy slowly unfolds.  Caligula’s calculated reaction to absurdity is to emulate it; 
specifically, he strives to mirror the world’s indifference.  “The world has no 
importance,” he says, and “I shall teach men the truth of this world, which is that it has 
none.”114  Caligula’s decree signals his intent to expose the ultimate equivalence of 
everything, especially of human values.  Much of his actions, therefore, aim to undermine 
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the foundations of social life.
115
  For the present inquiry, however, it is essential to focus 
on the characters surrounding Caligula, as they most reflect Camus’ sensualist 
aspirations.   
One of the more interesting aspects of Caligula is the tension it creates between 
absurdity and the sensual life.  Following his sister’s death, Caligula is consumed by the 
absurd, and his only desire is to disabuse others of their metaphysical illusions.  
Caligula’s designs, however, brings him into conflict with the other characters, each of 
whom, as Avi Sagi has justly observed, “share Caligula’s basic human experience, but 
draw different conclusions from it.”116  Caesonia, Caligula’s mistress, is a sensualist in 
the strictest sense.  She implores Caligula to “stop thinking” and to love in spite of the 
world’s cruelty: “You can’t prevent the sky from being the sky, or a fresh young face 
from aging, or a man’s heart from growing cold.”117  Caesonia, as Sprintzen argues, 
“speaks for the body and for love . . . She is of the moment, the immediate.”118  Caesonia 
is fully aware of the absurd, however.  She knows “that life’s a sad business” and that 
“there’s good and bad, high and low, justice and injustice.”  Her plea to Caligula is to 
realize “these will never change.”119  Scipio is the romantic, for whom Caligula maintains 
a distant affection.  Scipio embodies the poetical disposition; his love of life and nature is 
invigorated through his passions.  He urges Caligula to find solace in art and nature, 
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which “has cured wounds more serious” than Caligula’s.120  The union of aestheticism 
and sensualism in Scipio speaks to the essential indivisibility of these two doctrines.  
Indeed, in all of his sensualist writings, Camus treats sensualism as an outgrowth of 
aestheticism; it is the posture of the artist.  In any case, Scipio is ultimately overwhelmed 
by Caligula’s absurd logic, and he retreats into the background for much of the play.  The 
third and final character is Cherea.  Cherea is Caligula’s confidant and foe, and often he 
seems to be the voice through which Camus speaks.  Cherea is a humanist who 
emphasizes the importance of acting without the support of a normative system.  His only 
desire is to live humanely; as such, he is indifferent to the metaphysical problems posed 
by Caligula.  When pressed by Caligula to explain his indifference, Cherea explains: 
What I want is to live, and to be happy.  Neither, to my mind, is possible if 
one pushes the absurd to its logical conclusions . . . True, there are 
moments when, to feel free of them, I desire the death of those I love, or I 
hanker after women from whom the ties of family or friendship debar me. 
Were logic everything, I’d kill or fornicate on such occasions.  But I 
consider that these passing fancies have no great importance.  If everyone 
set to gratifying them, the world would be impossible to live in, and 
happiness, too, would go by the board.
121
 
Convinced that Caligula has made life impossible, Cherea joins with others in a plot to 
assassinate him.  His actions are motivated by a sense of solidarity with others.  Cherea 
accepts that life is meaningless, but he believes in human dignity.  If he is driven to 
extremism, it is because Caligula has forced his hand.  “I’ll be no party to your logic,” he 
tells Caligula, “I’ve a very different notion of my duties as a man.  And I know that the 
majority of your subjects share my view.  You outrage their deepest feelings.”122  
Although he is not expressly sensualist, Cherea does reflect Camus’ emphasis on 
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experience.  Thus he is not concerned with ideas or metaphysical problems; he merely 
defends the human order, without which happiness is impossible.  Sagi’s account of 
Cherea sums up his disposition quite well:  
Cherea’s answer is that the criterion rests on practical reasoning, prompted 
by the need to protect life and attain happiness.  No supreme idea, no 
values rooted in the transcendental are necessary to justify normative 
preferences; life and its needs direct our choices.  Against alienated, 
absurd rationality, Cherea offers a concrete human existence that 
embodies wants and needs.
123
 
 
 In terms of Camus’ larger philosophical development, Caligula is significant for 
two reasons.  First, the work is situated between Camus’ sensualist and absurd periods, 
which makes it an ideal transitional text.  Second, it is the first work in which Camus 
problematizes the absurd in political terms.  Again, Camus does not negate his 
sensualism in Caligula; instead he points to the political implications of absurdity.  In 
Caligula’s case, the absurd is carried to its logical conclusion and nihilism, which is the 
political manifestation of absurdity, overwhelms the social order.  The problem, 
therefore, is not so much sensualism but the existential threat posed by absurdity.  The 
sensual life, however desirable, cannot flourish apart from a meaningful human 
community.  And absurdity, particularly in Camus’ time, imperiled the very foundations 
of that community.  Consequently, beginning with Caligula, Camus’ sensualism is 
subsumed (not replaced) by his absurdist thought. 
Conclusion 
 Before turning to Camus’ absurdist writings, it is important to sum up Camus’ 
dialogue with Nietzsche in these early works.  To begin, Camus’ sensualist writings are 
apolitical.  As his essays suggest, Camus’ concerns are metaphysical and aesthetic.  
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Given Nietzsche’s radical aestheticism, it is unsurprising that Nietzsche figures so 
prominently in these texts.  Perhaps more than any other modern thinker, Nietzsche 
stressed the importance of creative engagement and of concrete action in the world.  This 
likely appealed to Camus, who discovered in Nietzsche a justification for his own 
sensualist orientation.   
 Camus’ sensualist literature appears to grapple with two fundamentally 
Nietzschean problems: how to accept life without illusions and how to affirm meaning in 
a world in which meaning is not given.  Camus engages Nietzsche’s doctrines of eternal 
recurrence and amor fati because these are the doctrines in which Nietzsche offers 
solutions to these problems.  In A Happy Death and The Stranger, Camus explores the 
possibilities for meaning and happiness in an implicitly absurd context.
124
  In both texts, 
Nietzsche’s doctrines provide Camus with an affirmative vision and with a means of 
eternalizing the moment, and Nietzsche’s ideas are expressed in the language of Camus’ 
sensualism.  In Caligula, however, Camus’ engagement with Nietzsche seems to shift.  
Previously, Camus does little in terms of developing Nietzsche’s ideas; he simply 
incorporates (and affirms) them in his own writings.  Caligula is the first instance in 
which Camus implicitly problematizes Nietzsche’s ideas.  This is apparent in the 
character Scipio, whom I mentioned briefly above.  Scipio’s silence before Caligula’s 
absurd logic foreshadows Camus’ philosophy of revolt, which he would begin to develop 
shortly after Caligula.  While Camus does not maintain that an absurd existence and a 
sensual life are incompatible, or that sensualism demands community, he does point to 
the necessity of collective revolt against the forces of absurdity.  As seen above, Caligula 
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is absurdity incarnate.  Similarly, Scipio represents the aesthetic-sensualist life.  That 
Scipio is overwhelmed by Caligula and that order is preserved by an act of revolt 
symbolizes the limitations (and dangers) of a sensualist mode of existence.  
 In the following chapter, these claims will be developed in greater detail.  I argue 
that Camus’ transition to absurdity is prompted not by a rejection of sensualism but by an 
increasing awareness of the inadequacy of an individualist response to absurdity.  What 
emerges is thus a sense of the limits of sensualism.  This becomes clear when Camus 
examines the problem of collective values in an absurd world.  Here, perhaps for the first 
time, Camus directly engages Dostoevsky.  Absurdity, negation, and political disorder are 
linked in crucial ways, and Camus’ account of consciousness and the factors that drive 
individuals to despair and crime begin to crystallize.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ABSURD PSYCHE 
“Work, worry, toil and trouble are indeed the lot of almost all men their whole life long. 
And yet if every desire were satisfied as soon as it arose how would men occupy their 
lives, how would they pass the time? Imagine this race transported to a Utopia where 
everything grows of its own accord and turkeys fly around ready-roasted, where lovers 
find one another without any delay and keep one another without any difficulty: in such a 
place some men would die of boredom or hang themselves, some would fight and kill one 
another, and thus they would create for themselves more suffering than nature inflicts on 
them as it is” – Arthur Schopenhauer  
 The individual’s confrontation with absurdity was a consistent theme in Camus’ 
early writings.  However, there is a shift in tone and emphasis in Camus’ absurdist 
literature.  Owing in part to his engagement with Dostoevsky, Camus becomes 
increasingly interested in consciousness and the psychological implications of absurdity.  
This is evident in Camus’ absurdist literature, where psychic turmoil is examined in a 
social context.  In this chapter, I locate key Dostoevskyian motifs in Camus’ three 
absurdist works: Caligula, The Stranger, and The Misunderstanding.  The aim is to show 
how Camus wrestles with Dostoevsky’s critical link between individual crime and 
political disorder.  In each of these texts, Camus engages Dostoevsky on a variety of 
problems, including negation, crime, solipsism, and self-consciousness.   
In the final section, Camus’ The Fall and Dostoevsky’s The Possessed and Notes 
From Underground are comparatively analyzed.  These works examine the plight of the 
conscious absurd man in similar ways, and the interaction with both Dostoevsky and 
Nietzsche is apparent.  The Fall is important because it represents a clear departure from 
Camus’ previous works.  Consciousness becomes a source of individuation and internal 
division.  The prereflective brand of consciousness personified by Mersault of The 
Stranger gives way to a new, debilitating reflection.  In The Fall, moreover, Camus 
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associates certain psychopathologies with social alienation and political nihilism.  And 
the connections Camus makes between these neuroses are based largely on Dostoevsky 
and Nietzsche’s insights into freedom, resentment, guilt, and alienation.  I begin, 
however, with a brief comparative analysis of Camus and Dostoevsky’s view of the 
individual’s confrontation with the absurd.  This will provide some needed context for the 
ensuing discussion of Caligula and The Stranger. 
Camus’ substantive engagement with Dostoevsky first emerges in Camus’ The 
Myth of Sisyphus.  Here Camus struggles to reconcile the individual’s desire for meaning 
with the absurd.    In this text (as well as the notes that accompany it), Camus engages 
Dostoevsky’s psychology directly.  Of particular importance is Dostoevsky’s link 
between nihilism, consciousness, and suffering.  For Dostoevsky, consciousness was a 
concomitant of suffering.  His most reflective characters are continually tortured by their 
own intellects.
1
  A typical example of this is Dostoevsky’s Underground Man, who 
declares at one point that “to think too much is a disease, a real, actual disease.”2  In the 
opening pages of The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus echoes this sentiment: “Undermined . . . a 
more exact word cannot be imagined.  Beginning to think is beginning to be 
undermined.”3  In the broader context of Camus’ thought, this is a crucial point.  In 
Camus’ early works, the absurd is an ontological situation.  In The Myth of Sisyphus, 
Camus is dealing not with the feeling of absurdity but the consequences of 
conceptualizing it.  At this point, awareness is such that thought begins to “undermine” 
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the thinker.  Much like Nietzsche, Camus associates consciousness with a tragic break 
between the individual mind and the world.
4
  Hence Camus insists that consciousness of 
futility is the source of Sisyphus’ suffering.  “If this myth is tragic, that is because its hero 
is conscious.”5  The nature of this suffering was expressed most vividly in Dostoevsky’s 
novels.  “Probably no one so much as Dostoevsky,” Camus writes, “has managed to give 
the absurd world such familiar and tormenting charms.”6   
As intimated below, Camus’ engagement with Dostoevsky’s psychology can also 
be seen in Camus’ tendency to link solipsism and estrangement.  Unlike his Marxist 
contemporaries, who linked estrangement to capitalist rule, Camus understood 
estrangement in terms of spiritual uprootedness.
7
  It was thus not a matter of simply 
replacing capitalism with communism for Camus.  Like Dostoevsky, Camus’ estranged 
characters suffer from a loss of meaning, a sense of isolation from the world and from 
others.  For Dostoevsky, this is the result of being deprived of a “higher idea” of life.  
Camus’ view of estrangement is essentially the same as Dostoevsky’s, although it is 
expressed in the language of Camus’ absurdism.  It was largely because of this overlap, 
as Lev Braun has suggested, that Camus thought Dostoevsky’s literature a more universal 
articulation of the absurd problem.
8
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Camus’ dialogue with Dostoevsky in The Myth of Sisyphus orbits around yet 
another absurd problem: suicide.  The central question in this text is whether an absurd 
life is worth living at all.  “There is but one truly philosophical problem,” Camus writes, 
“and that is suicide.”9  Camus’ discussion of suicide is deeply informed by Dostoevsky.  
Indeed Camus says explicitly that with Dostoevsky suicide becomes “an absurd theme.”10  
If life cannot be justified on its own terms, then the value of life as such is undermined.  
Suicide was an abiding concern for Dostoevsky as well, and it is why he thought belief in 
the immortality of the soul indispensable.  “Without the conviction of one’s immortality 
on Earth,” Dostoevsky wrote, “the links between man and earth slacken, become more 
fragile, decay, and the loss of the sense of life’s higher meaning . . . inevitably leads to 
suicide.”11   
In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus challenges Dostoevsky’s claim that absurdity 
leads inexorably to suicide.  Indeed Camus’ engagement with the problem of suicide in 
this text revolves around Kirilov, a character from Dostoevsky’s The Possessed who kills 
himself in response to his absurd condition.  Thomas Epstein has recently argued that 
Camus’ analysis of Kirilov is best seen as a response to Dostoevsky.  “Unlike the Kirilov 
that Dostoevsky gives us,” Epstein writes, “Camus’ absurd man does not want to become 
God . . . he wants to become a man, a man, who thus must not kill himself . . . He will be 
lucid and happy, like Sisyphus.”12  Epstein’s point here is correct.  Camus does in fact 
appear to argue against Dostoevsky’s logic in The Myth of Sisyphus.  At the same time, 
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however, Camus continues to struggle with Dostoevsky’s assertion that suffering and 
suicide follow from the absence of meaning.  Consider, for instance, the following two 
passages from Dostoevsky and Camus in which the logic of suicide is described in 
remarkably similar terms.  First, Dostoevsky: 
I condemn this nature which with such impudent lack of concern brought 
me into the world in order to suffer – I condemn it to be destroyed with 
me.  But since I cannot destroy nature, I shall therefore destroy myself 
expressly to show my disgust at having to endure a tyranny which cannot 
be ascribed to anyone.
13
 
 
In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus similarly writes: 
Living, naturally, is never easy.  You continue making the gestured 
commanded by existence for many reasons, the first of which is habit.  
Dying voluntarily implies that you have recognized, even instinctively, the 
ridiculous character of that habit, the absence of any profound reason for 
living, the insane character of that daily agitation, and the uselessness of 
suffering.
14
 
 
I note these parallels in order to show the degree to which Camus develops his absurd 
arguments in contrast to Dostoevsky.  By raising meaning and suffering as fundamental 
questions, Dostoevsky helps to define the absurd problem for Camus.  Even as late as 
1949, Camus continues to reflect on Dostoevsky’s thematic treatment of suicide in his 
notebooks: “One must love life before loving its meaning, Dostoevsky says.  Yes, and 
when the love of life disappears, no meaning consoles us for it.”15 
As an author of psychological realism, then, Dostoevsky was able to propound the 
absurd problem in all of its complexity.  It was this psychological dimension of 
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Dostoevsky’s literature that most influenced Camus’ conception of the absurd psyche.16  
In Camus’ sensualist writings, much like Dostoevsky’s novels, reflection is regarded as 
an impediment to happiness.  During his absurdist phase, however, there is a shift in 
Camus’ attitude.  The absurd is now the defining characteristic of modern life.  Thus 
when Camus describes thinking as “beginning to be undermined,” it is to say that 
consciousness of absurdity is an ineludible problem; it must be accepted without appeal 
or avoided through self-delusion.  The fundamental question for Camus, then, is how to 
live meaningfully with absurdity.   
To answer this question, Camus probed Dostoevsky’s most tortured characters.  
There was something about Dostoevsky’s heroes and their habit of questioning 
“themselves as to the meaning of life” that made them uniquely modern (and instructive) 
for Camus.
17
  For Dostoevsky, human beings suffer immensely in a world deprived of 
transcendence.  In many of his novels, the felt absence of meaning poisons life and saps 
the individual’s will.  In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky expresses this powerfully 
through the Grand Inquisitor: “For the mystery of human life is not only in living, but in 
knowing why one lives.  Without a clear idea of what to live for man will not consent to 
live and will rather destroy himself than remain on the earth.”18  Contrary to the early 
Camus, then, Dostoevsky discovered little metaphysical consolation in nature.  Instead it 
was faith, active love, and a belief in the immortality of the soul that sustained the 
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individual’s happiness and established a common bond between men.  Dostoevsky 
suggests, moreover, that such sublime ideas ought to be accepted on existential rather 
than empirical grounds.  In this sense, Dostoevsky was uninterested in truth as 
traditionally conceived.  Certain “ideas” were justified by their effects on the believer, by 
their capacity to promote internal harmony and social order.
19
  
In any case, at this point it appears that Camus and Dostoevsky disagree about 
what human beings require for happiness.  Camus’ dialogue with Dostoevsky becomes 
more complicated, however, when Camus begins to reflect on the relationship between 
absurdity and nihilism.  For example, in a late notebook entry, Camus summed up 
Dostoevsky’s thesis as follows: “The same paths that lead the individual to crime lead the 
society to revolution.”20  This became a guiding theme of Camus’ political thought.  In 
Camus, though, absurdity succeeds nihilism as the source of internal malaise.  But the 
factors leading individuals to crime are the same: egoism, self-assertion, hyper-
consciousness, a compulsion for logic, and a failure to acknowledge the other.  This can 
be seen in the protagonists of Camus’ three absurdist works of fiction.  In these texts 
Camus examines sources of modern alienation, and Dostoevsky’s insights inform much 
of his work. 
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The Stranger and Caligula 
In his notebooks, Camus wrote that “The Stranger described the nakedness of 
man facing the absurd.”21  The innocence of Mersault, the hero of The Stranger, is a 
reflection of this nakedness.  But Mersault does not so much face the absurd as give 
himself over to it.  As mentioned, it is not until the end that Mersault confronts absurdity 
in the form of his own mortality.  For much of the text, he exists moment to moment, 
with no awareness of others or of time itself.  Mersault’s solipsism is important for two 
reasons.  First, it is among the earliest indications of a burgeoning theme in Camus’ 
absurdist writings.  With Mersault Camus points to the consequences of an overly narrow 
response to absurdity.  If Mersault revolts against absurdity, he does so only as an 
individual.  Consequently, the absurd never assumes a social meaning and Mersault is 
unable to act with or on behalf of others.  Second, Mersault’s egoism points to an 
important thematic overlap with Dostoevsky.  On Dostoevsky’s view, self-transcendence 
was essential both to individual wellbeing and to social harmony.  Dostoevsky explores 
this in many of his novels, particularly The Brothers Karamazov and The Possessed.  In 
The Brothers Karamazov, the absence of self-transcendence blinds Ivan’s ethical 
intuition and leads inexorably to the death of his father.  There is a similar logic at work 
in The Stranger.  Although Ivan and Mersault differ in significant ways, they share a 
limited lucidity that acknowledges the absurd but fails to connect experientially with 
others.   
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The pivotal event in The Stranger is Mersault’s murder of an Arab man on the 
beach.  Though it is not clear at first why Mersault pulls the trigger, Camus offers a clue 
in his description: 
It occurred to me that all I had to do was turn around and that would be the 
end of it.  But the whole beach, throbbing in the sun, was pressing on my 
back . . . The Arab didn’t move . . . Maybe it was the shadows on his face, 
but it looked like he was laughing.  I waited.  The sun was starting to burn 
my cheeks, and I could feel drops of sweat gathering in my eyebrows.  
The sun was the same as it had been the day I’d buried Maman, and like 
then, my forehead especially was hurting me, all the vein in it throbbing 
under the skin.  It was this burning, which I couldn’t stand anymore, that 
made me move forward.  I knew that it was stupid, that I wouldn’t get the 
sun off me by stepping forward.  But I took a step, one step, forward.  And 
this time, without getting up, the Arab drew his knife and held it up to me 
in the sun.  The light shot off the steel and it was like a long flashing blade 
cutting at my forehead . . . My whole being tensed and I squeezed my 
hand around the revolver.  The trigger gave; I felt the smooth underside of 
the butt; and there, in that noise, sharp and deafening at the same time, is 
where it all started.  I shook off the sweat and the sun. I knew that I had 
shattered the harmony of the day.
22
 
 
The first thing to notice here is the absence of motive.  Mersault’s behavior is instinctive.  
If his actions are dictated by anything, it is external elements – the sun, the sweat on his 
brow, the bright light.  Indeed his only explanation is that it was “because of the sun.”  
Mersault’s failure appears to be a lack of attention.  He is overwhelmed by physical 
sensations.  David Sprintzen has emphasized the significance of this failure.  Mersault, he 
claims, enters “into complicity with the forces of destruction” because he fails “to 
maintain the necessary human distance from the forces of nature.”23  Sprintzen’s main 
contention, however, is that Mersault’s immersion in experience blinds him to the 
intersubjective reality in which he exists.  As a result Mersault reinforces absurdity by 
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unwittingly killing a man.  Sprintzen’s interpretation is persuasive, and it underscores my 
larger claim concerning the inadequacy of individual responses to (or revolts against) 
absurdity.  Ultimately, Mersault is guilty of paying attention to the wrong things.  He is 
attuned to his private sensations but completely indifferent to the experiences of others. 
 A similar theme re-emerges in the final draft of Caligula.
24
  Previously I noted the 
destruction wrought by Caligula’s individual revolt.25  Here I emphasize a parallel 
between The Stranger and Caligula concerning absurd awareness and individual crime.  
To begin with The Stranger, there is a revealing remark by Mersault just moments before 
he kills the Arab man: 
The sun glinted off Raymond’s gun as he handed it to me.  But we just 
stood there motionless, as if everything had closed in around us.  We 
stared at each other without blinking, and everything came to a stop there 
between the sea, the sand, and the sun, and the double silence of the flute 
and the water.  It was then that I realized that you could either shoot or not 
shoot . . . and it would come to absolutely the same thing.
26
 
In this passage Mersault appears suddenly aware of the equivalency of things: “I realized 
that you could either shoot or not shoot . . . and it would come to absolutely the same 
thing.”  With the exception of the closing scene, this is the only moment in which 
Mersault is fully conscious of the absurd.  Thomas Hanna points to this passage for 
similar reasons: “At this moment Mersault is more deeply aware than ever of the 
meaninglessness and indeterminacy of human life.”27  Hanna’s interpretation is correct, 
but here I want to stress the implications of Mersault’s absurd epiphany.  Mersault’s 
realization that everything comes to “absolutely the same thing” is preceded by an 
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awareness of the world’s indifference.  Here, in embryo, is the value problem posed by 
absurdity; that is, Mersault has moved directly from absurdity (meaninglessness) to an 
equivalency of values and actions.  If everything amounts to the same thing, it matters 
little whether Mersault shoots the man or walks away.  That Mersault pulls the trigger 
moments after his epiphany, however, only confirms its nihilistic implications.  
 In Caligula the value problem becomes explicit.  Consciousness is heightened and 
the logic of absurdity is carried to its extreme.
28
  Much like Ivan Karamazov, Caligula 
experiences what Roger Quilliot has aptly called a “crisis of the intellect.”29  This is 
dramatized in an exchange between Caligula and his confidant Cherea.  With implacable 
logic, Caligula reasons from absurdity to nihilism.  He then asks Cherea if he “believes in 
some higher principle?”  Cherea accepts Caligula’s nihilistic logic, but insists that “some 
actions are . . . more praiseworthy than others.”  Predictably, Caligula dismisses Cherea’s 
claim, maintaining instead “that all are on an equal footing.”30  Most relevant here is 
Caligula’s uncompromising logic.  Despite his desire for meaning, Caligula is trapped in 
a kind of absurd logic, as a result of which he is driven to destruction.  “Who can 
condemn me in this world,” he laments, “where there is no judge, where nobody is 
                                                 
28
 This is evident in Caligula’s desire to play the part of the Gods as well as his 
uncompromising quest to show people the ultimate meaninglessness of things. Caligula’s 
attitude prefigures what Camus would later call the “all or nothing attitude” of logical 
crime. 
29
 Roger Quilliot, The Sea and Prisons (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama 
Press, 1970), p. 47. 
30
 Albert Camus, Caligula and Three Other Plays, trans. Stuart Gilbert (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1958), p. 52. 
 76 
innocent . . . where nothing lasts?”31  Thus we know that Caligula’s nihilism follows 
directly from his absurd awareness.
32
   
Caligula and The Stranger are united by a common theme of the individual’s 
confrontation with absurdity.  Additionally, both Mersault and Caligula deduce the 
equivalency of things from the perceived indifference of nature.  Without a community of 
revolt or a sense of solidarity, they fall into crime and despair.  Caligula is more extreme, 
but this is attributable to his logical disposition and to his power.  In the case of Mersault, 
the absurd is either ignored or left unresolved.  Caligula, on the other hand, is too 
conscious to live with (or accept) absurdity; instead, he externalizes its inhumanity in 
order to liberate himself, and by doing so he plunges the human community further into 
chaos.
33
  In their own way, however, the actions of Mersault and Caligula mirror the 
absurd.  If there is a difference, it is that Caligula does so intentionally and with obvious 
indifference.   
 In The Brothers Karamazov, we also find the motif of crime and absurdity.  
Indeed, like Mersault, Ivan Karamazov unwittingly involves himself in an act of murder.  
Although Ivan does not commit murder, his absurd logic (which mirrors Caligula’s) 
facilitates the crime.  Since we know Camus was reading The Brothers Karamazov at the 
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same time he was writing The Stranger and Caligula, a brief comparative analysis seems 
justified.
34
  As noted previously, Mersault’s mistake is to act as though the world were 
absurd without realizing it.  Ivan errs in the opposite way; he acknowledges absurdity but 
the humanist impulse which emerges from his absurd awareness remains abstract; he 
never moves from theory to praxis.  Part of the reason for this is Ivan’s intellectual 
intransigence.  But it is also because he pays insufficient attention to those in whose name 
he revolts.  Ivan is determined to resolve the absurd in intellectual terms, just as Caligula 
is, and when he is unable to do so he abandons his original rebellious impulse.   
Ivan can be seen as an intellectual precursor to Mersault and Caligula insofar as 
he anticipates their logic and actions.  However, Ivan’s engagement with absurdity is 
strictly theoretical.  He perceives the meaninglessness of things and deduces that 
“everything is permitted,” but makes no effort to live out this edict; Caligula, as we have 
already seen, does the opposite.  Caligula and Ivan are therefore united only by their 
attachment to logic.  Ivan’s relation to Mersault is more concrete, however.  Despite their 
divergent dispositions and their complete lack of malice, both Ivan and Mersault become 
embroiled in murder.  In the case of Ivan, the victim is his own father, who is killed by 
Smerdyakov, a follower of Ivan and a servant in the Karamazov house.  Ivan learns of his 
father’s death in the following exchange with Smerdyakov: 
 Can you really not have known till now?” Smerdyakov asked once more.  
“No, I did not know. I kept thinking of Dmitri. Brother, brother! Ach!”  
He suddenly clutched his head in both hands.  “Listen. Did you kill him 
alone?  With my brother’s help or without?”  
“It was only with you, with your help, I killed him, and Dmitri 
Fyodorovitch is quite innocent.”  
“All right, all right.  Talk about me later.  Why do I keep on trembling?  I 
can’t speak properly.”  
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“You were bold enough then.  You said ‘everything was lawful,’ and how 
frightened you are now,” Smerdyakov muttered in surprise. 
“Was I so eager then, was I?” Ivan snarled again.  
“To be sure you were, and by your consent you silently sanctioned my 
doing it . . . and I am not the real murderer, though I did kill him.  You are 
the rightful murderer.
35
 
 
It is striking how similar Ivan’s predicament is to Mersault’s.  Ivan is both innocent and 
guilty.  He does not commit murder, but he tacitly consents to it.  Ivan no more desired 
the death of his father than Mersault sought to kill that Arab stranger, and yet both are 
somehow responsible.  Ivan’s nihilism, his “everything is permitted,” is the impetus for 
the crime.  Smerdyakov is a wayward spirit who has rejected God but still thirsts for 
transcendent guidance.
36
  Without God, Smerdyakov finds a justification for his base 
impulses in the ideas and logic of Ivan.  As Robert Louis Jackson suggests in his study of 
The Brothers Karamazov, Ivan’s “moral nature will not permit him openly to sanction the 
death of his father, but his ideas are picked up by his disciple Smerdyakov, who 
implements them with a ruthless logic.”37  At any rate, the point here is not that these 
episodes are analogous; rather, it is that they are guided by similar themes.  Caligula, 
Mersault, and Ivan cause suffering because they either pay attention to the wrong things 
or they accept moral license as a logical consequence of a Godless world.  Whether it is 
Mersault’s reflexive response to absurdity or Ivan and Caligula’s self-conscious 
obsession with its implications, each takes his behavioral cues from an absurd world.  
Because there is no consciousness of revolt and no recognition of the need to create 
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rather than justify values, these men are unable to reject (or resist) the absurd as a rule of 
action.  
The Misunderstanding 
 There is a continuation of these themes in Camus’ final absurdist work, The 
Misunderstanding.  Written in 1944, The Misunderstanding is the story of a son, Jan, who 
returns home after twenty years to reunite with his widowed mother and sister.  Jan hopes 
to share his wealth with his family, who run a small inn out of their home.  When Jan 
arrives, however, he is not recognized.  Inexplicably, he decides to conceal his identity 
and pose as a regular customer.  He requests a room and vows to objectively observe his 
family “from the outside.”  He is convinced that this will give him a “better notion of 
what makes them happy.”38  By all accounts, Jan is sincere in his desire to move his 
family from the country to his seaside home.  The tragedy unfolds as we learn that Jan’s 
sister, Martha, has long dreamed of leaving Europe to live “beside the sea.”39  In fact, 
Martha is so fixated on her goal that she immediately plots to rob and murder their new 
houseguest.  The misunderstanding is thus apparent: Jan and his family share the same 
goal, but their inability to communicate puts them at cross-purposes.  And it is not until 
Martha and her mother have already killed Jan that they discover his true identity. 
There are several ways to interpret The Misunderstanding.  Thomas Hanna reads 
the play as a meditation on individual revolt.  Thus his analysis centers on Martha.  On 
Hanna’s view, Martha consents to crime because she revolts angrily against the absurd.  
“The wretchedness of her present condition warrants any action which can give her the 
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irreplaceable experience of the sun and sea.”40  Hanna’s interpretation is just; however, 
Martha’s revolt also fails because of her solipsism.  The only suffering against which she 
revolts is her own: 
There is no love for me, so let her [the mother] die . . . all I wish is to be 
left in peace with my anger, my very rightful anger.  I have no intention of 
rolling my eyes heavenward or pleading forgiveness before I die . . . I hate 
this narrow world in which we are reduced to gazing up at God . . . I am 
suffering from the injustice done me . . . and I shall leave this world 
without being reconciled.
41
 
Martha cannot see beyond her own pain and longings.  Hence she has only two aims: “to 
get what I desire” and to “sweep away every obstacle on my path.”42  Martha makes no 
distinction between people and things.  This is why she kills with such ease.  Irina Kirk 
has come closest to this interpretation, arguing that Martha is “blind to mankind” and that 
her actions suggest “that pagan love for the earth must include a concern for one’s 
brother – for mankind – since man is bound both to this earth and to the other human 
beings on it.”43  
 More recently, Jeffrey Isaac has argued that Camus uses The Misunderstanding to 
emphasize the need for “mutual comprehension and dialogue.” 44  This is undeniably part 
of Camus’ intent.  As Camus notes later in The Rebel, “Every ambiguity, every 
misunderstanding, leads to death; clear language and simple words are the only 
salvation.
45”  But The Misunderstanding also concerns the individual’s failure to think 
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intersubjectively.  Like Patrice in A Happy Death, Martha pursues happiness in isolation.  
She has no concept of the other.  Thus she goes to her death alone and without the 
conciliations of love and communion.  In this sense, her fate speaks to the impossibility 
of happiness in a world in which isolated I’s narrowly fulfill their desires.46  Martha is 
blind to Jan’s intentions because her attention never extends beyond her wish to escape.  
Jan is seen only as a means to that end.  This is evident when Jan and Martha are alone in 
Jan’s room.  As Jan tries repeatedly to engage Martha in dialogue, even hinting at one 
point that they are related, Martha insists “that we should keep our distance.”47  Martha 
willfully avoids Jan in order to depersonalize him; for “it’s easier,” as the mother finally 
admits, “to kill what one doesn’t know.”48  Hanna has captured the symbolic significance 
of Martha and her mother: “Camus presents them not as ideal examples of how to live in 
an absurd universe; he offers them as dramatic examples of two persons clearly aware of 
such a universe, who suffer from it, struggle against it and are finally defeated by it.”49 
         If Martha’s mistake is her inability to transcend self-interest, Jan’s failure consists 
in refusing to speak plainly.
50
  Because of his subterfuge, Jan facilitates Martha’s crime 
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against him.  Thomas Merton has suggested that Jan is Camus’ caricature of modern man.  
Jan’s desire to be “reasonable” and to “study his family objectively,” Merton argues, are 
symptoms of an overly confident “scientific mind.”51  There are good grounds for 
Merton’s claims.  But Jan’s error is more elemental.  Despite his good intentions, Jan 
remains hopelessly self-involved.  For instance, he conceals his identity initially out of a 
rather shallow disappointment.  He “expected a welcome like the prodigal son’s.”52  
When instead he is received as a stranger, his reflex is to distance himself from the 
situation; it is only then that he attempts to intellectualize things.  Jan’s failure is 
highlighted by his wife, Maria, who implores him to be forthcoming. “There are 
situations,” she says, “in which the normal way of acting is obviously the best.  If one 
wants to be recognized, one starts by telling one’s name. Otherwise . . . one simply 
muddles everything.”53  But Jan’s excessive self-awareness prevents him from doing this.  
Even when moved by the noblest of intentions, he is undermined by internal confusion.  
         From Mersault’s narrow sensualism to Caligula’s absurd obsession to Martha’s 
egoism, Camus consistently links the individualist instinct to crime and the destruction of 
alterity.  Even Jan, a sympathetic figure, brings about his own ruin as his self-
involvement severs his connection to the concrete.  Like Caligula and Martha, he is 
unable to pay attention to what is in front of him – namely other people.  All of these 
characters, then, are united by an inability to transcend or surpass absurdity, and as a 
result they are alienated from others and the world.  Further, with the exception of Jan, 
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they all commit or consent to crime.  I have tried to show that their failures are rooted in 
their solipsistic orientations as well as their expression of self-will at the expense of 
others.  However, there is another individual (and related) response to absurdity that is 
equally problematic: indifference.  Indifference and inertia are recurring themes in 
Dostoevsky, and they are central to his absurd psychology.  Camus grappled constantly 
with this aspect of Dostoevsky.  To illustrate this, I turn to one of Camus’ later works, 
The Fall.  Here Camus tries to capture the essence of the modern, alienated soul.  In 
doing so, Camus incorporates themes from several of Dostoevsky’s works, including The 
Possessed, Notes From Underground, The Adolescent, and The Idiot. 
The Fall 
The Fall is arguably Camus’ most Dostoevskyian text, and the importance of 
Dostoevsky’s absurd psychology to Camus cannot be grasped apart from it.  Published in 
1956, The Fall is a confessional narrative and an absurd character study.  Through the 
protagonist, Jean-Baptiste Clamence, Camus raises a host of moral and religious 
questions.  Chief among these are guilt, innocence, meaning, judgment, exile, and the 
motivations and justifications for action.  More importantly, as Thomas Hanna observes, 
“The Fall reveals Camus as a psychologist.  For the first time he deals directly and 
seriously with the psychological make-up of men.”54  Following Hanna, this section 
focuses on Camus as psychologist.  There are numerous parallels between Clamence and 
Dostoevsky’s nihilistic protagonists.  Here I identify these parallels and associate them 
with more general Dostoevskyian motifs in The Fall.  The aim is to show how Camus’ 
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engagement with Dostoevsky influenced Camus’ view of the relationship between 
absurdity and estrangement.  
The Possessed is Dostoevsky’s most political novel.  Based loosely on historical 
events, the book concerns a group of revolutionaries who plot a series of attacks against 
the government.
55
  It is difficult to overstate Camus’ admiration for this work.  In 
addition to adapting it for the theatre, Camus placed The Possessed “among the four or 
five supreme works” in all of literature.56  Camus’ principal interest was Stavrogin, the 
anti-hero of The Possessed.
57
  Stavrogin’s personality is defined by negation and 
indifference.
58
  In The Possessed, he functions as a provocateur, driving much of the 
story’s chaos.  The narrative quickly unfolds when Stavrogin encounters Verkhovensky, 
the leader of the revolutionary group.  Unlike Stavrogin, Verkhovensky’s nihilism is 
insidiously active; it results not in paralysis or indifference but in blind submission to the 
libido dominandi.  Enamored by his strength, Verkhovensky solicits Stavrogin’s 
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membership in the group.  Stavrogin obliges, but he remains utterly indifferent to 
Verkhovensky’s political schemes. 
Stavrogin is a passive nihilist.  He values nothing and so cannot will himself to 
meaningful action.  Hence much of his behavior defies description.
59
  Stavrogin leads, as 
Camus observes in The Myth of Sisyphus, an empty and “ironic life.”60  But the key to 
understanding Stavrogin lies in his inability to transcend negation.  In a letter before 
committing suicide, Stavrogin explains his failure: 
I’ve tried my strength everywhere.  You advised me to do this that I might 
learn to know myself . . . But to what to apply my strength, that is what 
I’ve never seen, and do not see now in spite of your praises . . . I am still 
capable, as I always was, of desiring to do something good, and of feeling 
pleasure from it; at the same time I desire evil and feel pleasure from that 
too.  But both feelings are always too petty, and are never very strong . . . 
One may argue about everything endlessly, but from me nothing has come 
but negation, with no greatness of soul, no force . . . Everything has 
always been petty and spiritless.
61
 
The source of Stavrogin’s anguish is his conscience, which strives for tranquility and 
purpose but lacks the spiritual capacity to attain either.  Stavrogin’s significance to 
Camus has been noted by several commentators.  In one of the few comprehensive 
studies of Camus and Dostoevsky, Ray Davison claims that Stavrogin’s influence on The 
Fall is apparent in Clamence’s ironic disaffection.62  Davison touches on an important 
parallel here.  Stavrogin can be seen as a model for Clamence in several ways.  For one, 
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Stavrogin arouses admiration in those around him.  This is partly because of his 
individual strengths, but it is also, as Felix Rysten notes, because Stavrogin “lives on 
solitary heights.”63  His solitude and indifference are seen as signs of greatness.  In the 
first part of The Fall, Clamence similarly lives aloft.  “My profession,” he admits, 
“satisfied most happily that vocation for summits.”64  Although Clamence, unlike 
Stavrogin, consciously elevates himself above others in order to be “seen and hailed by 
the largest number,” his solitude is nonetheless an essential part of his character.  Second, 
both Stavrogin and Clamence are esteemed by bourgeois intellectuals.  In The Possessed, 
it is the young socialists who are most drawn to Stavrogin; in The Fall, it is the Parisian 
bourgeoisie who are impressed by Clamence’s perceived virtues.  In both works, 
however, this reflects the vacuousness of their contemporaries as well as the absence of 
guiding norms.  Lastly, Stavrogin and Clamence embody the disorder of their day.
65
  
Dostoevsky suggests this in an 1869 notebook entry.  “Everything is within the character 
of Stavrogin,” he writes, “A depraved aristocrat and nothing more.  Nothing but 
disorder.”66  It is not clear to what extent Camus was familiar with Dostoevsky’s 
notebooks, but we know Camus interpreted Stavrogin more or less in this way.
67
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Furthermore, Clamence appears to fulfill the same role in The Fall.  In an interview cited 
by his biographer Herbert Lottman, for instance, Camus said of Clamence:  
The mirror into which he looks will finally be held out to others.  Where 
does the confession begin, where the accusation?  Is the man who speaks 
in this book putting himself on trial, or his era?  Is he a particular case, or 
the man of the day?  There is, in any case, a sole truth in this studied play 
of mirror: pain and what it promises.
68
 
 
In their dysfunction and disaffection, Stavrogin and Clamence bear the crosses of their 
cultures.  As Camus writes in his notebooks, the name Stavrogin is derived from the 
Greek word for “cross,” stauros.69  The problem, though, as Father Tihon says to 
Stavrogin during the latter’s semi-confession, is that “It is difficult for a man to take up 
his cross when he does not believe in the cross of Christ.”70  Like Stavrogin, Clamence 
cannot love or repent because there is no one to whom he can appeal or from whom he 
can seek forgiveness.    
Stavrogin’s despair also dramatizes the link between metaphysical angst and 
nihilism.  In The Possessed and The Fall, this is explored through the theme of sexual 
promiscuity.
71
  In the case of Stavrogin, sex is a diversionary activity rather than a source 
of pleasure or an affirmation of love.
72
  “I’ve tried the depths of debauchery, and wasted 
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my strength over it.”73  Stavrogin frequents brothels, misleads women, and inexplicably 
marries a disabled girl for whom he feels nothing.  These pointless acts are done either 
out of a spirit of irony or in an effort to relieve boredom.
74
  Such is the fate, Dostoevsky 
suggests, of an incoherent personality.  In The Fall, Camus imbues Clamence with a 
similar disposition.  Throughout the text, Clamence seeks solace in sex and debauchery.  
“Alcohol and women provided me,” he admits, “the only solace of which I was 
worthy.”75  For Clamence as well as Stavrogin, depravity is “a substitute for love.”76  I 
emphasize Clamence and Stavrogin’s licentiousness because it is a symptom of their 
internal disorder.  Their world is emptied of meaning as a result of their hyper-active 
consciousness.  Unable to fill this void, they grow increasingly estranged from the world 
and others.  Their inability to love must, therefore, be seen as a consequence of their 
inability to transcend their own subjectivity. 
 The alienation experienced by Clamence is also analogous to Stavrogin.  
Clamence cannot love because of his debauchery and isolation.  To ease his suffering, he 
indulges his excesses, which “decrease vitality, hence suffering . . . It is but a long 
sleep.”77  The excesses are thus a means to diminish consciousness.  For Stavrogin, 
however, nothing, including excess, sufficed.  He commits suicide instead.  What I want 
to emphasize here is the theme of the isolated consciousness.  Neither Clamence nor 
Stavrogin are able to connect meaningfully with others.  Their inner turmoil leaves them 
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broken and restless, and their individual strengths prove useless without a sense of 
purpose or community.  Ultimately they divorce themselves from a world to which they 
no longer feel connected.  Stavrogin takes his own life and Clamence retreats to the 
bourgeois hell of Amsterdam.  In both cases, the path from self-estrangement to social 
isolation is straightforward.  
 Along with the motif of estrangement, Dostoevsky and Camus also stress the 
importance of transcendence and roots; in Dostoevsky’s universe in particular, characters 
typically suffer from the absence of both.
78
  This is especially true of Stavrogin.  “I have 
no ties in Russia,” he laments, “everything is as alien to me there as everywhere.”79  
Seeking stability, Stavrogin travels abroad, but he is unable to find fulfillment.  He enjoys 
all the trappings of modern life: wealth, travel, education, culture, etc.  Yet he has no 
sense of self and no community with which he can identify.  Like Mersault of The 
Stranger, Stavrogin is an outsider wherever he goes.  “I’m an outsider,” he says to his 
wife, “not your husband, nor your father, nor your betrothed.”80  As his doubt increases, 
Stavrogin sinks deeper into isolation and his social ties are completely severed.
81
  In this 
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way, he personifies the rootless individualism of modern man.
82
  Stavrogin is among the 
clearest incarnations of Dostoevsky’s view of the link between reason (intelligence) and 
individualism.  This is suggested in Maria Banerjee’s account of Stavrogin: “reason 
decoupled from faith and individualism without self-transcendence are linked together by 
the fatal flaw of egocentrism.”83  Stavrogin is an unmoored ego in precisely this sense 
and for precisely these reasons.
84
 
Clamence’s descent into negation is similarly linked to rootlessness in The Fall.  
Ray Davison has recently pointed to this thematic parallel.  “Camus appears in The Fall,” 
he writes, “to embrace the despair and tormented rootlessness of Dostoevsky’s hapless 
atheists.”85  Though Davison is speaking in general terms here, his claim is correct and is 
especially clear when comparatively analyzing Clamence and Stavrogin.  Clamence, for 
example, begins as a successful Parisian lawyer, just as Stavrogin is introduced as an 
esteemed figure in St. Petersburg.  However, after experiencing a moral failure, 
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Clamence’s self-image deteriorates.  His account of the humiliating event is worth 
quoting in full: 
It was an hour past midnight, a fine rain was falling, a drizzle rather . . . 
I had just left a mistress . . . I was enjoying that walk, a little numbed, my 
body calmed and irrigated by a flow of blood gentle as the failing rain.  On 
the bridge I passed behind a figure leaning over the railing and seeming to 
stare at the river.  On closer view, I made out a slim young woman dressed 
in black . . . I had already gone some fifty yards when I heard the sound . . 
. of a body striking the water.  I stopped short, but without turning around.  
Almost at once I heard a cry, repeated several times, which was going 
downstream; then it suddenly ceased . . . I wanted to run and yet didn’t 
stir.  I was trembling, I believe from cold and shock.  I told myself that I 
had to be quick and I felt an irresistible weakness steal over me.  I have 
forgotten what I thought then. Too late, too far . . . or something of the 
sort.  I was still listening as I stood motionless.  Then, slowly under the 
rain, I went away.  I informed no one.
86
 
 
Clamence is permanently altered as a result of his inaction on the bridge that night.  
Indeed, as Avi Sagi suggests, Clamence “discovers that he is no more than an actor.”87  
Realizing that something false about his character was exposed, he flees Paris, wanders 
about Europe, and ends finally in the slums of Amsterdam.  Increasingly, he becomes 
disconnected and overly self-conscious.  And be begins, almost pathologically, to subject 
everything and everyone to relentless scrutiny.  I note Clamence’s moral failure because 
Stavrogin experiences a similar fall from grace, the effects of which he describes in his 
final confession: 
Toward evening I felt afraid again, but this time the fear was 
incomparably more intense.  The main thing was that I was afraid and that 
I was so conscious of being afraid.  Oh, I know of nothing more absurd 
and more abominable!  I had never experienced fear before . . . but this 
one time in my life I was afraid, and in fact, I literally trembled.  The 
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intense consciousness of it was a profound humiliation.  If I could, I would 
have killed myself, but I felt myself unworthy of death.
88
 
Here Stavrogin is referencing his failure to stop a young girl, whom he had just raped, 
from hanging herself.  Like Clamence, Stavrogin’s sense of self is shattered in this scene.  
As Felix Rysten notes, Stavrogin is “faced with the absurd in his recognition of the 
discrepancy between his actual self and the way he has conceived himself to be.”89  In 
both works, these are pivotal events; they trigger an internal confrontation as a result of 
which neither character can escape the feeling of guilt and estrangement.  Alone and 
deprived equally of transcendence and communion, Clamence and Stavrogin withdraw 
from life.  If there is a discernible difference between them, it is that Clamence hides 
behind a veneer of strained, self-glorifying cynicism, whereas Stavrogin is more 
bewildered and apathetic.  But they both suffer from a sickness of spirit.  And their 
inability to construct meaning in experience results finally in exile and despair.  Worse 
still, because they mirror and magnify the disorder in which they live, they drag everyone 
they encounter into negation and crime.   
Estrangement and negation are explored from a slightly different angle in 
Dostoevsky’s Notes From Underground.  Here Dostoevsky uses his protagonist to 
examine the despair of the typical bourgeois Russian, and the result is a more 
illuminating look at the inner life of an estranged and ordinary man.  Because the hero of 
Notes From Underground is intended to indict an entire era, there are several parallels 
between this text and Camus’ The Fall.90  The next section discusses these parallels and 
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argues that Notes From Underground was vital to Camus’ conception of the modern 
absurd psyche. 
Estrangement in The Fall and Notes From Underground  
 Dostoevsky’s Notes From Underground is a first- person confessional narrative in 
the vein of Camus’ The Fall.  Like The Fall, Notes From Underground is also a polemic 
directed at the dominant philosophical movement of its time.
91
  In addition to noting 
various structural similarities, this section emphasizes three points of thematic overlap.  
First, Camus and Dostoevsky both explore the plight of the conscious absurd man, whose 
search for identity within a community is continually undermined by internal disorder.  
Second, I examine the theme of estrangement and its relation to egoism, freedom, and 
resentment.  Here I also draw on Nietzsche’s concept of bad conscience to help clarify 
the psychological conditions of Clamence and the Underground Man.  Lastly, I explore 
the problem of guilt and innocence without absolute standards.  The concern here is to 
demonstrate how Camus’ understanding of the modern psyche and condition overlaps 
with Dostoevsky’s.   
It is important to begin by situating these works in their proper political and 
cultural context.  Both The Fall and Notes From Underground are veiled attacks on the 
bourgeois virtues of modernity.  In Notes From Underground, Dostoevsky links the 
neuroses and self-division of contemporary Russians to the corrupting influence of 
Western rationalism.  The state of the Underground Man’s soul speaks to the 
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consequences of abandoning traditional virtues and beliefs.  In an authorial note on the 
first page of the text, Dostoevsky explains his intentions in Notes From Underground:  
The author of these Notes, and the Notes themselves, are both, of course, 
imaginary.  All the same, if we take into consideration the conditions that 
have shaped our society, people like the writer not only may, but must, 
exist in that society.  I have tried to present to the public in a more striking 
form than is usual a character belonging to the very recent past, a 
representative figure from a generation still surviving.
92
 
As noted, Camus similarly uses Clamence to caricature modernity.  Like the 
Underground Man, Clamence has fully internalized the zeitgeist.
93
  Referring to this in a 
1959 interview, Camus remarked that “My hero is indeed discouraged, and this is why, as 
a good modern nihilist, he exalts servitude.”94  There are nonetheless some important 
differences between Clamence and the Underground Man.  For one, the Underground 
Man’s critique is implicit in his fate; that is, he fails insofar as he embodies the virtues of 
contemporary culture.
95
  He has also lived underground his entire life.
96
  Clamence, on 
the other hand, lived happily in society for years.  His exile begins with his inaction on 
the bridge.  Once his self-image collapses, however, he is reduced to a state of ironic 
detachment in which he parodies the virtues he once affirmed.  Further, by admitting his 
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own guilt, he pronounces judgment on all.
97
  As Clamence proclaims, he is “an empty 
prophet for shabby times, Elijah without a messiah.”98  At any rate, despite their 
differences, both of these anti-heroes are captives of the same absurd psyche.
99
  They try 
to live alone and without illusions but are unable to do so.   
 Before examining the theme of estrangement, it is essential to stress the 
problematic nature of consciousness in these works.  In Notes From Underground, 
consciousness is a disease.  “I tell you solemnly,” the Underground Man proclaims, “that 
I have many times tried to become an insect.  But I was not equal even to that.  I swear, 
gentlemen, that to be too conscious is an illness.”100  Consciousness as pathos is also a 
key motif in The Fall.  Thomas Merton describes this well in his brief but insightful study 
of The Fall: 
 Clamence is a bourgeois man whose conscience has died of self-analysis 
and whose frustrated reasoning has become a kind of moral eczema . . . 
His confession cures nothing and finds relief only in passing on the 
contagion to another.  The plague, which in the novel of that name was 
physical, is here revealed as a moral sickness unto death, an utter despair 
which can do anything but live with itself and accept life without analysis 
– a plague of self-examination which turns narcissism into self-hate.101 
The “plague of self-examination,” as Merton describes it, infects both Clamence and the 
Underground Man; it is the source of their suffering and their isolation.
102
  Indeed the 
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Underground Man’s consciousness leads inexorably to inertia.  To combat this, he turns 
to books and “ideas.”  “I was always alone,” he says, “I did a lot reading.  I wanted to 
stifle all that was smoldering inside me with external impressions and reading was for me 
the only possible source of external impressions.”103  Reading thus becomes a substitute 
for experience and human contact.  In The Fall, Clamence repeatedly scorns this modern 
tendency.  Europeans are derided for their indifference to experience and their 
preoccupation with “ideas.”104  In both texts, then, there is an implicit connection 
between consciousness and inertia.
105
  But there is also a link between consciousness and 
social atomism.  As Irina Kirk notes, The Fall and Notes From Underground ask whether 
in the absence of “traditional remedies for the human condition there does not exist an 
existential answer to each man’s isolation.”106  The answers proffered by Camus and 
Dostoevsky are difficult to discern.  Here I point to thematic parallels and suggest that 
Camus appropriated many of Dostoevsky’s insights into the causes and consequences of 
modern estrangement. 
 In The Fall, Clamence’s isolation increases in proportion to his self-awareness.  
The more he questions and doubts, the more divided his personality becomes.  At the 
core of Clamence’s disarray is a perverse need for contradiction.107  Clamence knows 
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what he ought to do but can no longer do it.  In this way, Clamence resembles Ivan 
Karamazov, who, as the devil observes, wants to “perform an act of heroic virtue” but is 
tormented by his disbelief “in virtue.”108  Clamence’s conscience, as Germaine Bree has 
observed, is reduced “to an endless, formless, chaotic parade of inner consciousness.”109  
There are several reasons for Clamence’s confusion.  For one, he has rejected the virtues 
and traditions that bind him to others, and can no longer practice them in good faith.  But 
his embeddedness in a community means that his identity, his sense of worth, depends 
upon the judgments of others.  This is why his exile follows from the disintegration of his 
self-image.  His self-image was preserved so long as it corresponded to his public image.  
Having failed to act on the bridge, Clamence is confronted by two facts.  First, he realizes 
that his self-esteem was a product of his perceived social standing, and that his virtues 
were merely for self-elevation.  “When I was concerned with others,” he concedes, “I 
was so out of pure condescension, in utter freedom, and all the credit went to me: my 
self-esteem would go up a degree.”110  In effect, as Sagi also observes, Clamence 
discovers that “he lives constantly vis-à-vis others.”111  Second, and more importantly, he 
recognizes that his freedom was illusory.  As Kirk points out, before the incident on the 
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bridge, Clamence “exercised his will within the framework of what is considered virtuous 
by conventional standards.”112  However, when given a chance to be authentically 
virtuous, to save another human being, he shrinks.  Consequently, he discovers that he 
was only playing the role of the virtuous man and, moreover, that his happiness and 
freedom were “not free from social opinion.”113  Clamence sinks under the weight of 
these realizations.  Thomas Hanna’s account of the significance of this is worth quoting 
at length: 
Clamence was undistinguished from his habitual virtues until that crucial 
moment when the plaints of a drowning woman inserted itself between 
Clamence and his virtue.  In that instant Clamence chose himself and not 
his virtue, he suddenly acted as a completely free individual, and, in this 
very act, took upon himself the enormous, inescapable responsibility for 
his act.  He was no longer safe or unconscious, he was in trouble.  His 
virtue could not justify his action; he alone had to be its justification.  
From this point onward, Clamence moved toward consciousness and the 
agony of decision.
114
 
Following his failure on the bridge, then, Clamence is thrust into a state of genuine 
freedom, which obliges him to take responsibility for his choices and actions.  But his 
neutrality on the bridge exposed his inability to accept this responsibility.  As a result 
Clamence is overwhelmed by a sense of guilt.   
 Clamence’s estrangement is hastened by this sense of guilt because it occurs in an 
absurd context in which, as John Cruikshank notes, “there is no available standard of 
innocence.”115  “We cannot assert the innocence of anyone,” says Clamence, but “we can 
state with certainty the guilt of all.”116  Because there is no God, no ultimate redemption, 
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Clamence is condemned to live in perpetual self-judgment, which he tries to escape by 
confessing his guilt and implicating the rest of mankind.  This alienates him from the 
community of men to which he properly belongs, as his interactions with others are 
driven by this desire to provoke a sense of guilt.
117
  Henceforth Clamence is consumed by 
an inner need to justify his moral failure, and “the fear of self-judgment,” as Kirk writes, 
sets him on a “course of self-deceit.”118 
Like The Fall, estrangement is the foremost theme of Notes From 
Underground.
119
  Here our main concern is the relationship between resentment and 
estrangement, which Camus and Dostoevsky depict in similar ways.  As seen already, 
Clamence’s need to discharge his guilt guides much of his behavior.  But he is also 
animated by a spirit of resentment.  Indeed, as several commentators have suggested, 
Clamence is a model of Nietzschean bad conscience.
120
  Walter Kaufmann, for instance, 
argues that “Camus’ last novel, The Fall . . . is a veritable case history of the will to 
power of the weak, who, as a last resort, derive a sense of superiority from their 
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insistence that they are unworthy and guilt-ridden.”121  Kaufmann’s insight here is 
important because it offers an interpretive framework for Clamence and the Underground 
Man’s compulsive and contradictory actions.   
Nietzschean Resentment in The Fall and Notes From Underground 
Nietzsche’s notion of bad conscience defies simple explanation.  Nietzsche is 
clearest about its meaning and origins in his essay On the Genealogy of Morality.  Here 
bad conscience is associated with man’s entrance into society.  “I take bad conscience to 
be the deep sickness into which man had to fall under the pressure of that most 
fundamental of all changes he ever experience – the change of finding himself enclosed . 
. . within the sway of society and peace.”122  The emphasis on society is particularly 
important here.  For Nietzsche, society profoundly altered human consciousness.  Pre-
societal man lived primarily on instinct.  Questions of meaning, morality, and justice 
were entirely alien.  In society, however, man was divorced “from his animal past” and 
plunged “into new situations and conditions of existence.”123  Suddenly, Nietzsche writes, 
instincts were repressed and men 
were reduced to thinking, inferring, calculating, connecting cause and 
effect, these unhappy ones, reduced to their consciousness, to their poorest 
and most erring organ!  I do not believe there has every been such a 
feeling of misery on earth, such a leaden discomfort – and yet those old 
instincts had not all at once ceased to make their demands: for the most 
part they had to seek new and as it were subterranean gratifications.  All 
instincts that do discharge themselves outwardly turn themselves inward – 
this is what I call the internalizing of man.
124
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Along with this new state of consciousness, man also experienced a radical new freedom 
– the freedom to decide good and evil, just and unjust, guilt and innocence.  Out of this 
situation, Nietzsche argues, there emerged a consciousness of others and, more 
importantly, a concern with “the relationship of those presently living to their 
ancestors.”125  This produced in turn a sense of obligation, both to those with whom we 
live and to those whose previous sacrifices helped to ensure our present existence.  
According to Nietzsche, this sense of indebtedness is at the root of man’s religious 
impulse.  “In the end,” he writes, “the progenitor is necessarily transfigured into a god . . . 
This may even be the origin of the gods.”126 
 Nietzsche’s account of consciousness and human obligation is important in this 
context for two reasons.  First, it connects two of the central themes in The Fall and 
Notes From Underground, namely absurdity (nihilism) and guilt.  Nietzsche, for 
example, surmises that the death of God should have resulted in a “final victory of 
atheism” which “might free humanity from the entire feeling of having debts to its 
beginnings, its causa prima.  Atheism and a kind of second innocence belong 
together.”127  However, this prospect is lost with the rise of Christianity, which proposed 
a paradoxical solution to the problem of guilt: “God sacrificing himself for the guilt of 
man, God himself exacting payment of himself, God as the only one who can redeem 
from man what has become irredeemable for man himself.”128  By offering this remedy, 
Nietzsche argues, Christianity necessitated the modern “bad conscience.”  By this he 
means that Christianity spared man the burden of true freedom and, secondly, preserved 
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“the will of man to find himself guilty and reprehensible to the point that it cannot be 
atoned for.”129  The guilt-ridden minds of Clamence and the Underground Man are 
perfect illustrations of this bad conscience.  They are isolated egos thrust into a world 
without God, and are unable to bear the consequences.
130
  This is particularly true of 
Clamence.  “The essential,” he says, “is to cease being free and to obey, in repentance, a 
greater rogue than oneself.  When we are all guilty, that will be democracy.”131  It is to 
this attitude that Camus refers when he describes Clamence as a “modern nihilist” who 
“exalts servitude.”  As David Sprintzen correctly observes, Clamence’s “response to the 
death of God,” like the modern bourgeois he mocks, “has been to assume the unbearable 
burden of an absolutized individualism in the context of a pervasive political cynicism 
glossed as morality and practical idealism.”132  Sensing the shallowness of modernity as 
well as his own complicity, Clamence becomes a “judge-penitent.”  The religious aspect 
of this pathology is prefigured by Nietzsche in a remarkable passage in The Antichrist: 
Let us not be led astray: they say “judge not,” and yet they condemn to 
hell whoever stands in their way.  In letting God sit in judgment they 
judge themselves; in glorifying God they glorify themselves; in 
demanding that everyone show the virtues which they themselves happen 
to be capable of – still more, which they must have in order to remain on 
top – they assume the grand air of men struggling for virtue . . . in point of 
fact, they simply do what they cannot help doing. Forced, like hypocrites, 
to be sneaky, to hide in corners, to slink along in the shadows, they 
convert their necessity into a duty.
133
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Clamence does precisely what Nietzsche describes above, only in a post-Christian, 
nihilistic context.  Hence he readily admits his delight in being seen as noble and 
virtuous: 
It cleansed me of all bitterness toward my neighbor, whom I always 
obligated without ever owing him anything.  It set me above the judge 
whom I judged in turn, above the defendant whom I forced to gratitude.  
Just weigh this, cher monsieur, I lived with impunity.  I was concerned in 
no judgment; I was not on the floor of the courtroom, but somewhere in 
the flies like those gods that are brought down by machinery from time to 
time to transfigure the action and give it its meaning.  After all, living aloft 
is still the only way of being seen and hailed by the largest number.
134
 
Implicit in Clamence is the notion that man’s thirst for an absolute, for salvation and 
repentance, persists even in the shadow of God.
135
  Furthermore, that without God or 
some unifying idea, this impulse degenerates into the sort of morose, self-serving 
cynicism typified by Clamence.  In his analysis of The Fall, Sagi points more directly to 
this Nietzschean aspect of Clamence: 
Religion is an endless human attempt to reject guilt, namely, to renounce 
freedom and personal responsibility, since only a free creature can be 
guilty, and only a person who can be guilty can also be free.  Like 
Nietzsche, Camus emphasizes that religion is an escape from freedom, 
responsibility, and guilt.
136
 
 
As for the Underground Man, though his need to project guilt is less pronounced 
than Clamence’s, the confessional quality of his account is itself a manifestation of this 
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need.  Moreover, he continuously shifts from “I” to “we” when addressing his own 
shortcomings.  “I missed life through decaying morally in a corner, not having sufficient 
means, losing the habit of living, and carefully cultivating my anger underground,” he 
begins, and then immediately says that “we have all got out of the habit of living, we are 
all in a greater or lesser degree crippled.”137  As Robert Solomon has noted, Clamence 
adopts the same tactic, “imperceptibly passing from the ‘I’ to the ‘we’” when describing 
his own lowliness.
138
  For Clamence and the Underground Man, then, implicating others 
is inherently self-serving.  In Clamence’s case, a moral advantage is gained: “The more I 
accuse myself, the more I have a right to judge you.”139  For the Underground Man, it is a 
means of abdicating personal responsibility and justifying his underground status. 
 The second reason Nietzsche’s historical account of consciousness is important is 
that it helps to elucidate the domineering tendencies of Clamence and the Underground 
Man.  As noted previously, Clamence is immobilized by contradictory impulses.  One of 
the reasons for this is that he is unable to displace his resentment in the Nietzschean sense 
of the term.  This is evident in Clamence’s compulsive need to dominate others, which, as 
Kaufmann notes, is a clear manifestation of Nietzschean bad conscience.
140
  Recognizing 
that he “can’t get along with domineering or being served,” Clamence finds that his sense 
of superiority is best maintained in solitude: “In a general way, I like all islands.  It is 
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easier to dominate them.”141  This is precisely how the Underground Man justifies his 
isolation.  “Without power and tyranny over somebody I can’t live,” and “I could no 
longer fall in love because, I repeat, with me love meant to tyrannize and hold the upper 
hand morally.”142  The Underground Man is also plagued by an internal dialectic, which 
Donna Orwin suggests is the defining characteristic of his personality.  Each of his 
moods, she writes, “succeeds the previous one as its opposite and as a reaction to it.”143  
The Underground Man expresses this in the following lamentation: 
When I was most capable of recognizing all the subtle beauties of the 
highest and the best . . . I could not only fail to recognize them, but could 
actually do such ugly repulsive things as . . . well, such things, in short, as 
perhaps everybody does, but which always happened to me, as if on 
purpose, when I was most conscious that I ought not to do them?
144
   
The paralysis described above recurs throughout Dostoevsky’s novels – indeed it is one 
of his most pervasive themes.
145
  In Notes From Underground and The Fall, it can be 
seen in the internal dynamic of contradiction that propels the protagonists.  Noticing this 
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parallel, Maria Banerjee maintains that “Camus, following both Dostoevsky and 
Nietzsche, zeroed in on this addictive aspect of resentment which affects the self as an 
autointoxication, the malignant secretion of one’s preconceived impotence inside the 
enclosure of the self.”146  As hyper-conscious egos struggling to reconcile their individual 
freedom in a social context, Clamence and the Underground Man are trapped “in 
permanent self-contradiction.”147  For this reason, they act in spite of themselves, and 
their irony is indistinguishable from their sincerity.  
 The alienating effects of Clamence and the Underground Man’s states of 
consciousness can be seen in several analogous episodes, which help to clarify the 
connection between resentment and estrangement.  To begin with Notes From 
Underground, there is a pivotal scene in which the narrator lures a prostitute to his home.  
She comes out of sympathy, hoping to comfort this strange man whom she hardly knows.  
But owing to his pathological need to justify his underground status, he immediately 
shuns her.  When this fails, he tries once more to provoke her to reject him: 
But at this point something exceedingly strange happened.  I was so used 
to thinking and imagining everything like a book, and seeing everything in 
the guise in which I had previously created it in my dreams, that at first I 
didn’t even understand this strange circumstance.  But this is what 
happened: Liza, whom I had so abused and humiliated, understood a great 
deal more than I imagined.  She understood that part of it that a woman 
always understands first, if she sincerely loves, and that was that I myself 
was unhappy.
148
 
Despite Liza’s compassion, the Underground Man is unable to accept her love.  His 
moods swing pendulously from one emotion to its opposite; and he is constantly 
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responding, resisting, mastering.
149
  This episode mirrors Clamence’s scene on the bridge 
insofar as both are presented with a choice.  For Clamence, the choice is to act virtuously 
or not; for the Underground Man, it is to accept or reject Liza’s love.  Neither is able to 
do what they know they ought to do, and consequently they succumb to guilt and, 
eventually, resentment.  The sense of self-judgment that follows these episodes, however, 
overwhelms both characters, and their solipsism deepens as a result. 
 The Underground Man is also paralyzed by a simultaneous (and contradictory) 
desire to be recognized and humiliated.  Like Clamence, he has need of others but 
obstinately distances himself from them.
150
  Moreover, he is seeking self-justification, 
and because he cannot resolve his internal contradictions, he is overpowered by a sense 
of his own humiliation and, consequently, a general contempt for mankind.
151
  This is a 
consistent theme in both texts, and is illustrated in a number of tragic-comic incidents.  In 
The Fall, for instance, there is a revealing scene in which Clamence leaves his car to help 
a man move his stalled motorcycle off the road.  An argument ensues and Clamence 
receives “a violent blow on the ear.”152  “Instead of giving a drubbing to the idiot,” 
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Clamence recalls, “I docilely returned to my car and drove off.”153  This otherwise banal 
affair becomes debilitating when Clamence is unable to forget it.  For several days he 
stews in solitude.
154
  The psychic consequences of this event mirrors an incident in Notes 
From Underground in which the protagonist is casually brushed aside by a military 
office:  
I had been standing by the table and unknowingly blocking the way; he 
wanted to get past, and he took me by the shoulders and silently . . . 
moved me from the place where I stood to another; then he walked past as 
if he hadn’t seen me . . . I had been treated like an insect.155 
For Clamence and the Underground Man, these humiliating incidents are destructive of 
both their public and self-images.
156
  “After having been struck in public without 
reacting,” Clamence says, “it was no longer possible for me to cherish that fine picture of 
myself.”157  As for the Underground Man, his agony is such that he dreams (for an entire 
year) of “challenging my enemy to a duel” so as to reclaim his sense of honor.  
Ultimately, Clamence and the Underground Man are immobilized by their solipsistic and 
self-undermining need to assert themselves in an intersubjective context.  Indeed, Robert 
Solomon has suggested that Clamence assumes the role of judge-penitent in a “desperate 
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effort to remain proud and feel superior in the face of his ever-increasing humiliation.”158  
Although there is no direct analogue to the judge-penitent in Notes From Underground, 
the self-justifying antics of the Underground Man mirror Clamence’s in this respect.  
Finally, it is important to restate the link between the spiritual disorder of 
Clamence, Stavrogin, and the Underground Man and broader problem of absurdity and 
nihilism.  The internal confusion of these absurd figures corresponds to the cultural 
confusion wrought by nihilism.  To understand their depravity is to understand to what 
extent, as Dostoevsky writes in The House of the Dead, society is “already contaminated 
to its foundations.”159  In the texts above, absurdity has abolished absolutes; nihilism has 
rendered everything equivalent; and human beings have abandoned the “noble ideas” 
which bind them together.  Hence Camus and Dostoevsky imbue their nihilists with the 
psychic traits shared (and exemplified) by Clamence and the Underground Man.  
Furthermore, Camus explores religious themes (exile, judgment, guilt, innocence) in The 
Fall in order to show how absurdity problematizes them anew.  Dostoevsky preceded 
Camus’ efforts in this respect.  His absurd characters (particularly the ones discussed 
above) demonstrate how nihilism disorients – and alienates – the modern psyche by 
delivering it over to solipsism; Dostoevsky merely helps to illuminate the political 
implications of this for Camus.  When Camus sums up Dostoevsky’s central thesis as 
“The same paths that lead the individual to crime lead the society to revolution,” this is 
precisely what he has in mind.
160
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Conclusion 
 To sum up, let us distill what Camus takes from Dostoevsky and Nietzsche at this 
stage, and try to situate it in the context of Camus’ larger thought.  In terms of the 
individual’s relation to absurdity, it is Dostoevsky as psychologist that most influences 
Camus.  Dostoevsky’s insights into the nature of consciousness and the sources of 
estrangement pervade Camus’ absurdist works.  In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus asks 
whether man can find meaning and value in an absurd world.  Camus responds 
affirmatively, and even takes issue with Dostoevsky’s leap into faith.161  However, 
beginning with Caligula, Camus appears to re-examine Dostoevsky’s insights.  In 
Caligula, the absurd problem is made manifest, men are deprived of transcendent 
meaning, and political nihilism is the result.  This is Camus’ most forceful depiction of 
Dostoevsky’s link between metaphysical angst and nihilism (negation and crime).  In The 
Fall, Camus’ dialogue with Dostoevsky is more pronounced.  Indeed, Camus applies 
Dostoevskyian themes in a contemporary context, and appears to corroborate many of 
Dostoevsky’s ideas.  While Camus’ full engagement with Dostoevsky cannot be 
understood without an analysis of Camus’ revolt writings (the subject of the following 
chapter), the works above suggest that Camus began to reconsider some of his previous 
claims in The Myth of Sisyphus, particularly as it relates to the need for transcendence.  
Camus’ depiction of modern ideology – its emptiness, its pseudo-humanitarianism, and 
its destruction of social harmony – in The Fall indicate at the very least that Camus was 
struggling to reconcile his absurd humanism with the bleak nihilistic vision of 
Dostoevsky.  
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 Camus’ interaction with Nietzsche in the above works is less extensive, but 
nonetheless important.  As discussed previously, Nietzsche crystallizes Camus’ early 
conceptions of reason and truth.  This was evident in Camus’ sensualist writings.  In 
these texts, however, Nietzsche’s metaphysics are applied in an absurd context, and the 
results are devastating.
162
  In the case of Caligula, Nietzsche’s call to self-affirmation and 
freedom is carried to its logical extreme.  Having confronted the absurd, Caligula’s 
reaction is to mirror nature, “to be as cruel” as the Gods.163  Indeed, Caligula is liberated 
by the absurd and, consequently, embraces “the power to enforce my will.”164  As I tried 
to show above, Caligula makes two mistakes.  First, like Ivan Karamazov, he deduces the 
equivalency of things and accepts the absurd as the only rule of action.  Second, he turns 
inward, severs his connection to others, and blindly exercises his will.  For this reason, I 
read Caligula both as a critique of the implications of Nietzsche’s metaphysics and as an 
affirmation of Dostoevsky’s link between negation and crime. 
 In The Fall, Nietzsche’s psychological insights are as significant as Dostoevsky’s.  
Nietzsche’s bad conscience, his will to power of the weak, and his pathos of guilt are all 
woven into Clamence’s psyche.  In terms of Camus’ broader interaction with Nietzsche’s 
ideas, The Fall suggests three things.  First, that Camus continued to grapple with 
Nietzsche’s ideas well beyond his sensualist writings.  Second, that Camus located the 
pathologies identified by Nietzsche in the modern bourgeois culture, and that he believed 
they intensified in a climate marred by individualism and political realism.  Finally, that 
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Nietzsche’s philosophy, however insightful, was ethically problematic in Camus’ view.  
In fact, Camus declared in 1946 that it was “time to start the critique of 
Nietzscheanism.”165  When Camus wrote these words to his mentor Grenier, it was with 
the historical consequences of Nietzsche’s metaphysics in mind.166  Hence as Camus 
develops his theory of revolt, Nietzsche remains an important influence, but Camus’ 
orientation to Nietzsche’s ideas shifts dramatically.  Having endured the “cult of history 
and the will to power,” as Camus calls it, it was necessary to confront Nietzsche and to 
transcend his thought without betraying its inmost truths.   
 So far we have seen how the absurd psyche struggles for unity and purpose in a 
world divested of transcendent meaning.  But equally important is the means by which 
these struggles give way to ideology and dogmatism.  In the following chapter I connect 
the personal pathologies identified above to the persistence of absolutism in modern life.  
Nietzsche’s “will to truth,” Dostoevsky’s desire for a “sublime idea,” and what Camus 
calls “the nostalgia for unity” all point to the same fundamental impulse for order.  This 
impulse is laid bare by absurdity, and it is channeled in destructive ways in much of 
Camus’ writings.  Above I discussed these destructive tendencies at the level of the 
individual psyche.  The next chapter demonstrates how totalizing ideologies emerge as 
false solutions to the ontological and epistemological problems posed by absurdity.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ABSURDITY AND THE APOTHEOSIS OF REASON 
 “The ideologies which guide our world were born in the time of absolute scientific 
discoveries.  Our real knowledge, on the other hand, only justifies a system of thought 
based on relative discoveries.” – Camus 
 
Following his early absurdist inquiries, Camus’ attention turned increasingly to 
the political sphere.  This was due in part to his particular historical moment, but it was 
also because he sensed an important connection between nihilism, absurdity, and reason.  
More precisely, Camus thought reason emerged as a false and dangerous solution to the 
problem of absurdity.  Indeed reason was co-opted in man’s essentially religious pursuit 
of totality.  However, reason does not supplant the God impulse; it merely aids in the 
construction of ideologies that replace religious truths with ideological dogmas.  For 
Camus, the use of such ideologies to justify crime and political terror was the defining 
problem of the twentieth century.   
 Camus engages Nietzsche and Dostoevsky continually as he wrestles with the 
metaphysical roots of ideologies.  Nietzsche in particular illuminates the religious origins 
of ideology for Camus, and Camus more or less follows Nietzsche in his depiction of 
socialism as a “degenerate form of Christianity.”1  Nietzsche’s influence can also be seen 
in Camus’ critique of Hegel, which amounts to an existential critique of rationalism.  In 
Dostoevsky’s works, Camus discovers a vision of nihilism that prefigures the 
revolutionary excesses of his own epoch.  In a 1959 interview, for instance, Camus 
identifies Dostoevsky’s The Possessed as “prophetic because of the nihilism that is now 
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part of ideologies.”2  In this text Camus encounters characters whose inner nihilism 
leaves them susceptible to the murderous logic of political realism.  For this reason, 
Camus believed it was Dostoevsky who most anticipated the modern ideological 
manifestations of nihilism.  In this chapter, I interpret Camus’ political thought against 
the backdrop of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  Camus’ resistance to reason, his 
metaphysical account of ideology, and his critiques of totalitarian regimes are seen as 
extensions and syntheses of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s thought.   
Camus’ confrontation with absurdity begins in 1942, when The Myth of Sisyphus 
and The Stranger are published.  This is a pivotal point in Camus’ intellectual life.  
Having experienced the peculiar disorder of twentieth-century politics, Camus is 
increasingly concerned with the reality of nihilism.  The abstract themes that pervade his 
earlier writings give way to a growing concern over the political implications of 
absurdity.  Camus’ attitude is summed up well in a 1944 article he wrote for the 
resistance newspaper Combat: 
We believe that the truth of this century cannot be discovered unless its 
tragedy is explored to the bitter end.  If the age is afflicted with nihilism, it 
is not by ignoring nihilism that we will discover the morality we need.  
True, not everything can be summed up by the words ‘negation’ or 
‘absurdity.’  We know this.  But negation and absurdity must be posited as 
ideas because our generation has encountered them and we must learn to 
live with them.
3
 
 
Whereas previously Camus sought responses (on an individual level) to nihilism and 
absurdity, now he wonders if it is possible to live peacefully and meaningfully in an age 
defined by them.  So Nietzsche’s problematization of absurdity, initially a life-affirming 
                                                 
2
 Quote from a 1959 interview with Pierre Dumayet.  This was one of several interviews 
Camus conducted prior to the opening of his theatrical adaptation of Dostoevsky’s The 
Possessed. 
3
 Albert Camus, Camus at Combat, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), p. 100. 
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revelation for Camus, is now both a metaphysical and a political crisis.  Referring to the 
impetus for this crisis, Phillip Rhein writes that 
Camus could say in 1943 that the only serious philosophical problem was 
the one of suicide; but confronted with the Hitler terror, the occupation, 
resistance, and final liberation of France, the Communist successes in 
France, and the events of the Cold War, he soon discovered that the stoic 
comfort offered by Sisyphus was of little solace or value.  As early as 
1943 and 1944, although still enmeshed in the theory of the absurd, Camus 
began . . . a search for some way to transcend the nihilism of his early 
writings.
4
 
 
 This shift in Camus’ philosophical and political attitude is evident in his 
notebooks and in The Myth of Sisyphus.  In these texts Camus searches for value and 
meaning in an explicitly absurd context.  This is particularly true in The Myth of 
Sisyphus, where the guiding question is whether absurdity devalues life.  Camus begins, 
however, by asking whether life has (or can have) value for the individual absurd man: 
“The fundamental subject of The Myth of Sisyphus is this: it is legitimate and necessary to 
wonder whether life has a meaning; therefore it is legitimate to meet the problem of 
suicide face to face.”5  Camus seeks to justify the individual’s life without sacrificing or 
denying the absurd.  In this pursuit, and yet again, Camus draws heavily on Nietzsche.  
After quoting a lengthy Nietzsche passage from Nietzsche’s The Twilight of the Idols, 
Camus writes that Nietzsche effectively “points the way of the absurd man.”6  Here 
Camus is referring to Nietzsche’s emphasis on man’s creative possibilities; “art, music, 
dance, reason” and “the mind” are all listed as potential sources of meaning.  
 Art becomes central to Camus’ absurdism for two reasons.  First, it is only 
through art that an absurd world can be made meaningful.  Second, art adds aesthetic 
                                                 
4
 Phillip H. Rein, Albert Camus (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1969), p. 80. 
5
 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. Justin O’Brien (New York: Vintage 
International, 1991), p. v. 
6
 Ibid, p. 64. 
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value to life without dogmatically reducing reality or pretending to ultimate knowledge of 
things.  Camus’ embrace of art also reflects a key point in his transition from sensualism 
to absurdity.  In many ways, sensualism is the posture of the artist; that is, the artist does 
not define the world so much as experience and transfigure it.  If anything, the artist uses 
myth and symbolisms to communicate experiential truths.  As Camus engages the 
absurdist stance, then, art becomes an invaluable source of meaning.  Indeed absurdism is 
rescued by his sensualism. 
 Perhaps the most significant convergence between Camus and Nietzsche in The 
Myth of Sisyphus concerns the epistemological implications of absurdity.  This can be 
seen in Camus’ attempt to delineate the limits of knowledge in absurdist terms.  Here 
Camus makes considerable use of Nietzsche’s perspectivism.  However, to illustrate this 
requires that we first examine Nietzsche’s perspectival account of truth.  For Nietzsche, 
truth is a product of man’s desire for coherence and fixity.  A living and thinking thing 
requires a horizon, he claims, and if “it is unable to draw one around itself . . . it will 
come to an untimely end.”7  Understood in this way, truth is an existential ground, an 
indispensable fiction that serves life.  Truth, however, remains an anthropomorphic 
projection; it is always an interpretation of things.
8
  Hence Nietzsche considers truth a 
kind of error that emerges out of the need for intelligibility.  Without truth, the ability to 
order the world and to pass definitive judgment would be greatly diminished.  “We can 
                                                 
7
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. Anthony Ludovici and Adrian Collins 
(New York: Digireads, 2009), p. 101. 
8
 In The Will to Power, Nietzsche makes this point with regard to all knowledge: “Of 
what alone can knowledge consist? – Interpretation, the introduction of a sense into 
things, not explanation . . . There is no such thing as an established fact, everything 
fluctuates, everything is intangible, yielding; after all, the most lasting of all things are 
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only take cognizance,” Nietzsche writes, “of a world which we ourselves have made.”9  
Nietzsche points to the utilitarian function of truth in order to refute the notion that a 
thing or proposition is true insofar as it corresponds to reality.  Instead, by exposing truth 
as a human contrivance, he can argue that things are considered true in virtue of their 
utility to life itself. 
 Nietzsche hoped to undermine the conventional sense in which truth is 
understood.  Truth typically implies objectivity or certainty.  But this erroneously 
assumes that truth is independent of human volition.
10
  Even science, our most reliable 
instrument of knowledge, fails to meet this standard.  “How is it possible for an 
instrument to criticize itself,” Nietzsche asks, “when it is itself that exercises the critical 
faculty?”11  This is not to say that knowledge is impossible or that all truth claims are 
equivalent; rather, the point is that science relies upon certain constructs and 
presuppositions that are themselves determined by practical human needs.
12
  The same is 
true of reason.  Man uses reason as a conceptual tool in order to differentiate phenomena; 
in this way, it helps to conceal the chaos of nature.  But reason does not produce a 
dispassionate account of reality; on the contrary, it bears the stamp of its human origins.  
                                                 
9
 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Anthony Ludovici (New York: Barnes 
and Noble Publishing, 2006), p. 290. 
10
 Maudemarie Clark has emphasized why Nietzsche’s metaphysics does not permit such 
a conception of truth. Nietzsche, she writes, maintains that “once we get rid of the thing-
in-itself, we lose all basis for regarding objectivity as the transcendence of subjective 
factors.  If we recognize the perspectival character of knowledge, our only alternative is 
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 As an example of this, Nietzsche points to the assumed distinction between appearance 
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“The world appears to us logical,” Nietzsche says, “because we first logicized it.”13  
Reason is quite literally, then, a metaphysical illusion; by allowing man to interpret the 
world as reasonable, it possibilizes truth and imposes sense – but that is all it does.14  
Nietzsche tries constantly to expose this aspect of truth and to identify its origins in the 
human psyche. 
Despite his epistemological critique, Nietzsche does not deny the utility of truth.  
Instead he emphasizes the consequences of grounding truth outside experience.  The need 
to place truth above the flux of experience has produced a host of suprasensory grounds 
(God or History, for instance); this is problematic inasmuch as it obscures the creative 
origins of human values.
15
  In fact, Nietzsche attributes the rise of nihilism to this mass 
obfuscation.  As faith in God began to recede in the eighteenth century, the metaphysical 
justifications of values collapsed.  It was apparent to Nietzsche that “the highest values” 
were “losing their value.”16  Recognizing the moral implications of this, Nietzsche writes 
in The Gay Science:  
Whither is God?’ he cried; ‘I will tell you.  We have killed him – you and 
I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we 
drink up the sea?  Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire 
horizon?  What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? 
Whither is it moving now?  Whither are we moving?  Away from all suns?  
Are we not plunging continually?  Backward, sideward, forward, in all 
directions?  Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to 
light lanterns in the morning?  Who will wipe this blood off us?  What 
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 Nietzsche quoted in Arthur Danto’s Nietzsche as Philosopher (1965, p. 89). 
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 Arthur Danto sums up Nietzsche’s claim quite well in his analysis: “He [Nietzsche] 
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water is there for us to clean ourselves? Is not the greatness of this deed to 
great for us?
17
 
 
 Considering his view of nihilism, it is unsurprising that Nietzsche’s philosophy is 
largely an attack on truth as such.  Nietzsche was responding to the emergent positivist 
model, which associated truth with empiricism.  Much of his metaphysics, in fact, is a 
refutation of positivism.  In The Will to Power, for example, Nietzsche speaks to the error 
in divorcing truth from the interpreting subject.  “In opposition to positivism, which halts 
at phenomena and says, these are only facts and nothing more, I would say: No facts are 
precisely lacking, all that exists consists of interpretations.  We cannot establish any fact 
in itself.”18  That we cannot establish a fact in itself means that knowledge is necessarily 
nonfoundational.  A particular belief may be true or false, but it must perforce rest on 
relative foundations.
19
  Nietzsche’s broader point is that truths are incommensurable 
insofar as they can only be judged relative to a perspective.
20
  This is consistent with 
Nietzsche’s belief that human beings adopt a conceptual scheme by default in order to 
make sense of the world.  Whether this scheme is scientific, religious, or ideological, it 
begins fundamentally with a choice.  Nietzsche insists that this choice is permeated by 
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 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random 
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 The Will to Power, p. 284. 
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 Maudemarie Clark illustrates Nietzsche’s point concerning the impossibility facts in 
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valuations.  “It is our needs,” he writes, “that interpret the world; our instincts and 
impulses for and against.”21  In every conceivable case, then, it is this original impulse 
that determines truth and falsity, not the physical world.  Maudemarie Clark explains this 
aspect of Nietzsche’s perspectivism by noting that perspectives can be seen as “non-
competitors, as offering answers to different questions, in accord with different standards 
of acceptability.”22  Clark’s point here illustrates what Nietzsche means when he speaks 
of truth as utilitarian.  We choose an interpretive scheme or a perspective on the basis of 
our prejudices and preferences.  Because the standards of that scheme will determine 
what we accept as true, truth effectively helps us to get what we antecedently preferred.  
It is in this sense that Nietzsche believes truth claims are reducible to “value 
judgments.”23   
Nietzsche’s perspectivism informed much of Camus’ absurdist thought.  Indeed 
Camus’ essay on absurdism takes Nietzsche’s epistemology as a point of departure.  
Consider Camus’ assertion in The Myth of Sisyphus that “In psychology as in logic, there 
are truths but not truth.”24  Camus’ point here is essentially Nietzschean.  At bottom he 
accepts the view that a permanent divide separates the thinker from the object of thought.  
For this reason, Camus advocates the use of critical reason, but he objects to the sort of 
uncritical rationalism which assumes that complete knowledge of the world is possible.  
Indeed, in this way, Camus embodies what Karl Popper called “pragmatic rationalim.”25 
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Ultimately, Camus adopts Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism and regards all knowledge as 
construction.
 26
  Science, philosophy, art, all of these activities represent the world; they 
do not apprehend it.  Camus also appears to borrow Nietzsche’s conception of truth as 
metaphor.  Camus, for instance, describes the limits of science thus: 
All this is good and I wait for you to continue.  But you tell me of an 
invisible planetary system in which electrons gravitate around a nucleus.  
You explain this world to me with an image.  I realize then that you have 
been reduced to poetry: I shall never know.  Have I the time to become 
indignant?  You have already changed theories.  So that science that was 
to teach me everything ends up in a hypothesis, that lucidity founders in 
metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved in a work of art . . . I realize that if 
through science I can seize phenomena and enumerate them, I cannot, for 
all that, apprehend the world.
27
 
 
In his essay On Truth and Untruth, Nietzsche similarly reduces truth to 
anthropomorphisms and metaphors.
28
  The overlap here is worth noting as it highlights 
the shared basis of Camus and Nietzsche’s epistemological skepticism.   
 Eventually, Nietzsche’s perspectivism becomes politically problematic to Camus.  
As the later Camus (primarily in The Rebel) deals with responses to absurdity at both the 
individual and the collective level, Nietzsche’s insight into the perspectival nature of 
truth helps to clarify Camus’ early understanding of modern absolutism; specifically, 
Camus views ideologies as disguised manifestations of this Nietzschean will to truth.  
Camus hints at this in The Myth of Sisyphus: 
The tradition of what may be called humiliated thought has never ceased 
to exist.  The criticism of rationalism has been made so often that it seems 
unnecessary to begin again.  Yet our epoch is marked by the rebirth of 
those paradoxical systems that strive to trip up the reason as if truly it had 
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 “This heart within me I can feel,” Camus writes, “and I judge that it exists.  There ends 
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 The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 20. 
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 All truth, Nietzsche writes, is but “a sum of human relations that have been poetically 
and rhetorically intensified, translated and embellished” (On Truth and Untruth, p. 29). 
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always forged ahead.  But that is not so much a proof of the efficacy of the 
reason as of the intensity of its hopes.
29
 
 
The emphasis on “the intensity of its hopes” seems especially important.  The language 
Camus uses here is reminiscent of Nietzsche, who often spoke of the will to truth as a 
manifestation of the human desire for metaphysical solace.  In the political realm, Camus 
believed this desire produced a distinctly ideological brand of politics.  People cling to 
ideological systems, he suggests, because ideologies appeal to their thirst for clarity.  
“That nostalgia for unity” and “that appetite for the absolute,” he writes, “illustrates the 
essential impulse of the human drama.
30
  Politically, then, Nietzsche’s perspectivism has 
two important implications.  On the one hand, it abolishes absolutes.  By their very 
nature, truth claims are interested.  Nietzsche is not so much denying certainty as the 
notion that beliefs can rest on absolute, epistemologically pure foundations.  
Consequently, there can be no privileged account of reality over and above all others.  
However, because the impulse for certainty persists, people continue to order the world in 
accordance with ideological narratives.  Further, ideologies concretize truths that are 
based not on common experience but on particular perspectives.  This undermines any 
experiential basis for shared values and, worse still, it devalues the present by justifying 
action in terms of the future.
31
  It is therefore Nietzsche’s problematization of truth that 
crystallizes Camus’ account of the moral and political perils of absurdity.  
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 As I will explore in subsequent chapters, this concern is at the center of Camus’ 
critique of teleological ideologies in The Rebel.  Camus claims that ideologies are 
indispensable to the means-end logic of political realism, which sacrifice the present in 
the hope of future salvation.   
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Dostoevsky and Reason 
 In Dostoevsky’s fiction the failure to acknowledge the limits of reason is a 
central theme.  Indeed Dostoevsky’s most logical characters often descend into 
debauchery or give themselves over to nihilism.  This motif pervades much of Camus’ 
work as well.  His characters are constantly ensnared by contradictions from which they 
cannot escape.  In this way, intelligence becomes a kind of pathology in the works of 
Dostoevsky and Camus.  But the implications of this pathology extend well beyond the 
individual.  Establishing this point of convergence is necessary before pivoting to the 
political consequences of a society grounded entirely on reason. 
 In 1922 Andre Gide, a French author whom Camus read and admired, delivered a 
series of lectures on Dostoevsky.  One of Gide’s theses is that Dostoevsky juxtaposes 
love not with hate but with excessive mindfulness.
32
  Dostoevsky’ intent, Gide claims, 
was to show that “it is the intellect which individualizes, which is the enemy of the 
Kingdom of Heaven.”33 Gide’s interpretation is persuasive, as Dostoevsky continually 
contrasts intelligence with self-dissolution.  Indeed many of Dostoevsky’s intellectuals 
are unable to love because they fail to find reasons for it.  Stavrogin, for example, wants 
to believe – in goodness, in life, in others – but cannot will himself to do it.34  As he 
confesses in a final letter, “I lack greatness of soul . . . because I can never lose my 
                                                 
32
 Gide writes: “Dostoevsky never deliberately states, although he often insinuates, that 
the antithesis of love is less hate than the steady activity of the mind” (1926, 146). 
33
 Andre Gide, Dostoevsky, trans. Arnold Bennett (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), p. 
146. 
34
 Near the end of The Possessed, Stavrogin questions the strength of Tihon’s faith. Tihon 
responds by readily acknowledging that his “faith is imperfect” (697).  But then he 
suggests to Stavrogin that his problem is not that he does not believe; it is that he “wishes 
to believe” (698) but is unable to. Stavrogin never refutes this assertion by Tihon. 
 124 
reason, and I can never believe in an idea.”35  Kirilov of The Possessed is similarly 
undermined by his intellect.  Without God, Kirilov is consumed by the problem of 
freedom.  Logic convinces him of God’s non-existence but his intellect demands reasons 
for living.  What Kirilov ultimately craves, Dostoevsky implies, is faith.  Thus, as 
Maurice Friedman notes, Kirilov’s intellectual “denial of God conceals the most 
desperate need of him.”36  Kirilov is forced to unbelief by his intellect, which refuses to 
accept what it knows to be untrue.  In the end, as Stavrogin says, Kirilov “could not 
compromise with an idea.”37  Unable to live, he kills himself as an example for others: 
I am bound to show my unbelief . . . I have no higher idea than disbelief in 
God.  I have all this history of mankind on my side.  Man has done 
nothing but invent God so as to go on living, and not kill himself; that’s 
the whole universal history up till now.  I am the first one in whole history 
of mankind who would not invent God. Let them know it once for all.
38
 
 
In The Brothers Karamazov Ivan’s brother, Dmitri, is likewise tortured by doubt.  Dmitri 
tries to live a sensual life, but he is increasingly overwhelmed as he is confronted with 
various materialist notions.
39
  Finally, he succumbs to doubt and confesses to Alyosha 
that 
I never had any of these doubts before, but it was all hidden away in me.  
It was perhaps just because ideas I did not understand were surging up in 
me that I used to drink and fight and rage.  It was to stifle them in myself, 
to still them, to smother them . . . It’s God that’s worrying me.  That’s the 
only thing that’s worrying me.  What if He doesn’t exist? What if 
Rakitin’s right – that it’s an idea made up by men? . . . For whom is man 
going to love then?  To whom will he be thankful? . . . After all, what is 
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 125 
goodness? . . . Goodness is one thing with me and another with a 
Chinaman, so it’s a relative thing.  Or isn’t it? Is it not relative thing?  A 
treacherous question!  You won’t laugh if I tell you it’s kept awake for 
two nights.
40
 
 
Dmitri’s tranquility is ruined by exposure to European ideas that erode his belief in God.  
Gradually his natural contentment gives way to endless questions about the relativity of 
values.  “Goodness is one thing with me and another with a Chinaman, so it’s a relative 
thing? Or is it? . . . You won’t laugh if I tell you it’s kept me awake two nights.”41  As a 
result of their disbelief, then, Kirilov and Dmitri are unable to transcend themselves.  
Kirilov obsesses over the problem of self-will without God and Dmitri agonizes over the 
loss of transcendent standards.  In both cases, though, the fixation on ideas and 
foundations leads first to doubt and then to solipsistic despair.  
This pathological aspect of reason is perhaps best seen in the figure of Ivan 
Karamazov.  Ivan’s metaphysical rebellion is itself a product of critical reason, and the 
nihilism to which it leads is instructive.  For one, it illustrates the inability of reason to 
definitively justify value claims.  Ivan, it is important to remember, assents to nihilism for 
the sake of intellectual coherence.  As Robert Louis Jackson notes, Ivan “is a victim, 
finally, of the fatal logic of his position: believing absolutely in the concrete, as it were, 
day-to-day interdependence of virtue and faith but lacking personal belief in immortality, 
he arrives at the intellectual position that all is permissible.”42  That Ivan’s conclusion is a 
rational outcome of his materialist premise is confirmed by Dmitri: “Excuse me . . . have 
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I heard things right?  ‘Villainy must not only be permitted but even recognized as the 
inevitable and even rational outcome of his position for every atheist’!”43  
 In addition to exposing the justificatory limits of reason, Ivan’s dilemma also 
emphasizes the need for self-transcendence.  Ivan cannot transcend himself because he 
remains hostage to his intellect.  His desire for intellectual consistency condemns him to 
the either-or logic of nihilism.  “Caught between unjustifiable virtue and unacceptable 
crime,” Camus writes, “this man of supreme intelligence is killed by contradiction.”44  
Unable to reason his way to God or virtue, Ivan abandons morality altogether.  “All I 
know,” he concludes, “is that there is suffering and that there are none guilty; that cause 
follows effect, simply and directly; that everything flows and finds it level – but that’s 
only Euclidean nonsense, I know that, and I can’t consent to live by it.”45  As evident 
here, Ivan vainly searches for a rational response to suffering.  He talks incessantly of 
God, but fails to understand him because he talks (and thinks) only in the language of 
logic.  In a crucial exchange in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, Prince Muishkin clarifies Ivan’s 
failure: “The essence of religious feeling has nothing to do with reason, or atheism, or 
crime, or acts of any kind – it has nothing to do with these things – and never had.  There 
is something besides all this, something which the arguments of the atheists can never 
touch.”46  For Dostoevsky, then, faith is beyond reason.  Indeed a key theme of The Idiot 
is the folly of trying to justify one’s faith in terms of reason.  Muishkin appears most 
idiotic, in fact, when attempting to communicate his religious beliefs in non-religious 
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terms.  As Robin Feuer Miller rightly notes in her study of Dostoevsky, “The atheist 
cannot talk about God because his atheism is caused by his rational response to evil and 
to injustice, while faith exists as an instinctual response.  The two spheres do not 
intersect.”47  The final result of Ivan’s rebellion is thus defiant resignation.  
Camus was also concerned with the tendency of intelligence (consciousness) to 
overwhelm the individual.  As mentioned, this is particularly true of Camus’ Caligula.48  
In Dostoevsky’s works, however, reason (divorced from faith) is more than a source of 
individuation; it is also destructive of man’s spiritual health.  The evolution of Camus’ 
political thought suggests that this aspect of Dostoevsky was deeply influential.  Of 
course, as discussed in chapter one, Nietzsche is important to Camus for similar reasons, 
but Dostoevsky explores this theme from a uniquely religious perspective.  Dostoevsky’s 
novels are full of faithless believers who reject God but persist in their rational search for 
solidarity and love.  Insofar as Dostoevsky connects the religious impulse to modernity’s 
faith in reason, his insights converge with Nietzsche’s.  Dostoevsky and Nietzsche are 
thus concerned with essentially the same phenomenon; they merely interpret it in 
different terms.  Dostoevsky condemns reason in order to emphasize the fundamentally 
irrational nature of man, however.  His atheists are instructive because, like Camus, they 
are not atheists in the strictest sense.
49
  Their atheism, as Jackson argues, “is not so much 
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an ideology as a state of behavior or consciousness.”50  For Dostoevsky, to be wholly 
logical is to be at odds with one’s own nature.  As his characters confront the limits of 
reason, therefore, they become internally divided; they deny what Dostoevsky calls “the 
source of living life” in his novel The Adolescent.51  
Despite their divergent perspectives, however, the political implications of 
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s insights into human nature, faith and reason are remarkably 
similar.  For Camus they were indeed prophetic, particularly as it relates to ideology and 
the development of reason.  This was evident to Camus at both the individual and the 
collective level.  In terms of the individual, there remains a persistent inability to accept 
absurdity, to affirm life (and meaning) in relativistic terms.  For those who do not sink 
into negation – as Caligula, Stavrogin, Clamence, and Ivan do – this results either in the 
exaltation of reason or in a destructive mania for certainty.  In his short story The 
Renegade, Camus explores the pathological need for certainty in a pseudo-religious 
context.  The protagonist of The Renegade is a missionary who has traveled to Africa in 
search of converts.  The renegade is a quintessentially modern man.  He is passionate but 
inauthentic, and his existential insecurity is apparent in his need to proselytize: 
I shook my pig-head and repeated the same thing, to get among the most 
barbarous and live as they did, to show them at home, and even in the 
House of the Fetish, through example, that my Lord’s truth would prevail . 
. . I dreamed of absolute power, the kind that makes people kneel down, 
that forces the adversary to capitulate, converts him in short, and the 
blinder, the crueler he is, the more he’s sure of himself, mired in his own 
conviction, the more his consent establishes the royalty of whoever 
brought about his collapse.
52
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The renegade represents the worst instincts of the absolutist man.  He seeks converts not 
because of the truth (or utility) of his doctrine but because of the consolation he derives 
from being right.  His beliefs are surface-level props, designed to justify action and the 
worldview on which those actions are based.
53
  The renegade is problematic in a modern 
context because his thirst for meaning is not satisfied by reason alone.  Initially he tries to 
reduce the world to oppositional categories such as good and evil.  However, his self-
serving Manichaeism is upended as a result of his confrontation with the native Africans, 
whose fidelity to force awakens him to the truth of things: 
I had been misled, solely the reign of malice was devoid of defects, I had 
been misled, truth is square, heavy, thick, it does not admit distinctions, 
good is an idle dream, an intention constantly postponed and pursued with 
exhausting effort, a limit never reached, its reign is impossible.  Only evil 
can reach its limits and reign absolutely, it must be served to establish its 
visible kingdom.
54
 
 
Here the renegade recognizes the contingency of human judgments, and consequently 
accepts force as the sole arbiter of truth.  If there is no God, there is no binding idea, no 
standard for good and evil beyond the realm of man.  Reason is thus revealed as a tool, 
capable of guiding action but not of grounding it.  This is the beginning of what Camus 
refers to as political realism; it is the individual’s realization that the “reign of truth” can 
only be established on the plane of force.  
 In a world ruled by force, truth is the province of the strong.  Ideologies, shrouded 
in reason, define the world in absolutist terms and, in this sense, instantiate a particular 
view of “truth.”  However, if they are to be binding, these ideological worldviews must 
be accepted by others or, if necessary, imposed.  Hence in The Fall Camus associates 
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ideologies with the suppression of alternative views.  What was once “This is the way I 
think. What are your objections?” has become “This is the truth . . . You can discuss it as 
much as you want; we aren’t interested.  But in a few years there’ll be the police who will 
show you we are right.”55  At the collective level, then, the existential impulse identified 
by Dostoevsky and Nietzsche results in sweeping ideologies, which exalt reason, eschew 
epistemological limits, and construct (and defend) fixed interpretations of reality.  The 
consequence of this is a world defined increasingly by totalizing (and irreconcilable) 
systems.   
Ideology and Logical Crime 
Camus and Dostoevsky’s critique of ideologies led to a mutual concern with the 
relationship between reason, ideology and violence.  Indeed the most enduring political 
concern of both writers was the collapse of foundations and the concomitant justification 
of crime.  Camus begins The Rebel, for instance, with the following observation: 
There are crimes of passion and crimes of logic.  The boundary between 
them is not clearly defined . . . We are living in the era of premeditation 
and the perfect crime.  Our criminals are no longer helpless children who 
could plead love as their excuse.  On the contrary, they are adults and they 
have a perfect alibi: philosophy, which can be used for any purpose – even 
for transforming murderers into judges.
56
 
 
 The purpose of The Rebel was thus to try to understand logical crime and “to examine 
meticulously the arguments by which it is justified.”57   Ideologies are central to Camus’ 
analysis because they typically supply the theoretical justification for murder.
58
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Dostoevsky was similarly concerned with the antecedent causes of logical crime.  Indeed, 
in a rejoinder to critics, Dostoevsky wrote that his intent in The Possessed was to 
understand “how, in our contemporaneous, transitional and peculiar society, are the 
Nechayevs, not Nechayev himself, made possible?”59  Here Dostoevsky is referring to the 
anarchist on which The Possessed is based.  Dostoevsky’s aim in The Possessed, then, 
was the same as Camus’ in The Rebel: to understand how ordinary men are able to take 
part in the most extraordinary crimes. 
On Dostoevsky’s view, eighteenth century Russia was “contaminated” by the 
influx of various socialist doctrines.
60
  Among the most pernicious was the belief in the 
progressive power of reason, which supported the Russian mind’s mania for meaningful 
action.  Under the sway of “European progressives,” Dostoevsky argued, socialism 
emerged as a corrective to Christianity, a modern means to universal harmony.
61
  He 
attributed the rise of political crime, in fact, to a belief in the purifying power of these 
ideas: 
In my novel The Possessed I made the attempt to depict the manifold and 
heterogeneous motives which may prompt even the purest of heart and the 
naïve of people to take part in the perpetration of so monstrous a villainy.  
The horror lies precisely in the fact that in our midst the filthiest and most 
villainous act may be committed by one who is not a villain at all! . . . This 
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is the most pathological and saddest trait our present time – the possibility 
of considering oneself not as a villain, and sometimes almost not being 
one, while perpetrating a patent and incontestable villainy  - therein is our 
present-day calamity!
62
 
 
 Here Dostoevsky prefigures Camus’ argument about the capacity of ideology to imbue 
action with a sense of justice.
63
  Dostoevsky also points to specific European thinkers – 
Mill and Darwin, for instance – as emblematic of the modern devotion to reason, utility, 
and empiricism.  In their pursuit of political perfection, these thinkers declared everything 
sacred false and outdated.
64
  They were united, moreover, by a fidelity to logic without 
transcendent foundations.  For Dostoevsky, this meant a love of theoretical truth but a 
complete indifference to truths of experience.  Hence there was a willingness to follow 
the dictates of reason without regard for social consequences.  This was the essence of 
political nihilism for Dostoevsky.   
Dostoevsky’s account of logical crime informs much of Camus’ political thought.  
In The Rebel, for example, such Dostoevskyian themes pervade Camus’ analysis of 
Marxism.  There particular attention is paid to the use of logic in the justification of 
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violence.  When describing the “All or Nothing” mentality of historical rebels, for 
instance, Camus writes 
Just as the movement of rebellion led to the point of ‘All or Nothing” and 
just as metaphysical rebellion demanded the unity of the world, the 
twentieth century revolutionary movements, when it arrived at the most 
obvious conclusions of its logic, insisted with threats of force on 
arrogating to itself the whole of history . . . Now that God is dead, the 
world must be changed and organized by the forces at man’s disposal.65  
 
In The Possessed Dostoevsky expresses this attitude through the character Chigalev.  
Chigalev is the learned rebel who reasons his way to a perfectly harmonious society.  
Believing he has solved the problem of freedom and equality, he announces his findings 
to the group: 
Dedicating my energies to the study of the social organization which is in 
the future to replace the present condition of man, I’ve come to the 
conviction that all makers of social systems from ancient times up to the 
present year . . . have been dreamers, tellers of fairy-tales, fools who 
contradicted themselves, who understood nothing of natural science and 
the strange animal called man . . . But, now that we are all at last preparing 
to act, a new form of social organization is essential.  In order to avoid 
further uncertainty, I propose my own system of world-organization.
66
 
Chigalev’s “system” is finally embraced on account of its logical consistency.  But its 
methods sacrifice present experience entirely.  Like the historical rebels Camus 
condemns in The Rebel, Chigalev is obliged to act in the name of a hope.  His actions are 
directed toward the future, toward the realization of some obscure freedom.  As 
suggested above, denial of the present is a recurring theme in both The Possessed and The 
Rebel.  To take one example from The Possessed, there is a young socialist, Yulia, who is 
pathologically fixated on the future.  “The public must understand,” she demands, “that 
the attainment of an object of universal human interest is infinitely loftier than the 
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corporeal enjoyments of the passing moment.”67  Camus thought such utopian aspirations 
fundamental to modern revolutionary ideologies.  Marx, he claims, “was obliged to speak 
in the future tense and in the abstract.  Thus it is not astonishing that he could blend in his 
doctrine the most valid critical method . . . with a utopian messianism.”68  For men 
deprived of God, the future was the only transcendental value.
69
   
Against the backdrop of their political thought, then, Camus and Dostoevsky’s 
resistance to scientism is much clearer.  Translated to the political realm, the methods of 
science – reason, empiricism, and logic – become extensions of the will to mastery.  For 
Camus this was particularly manifest in Nazism.  Here science serves as a cover for 
various irrational impulses.  “The systematic and scientific aspect of the Nazi 
movement,” he claims, “hides an irrational drive that can only be interpreted as a drive of 
despair and arrogance.”70  In this way, Nazism illustrates the consequences of divorcing 
science and technology from a transcendent or external value system.
71
  It also connects 
Dostoevsky’s philosophical anthropology to Camus’ political thought; that is to say, 
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Nazism imbues the negation of nihilism with the individual’s passion for higher meaning 
in a terrifyingly stark way.  And this is precisely the vision of nihilism foreshadowed in 
Dostoevsky’s works.  When Camus writes, therefore, that Dostoevsky’s characters 
“prefigure our nihilism,” this is likely what he had in mind. 
In his study of totalitarianism, Camus asks why modern revolutions tend to betray 
in action what they affirm in theory.  Communism, for example, begins with noble 
aspirations of delivering all men from bondage, but ends nevertheless by enslaving them 
all.  It was essential for Camus to understand how rebellion reached this point of extreme 
contradiction.  He begins by understanding it as a function of the absolutist quest itself.  
The pursuit of absolute freedom, for instance, collapses into contradiction because such 
freedom is possible only through totalitarian means; that is, through absolute negation.  
Thus Camus argues that “complete freedom can only exist and justify itself by the 
creation of new values identified with the entire human race . . . The shortest route to 
these new standards passes by way of total dictatorship.”72   
Camus’ admonitions concerning absolutist pursuits are forcefully anticipated in 
Dostoevsky’s works, particularly The Possessed and The Brothers Karamazov.  Indeed in 
The Rebel Camus devotes an entire section to the legacy of Chigalev, whose system he 
compares to the totalitarian defenders of State terrorism in the twentieth century.
73
  For 
Camus, it is the “implacable” nature of Chigalev’s mind that marks him as a precursor to 
modern revolutionaries.  The premise of Chigalev’s system, for example, is unlimited 
freedom.  “I am perplexed by my own data,” he says, “and my conclusion is a direct 
contradiction of the original idea with which I started.  Starting from unlimited freedom, I 
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arrive at unlimited despotism.”74  According to Chigalev, a scientific account of man 
shows that “that there can be no solution of the social problem but mine.”75  This same 
theme is expressed in The Brothers Karamazov through the Grand Inquisitor.  Here, 
however, slavery is offered as a gift to mankind.  The uncertainty of freedom is replaced 
by the stability of slavery.  Like Chigalev, the Inquisitor’s arguments are rooted in a 
purely objective view of human nature.   To stifle doubt, he claims, men have 
Set up gods and challenged one another, “Put away your gods and come 
and worship ours, or we will kill you and your gods!”  And so it will be to 
the end of the world, even when gods disappear from the earth; they will 
fall down before idols just the same.  Thou didst know, Thou couldst not 
but have known, this fundamental secret of nature, but Thou didst reject 
the one infallible banner which was offered Thee to make all men bow 
down to Thee alone – the banner of earthly bread; and Thou hast rejected 
it for the sake of freedom and the bread of Heaven.  Behold what Thou 
didst further.  And all again in the name of freedom!  I tell Thee that man 
is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find someone quick to whom he 
can hand over that gift of freedom with which the ill-fated creature is 
born.
76
 
 
The Grand Inquisitor thus fancies himself as a redeemer.  Convinced that men crave 
coherence more than freedom, he offers them a respite.
77
  At bottom, the inquisitor is a 
simplifier; he relieves men of the burden of choice.
78
  “Didst Thou forget,” he asks, “that 
man prefers peace, and even death, to freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and 
evil?”79  For the inquisitor, then, men are suited to slavery despite their rebellious 
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nature.
80
  Hence he regards the tyrants of the world as “the unconscious expression” of 
man’s “craving for universal unity.”81   
It is significant that Dostoevsky considered the Grand Inquisitor the “culminating 
point . . . of his religious and political thought.”82  For his part, the inquisitor’s blueprint 
represented the realization of a political order dedicated exclusively to order and reason.  
Indeed the point of his system, as Bruce Ward justly argues, is to “articulate a social 
order which most closely corresponds to human nature.”83  Thus in his repudiation of 
Christ, the inquisitor insists that his formula is a logical inference derived from empirical 
observations of life and man.  In this way, he crowns a central theme of Dostoevsky’s, 
which remains undeveloped in previous works such as The Adolescent.  There, for 
example, revolutionaries, inspired by Europe, vow to “live according to the laws of 
nature and of truth.”84  But despite their grandiose aims, they fail to realize their political 
Utopia.  Like the nihilists in The Possessed, they incite chaos in order to build a “modern 
well-organized state.”85  But they succeed only in the creation of disorder.  In the 
inquisitor’s social formula, however, the well-organized state of which they dream is 
fully articulated.   
 Ultimately, for both Dostoevsky and Camus, totalitarian systems exalted reason at 
the expense of reality; that is, they assumed life could be made coherent.  The absurd 
teaches the contrary.  But the absurd is a truth of experience; it is not a discovery of 
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reason.  Totalitarian regimes are blind to this fact; they are propelled by an internal logic 
that aspires to a level of unity unattainable in an absurd world.  On Camus and 
Dostoevsky’s view, the pursuit of this illusion obscures the ambiguities of life and 
produces a politics that reinforces rather than resists the absurd. 
It is worth noting that neither Camus nor Dostoevsky were opposed to reason or 
science as such; instead they objected to scientism or belief in the universal applicability 
of the scientific method.
86
  Science helps to enumerate the material world but it does not 
(and cannot) give meaning to history.  Totalizing ideologies, however, tend to make two 
mistakes.  First, they presuppose that the world’s structure is fully intelligible or follows 
some general order.  It is precisely this sort of epistemological certitude that supports the 
ideologue’s pursuit of totality.87  Second, they deny man’s existential (that is, irrational) 
needs.  In Notes from Underground, Dostoevsky insists that “man’s nature acts as one 
whole, with everything that is in it, conscious or unconscious, and although it is 
nonsensical, yet it lives.”88  To ignore this is to diminish man’s capacity to live and 
choose.  As Fred Willhoite aptly notes, Camus followed Dostoevsky in this respect.  
“Camus,” he writes, “implicitly maintained that what we learn through existential 
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knowing is just as valid for our genuinely human needs and purposes as are the 
discoveries and theories of empirical science.”89  There is thus an important link between 
Camus and Dostoevsky’s conceptions of human nature and their epistemological views.  
It must also be remembered that Camus’ aim was always to defend the dignity of man, 
the very “dignity that rebellion affirms.”90  The experience of the twentieth century taught 
him that human values required more than a rational defense.  As an instrument of 
knowledge, reason is quite useful.  But reason is abstract; it is a conceptual tool that 
interprets the world but does not speak to meaning or ends.  The potentialities for 
communion and dialogue are thus greatest in experience.  Political orders that fail to 
account for this inevitably exceed the bounds of human reason. 
Hegel and the Deification of Reason 
 
To better illustrate Camus’ engagement with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky on the 
problem of historical progressivism, I turn now to their overlapping critiques of 
Hegelianism.  This will help to clarify three points.  First, Camus, Nietzsche, and 
Dostoevsky each understood Hegelianism as an essentially religious impulse.
91
  This is a 
critical point of convergence, the implications of which become clearer in Camus’ 
writings on revolt.
92
  Second, it emphasizes what Camus, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky 
viewed as the Enlightenment effort to ground morality on purely rational grounds.  For 
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Camus and Dostoevsky in particular, this fidelity to reason alone was integral to what 
Camus often referred to as “crimes of logic.”93  Lastly, Hegel’s enormous influence 
illustrates the totalizing role of reason in the modern world.  In the absence of God, 
reason emerges as the only source of certainty, the only guide to action.  Camus refer 
specifically to this in his discussion of Hegel in The Rebel:  
If history is, in fact, independent of all principles and composed only of a 
struggle between revolution and counterrevolution, there is no way out but 
to espouse wholeheartedly one of the two and either die or be resurrected. 
Nechaiev [the Russian nihilist and the inspiration for Dostoevsky’s The 
Possessed] pursues this logic to the bitter end. With him, for the first time, 
revolution is going to be explicitly separated from love and friendship.
94
 
 
This is the sense in which logical crime and the loss of faith are concomitants of the 
apotheosis of reason; it is also the sense in which reason serves as a defense against 
absurdity. 
Dostoevsky rejected secular ideologies as morally vacuous; they lacked the 
transcendent ground of Christianity and they were too abstract to bind a community or a 
country.  As evidence of this, Dostoevsky pointed to the religious fervor with which 
Russian intellectuals embraced socialism.
95
  For his part, this was a consequence of the 
collapse of faith and the desperate need for a binding idea.
96
  In works such as The 
Possessed, therefore, socialist schemes are described as “new religions . . . coming to 
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take the place of the old one.”97  This was also the view of Nietzsche, in whose texts 
historical movements like Marxism are seen as frustrated religions or attempts to 
replicate the moral effects of Christianity (the equality of men under God, for example) 
while denying its transcendent justifications.  This is quite clear in Twilight of the Idols, 
where Nietzsche insists that “When one gives up Christian belief one thereby deprives 
oneself of the right to Christian morality.”98  Similarly in his attack on Hegel in Untimely 
Meditations, Nietzsche claims that “Christianity has been naturalized by historical 
treatment . . . until it has been resolved into pure knowledge and destroyed in the 
process.”99  In The Rebel Camus adopts the same view.  “Socialism,” he maintains, “is 
only a degenerate form of Christianity.  In fact, it preserves a belief in the finality of 
history . . . which substitutes ideal ends for real ends.”100  Camus even aligns himself 
specifically with Nietzsche, who “saw clearly that humanitarianism was only a form of 
Christianity deprived of superior justification, which preserved final causes while 
rejecting the first cause.”101  Camus thus follows both Dostoevsky and Nietzsche and 
equates humanitarianism with ideologies that justify action in the name of humanity.  
For Camus, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche, the tendency to act in the name of some 
abstract love for humanity was a hallmark of ideologies.  Indeed for each of them the 
Christian roots of secular doctrines (particularly socialism) were most apparent in this 
manifestation.  As noted previously, the impossibility of loving mankind in the abstract 
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was a recurring theme in The Brothers Karamazov.  But Dostoevsky also associates this 
sort of abstract love with socialism.  In The Idiot, for instance, Dostoevsky dismisses the 
socialist’s “abstract love of humanity” as nearly always love of self.”102  Interestingly 
enough, Camus echoes this sentiment in The Fall, as Clamence repeatedly mocks the 
ideologue’s “love of mankind” and implies that such men are moved primarily by “self-
love.”103  And Clamence’s failure to save the drowning woman is itself a sign of his 
shallow humanism.  In Diary of a Writer Dostoevsky continues his critique of secular 
humanism, asserting that Russians, “having detached themselves from the people . . . and 
God,” necessarily turn to reason for a justification for solidarity.  Consequently, humanity 
is converted into an “abstract ideal,” rooted in “logic” and “ideas.”104  It was 
inconceivable, Dostoevsky contended, to love one’s fellow man this way; it was too 
disconnected, too theoretical.  In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche makes essentially the 
same point:  
To love mankind for God’s sake has up to now been the most 
distinguished and far-fetched feeling that mankind has reached.  That love 
for mankind, without some sanctifying reservation, is only one more 
stupidity and brutishness, that the impulse to such love must first get its 
proportion, its delicacy, its grain of salt and dash of ambergris from a 
higher impulse. 
Although Nietzsche is not interested in defending Christianity, it is remarkable how 
similar his critique of humanism is to Dostoevsky’s.  Both hold that love of humanity is 
unsustainable without some higher inclination.  Kroeker and Ward have emphasized this 
parallel in their study of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche: “Secular humanism,” the authors 
claim, “is not tenable, according to Nietzsche, because it is driven by a fundamental 
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theoretical contradiction: one cannot do away with the ideal of God while holding onto 
the ideal of humanity . . . the love of humanity depends on belief in God.”105  As the 
authors also suggest, Nietzsche’s argument here mirrors that of Ivan in The Brothers 
Karamazov.
106
  Camus similarly condemns socialists for failing to serve man in the 
concrete.  In a 1944 essay for Combat, for example, Camus writes: 
 There is a certain form of socialist doctrine that we detest, perhaps even 
more than we detest the politics of tyranny.  It is a doctrine that rests on 
optimism and invokes the love of humanity to exempt itself from serving 
human beings, the inevitability of progress to evade the question of wages, 
and universal peace to avoid necessary sacrifice.  This kind of socialism 
relies mainly on the sacrifices of others.  Those who preach it never 
commit themselves.
107
 
The Dostoevskyian hue of this passage is apparent.  Indeed for Camus as much as for 
Dostoevsky, one either served man in the concrete or not at all.  As Camus remarks in the 
final chapter of The Rebel, true rebellion begins with a peculiar form of love, which is 
“crowned with the heart-rending cry of Karamazov.”108  However, rebellion betrays its 
noble origins the moment it prefers “an abstract concept of man to a man of flesh and 
blood.”109  This moment of betrayal is marked by the shift from rebellion to revolution in 
which ideas – of man, of history, of justice – become the object of devotion.   
Camus also argues that progressive ideologies mirror religions in their re-location 
of salvation at the end of history.  This effort to preserve transcendence is for Camus the 
result of a misguided belief in “the enlightening powers of science.”110  Further, it is born 
of a Utopian fantasy, which seeks to “replace God by the future” and to “identify the 
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future with ethics.”111  This aspect of Camus’ critique is significant in this context for two 
reasons.  First, it elucidates why Camus’ political thought is more aligned with 
Dostoevsky than Nietzsche.  In The Rebel, for example, Camus suggests that Nietzsche’s 
philosophy (as well as Hegel’s) helped to justify a certain kind of political realism.  
“Nietzsche’s responsibility,” Camus writes, “lies in having legitimized, for reasons of 
method – and even if only for an instant – the opportunity for dishonesty of which 
Dostoevsky had already said that if once offered to people, one could always be sure of 
seeing them rushing to seize it.”112  Here Camus is referring to the use of “great ends” to 
justify present action.  Dostoevsky also warned against this sort of logic; indeed he 
insisted that belief in Christ, in the immortality of the soul, was essential to resisting it.  
For Dostoevsky, this was an existential imperative; it satisfied the irrepressible desire for 
salvation, for a final goal.  But it also preserved the political order by uniting people 
around a common ideal.  In the absence of such a belief, there was an ever-present danger 
of historical ideologies filling this vacuum and distorting the present in the name of some 
future Utopia.  This Dostoevskyian insight is fundamental to Camus’ argument in The 
Rebel.  In fact, Camus condemns such historical doctrines as Marxism and Nazism for 
positing visions of the future and recognizing only those values “which serve this 
particular future.”113   
 The second reason why Camus’ critique is important is that it reveals the extent to 
which Camus critically engages Nietzsche.  As noted previously, Nietzsche enjoined men 
to embrace the earth and to find freedom in fate and creation.  However, Camus was 
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increasingly opposed to the affirmative implications of Nietzsche’s philosophy.  “With 
Nietzsche,” he writes, “rebellion ends . . . in the exaltation of evil.”114  While Camus 
understood that Nietzsche sought only to replace “the judge and the oppressor” with “the 
creator,” he also believed that, for the majority of mankind, “the intoxication of freedom 
ends in biological or historical Caesarism.”115  As his political novel The Possessed 
demonstrates, Dostoevsky was deeply troubled by this tendency as well, and his defense 
of faith cannot be understood apart from it.   
Let us return to Hegel, a figure of considerable importance in the writings of 
Camus, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche.  Dostoevsky traced much of Russia’s political 
disorder to the influence of Hegel.  So important, in fact, was Hegel to Dostoevsky that 
Dostoevsky remarked in a letter to a friend, from whom he was borrowing a copy of 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, that “my whole future” depends upon a firm 
understanding of Hegel’s philosophy of history.116  In Diary of a Writer, Dostoevsky 
specifically condemns the Hegelian roots of Russia’s socialist movement, calling it a 
“distressing, pathological phenomenon . . . yet one that was inevitable by reason of its 
historical logic.”117  Camus was also opposed to the totalizing logic of historical 
movements.  He regarded Hegel’s system in particular as an example of the modern 
apotheosis of reason.  As Jeffrey Isaac notes, for Camus “the deification of man 
characteristic of Enlightenment thinking reaches its culmination in the writings of Hegel . 
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. . which . . . unites a modernizing historicism with a dangerous faith in reason.”118  
Hegel’s secular philosophy, Camus argued, preserved the certainty of religious 
conviction by reducing man and history to reason.  In this way, Hegel denied the ground 
of freedom by subordinating human agency to history.  Camus suggests as much in a 
notebook entry in which he refutes both the existentialists and the Hegelians: 
“Existentialism kept Hegelianism’s basic error, which consists in reducing man to 
history.  But it did not keep the consequence, which is to refuse in fact any liberty to 
man.”119  Nietzsche rejected Hegel on similar grounds as Dostoevsky and Camus.  In The 
Use and Abuse of History, Nietzsche claims that Hegel has put “history in the place of 
other spiritual powers, art and religion, as the one sovereign.”120  This Nietzschean point 
is echoed in The Rebel.  After Hegel, Camus argues, “The whole effort of German 
thought has been to substitute for the notion of human nature that of human situation and 
hence to substitute history for god and modern tragedy for ancient equilibrium.”121  In 
any case, the key point here is that Camus, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche all converge in 
their repudiations of Hegel.  They reject not only Hegel’s system but also the living 
influence of his philosophy. 
With Hegel, history supplants God and the real becomes indistinguishable from 
the rational.  In effect, though, Hegel only reconciles the real and the rational by 
identifying one with the other.  The result of this distortion of reality is a kind of blanket 
justification of present action.  “Truth, reason, and justice,” Camus writes in The Rebel, 
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are “abruptly incarnated in the progress of the world.”122  Values, in other words, are 
either supplanted by facts or “found at the end of history.”123  And without independent 
principles to guide action, the task of shaping history falls to reason and force.  This is 
what Camus means when he maintains that Hegel furnished “the decisive justification of 
the spirit of power in the twentieth century.”124  In the case of Nazism, force is exalted 
and history is reduced to its purest form.  The goal of evolution displaces the process 
itself.  Such an attitude was expressed perfectly by Ernst Junger, the leading intellectual 
behind Nazism: “Evolution is far more important than living.”125  For Camus, this is the 
culmination of a logic rooted in historical dynamism.  
The fusion of power and historicism thus leads to an obsession with progress and 
motion.  Camus speaks to this in a series of Combat articles, in which he argues that the 
leading ideologies of his time (capitalism and Hegelian-Marxism) were 
based on the idea of progress . . . and convinced the application of their 
principles must inevitably lead to social equilibrium . . . They are 
extracting a very heave price from us.  In practical terms, it follows that 
the battle that will be waged in years to come will not pit the forces of 
utopia against the forces of reality.  Rather, it will pit different utopias 
against each other as they try to gain a purchase on the real, and the only 
choice remaining will be to decide which form of utopia is least costly.
126
 
 
As implied here, Camus considered Hegelianism the culmination of idealism.  This could 
be seen in its pretension to knowledge of the course of history, which is also a denial of 
absurdity.  Recall that both Nietzsche and Camus believed the world was justifiable only 
as an aesthetic phenomenon. To imbue history (or the world) with some higher meaning, 
therefore, is to negate the absurd.  Furthermore, by making idols of history and reason, 
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Hegelianism elevates ideas over experience.  The denial of experience is a crucial point 
for Camus.  Indeed, it is here that Camus extends Dostoevsky and Nietzsche’s ideas to 
contemporary politics.   
  For Camus, the elevation of ideas over experience was a byproduct of historical 
teleology; that is, of a linear and determined conception of history.  “Confronted with the 
possibility that the idea may be realized in the future,” he notes in The Rebel, human life 
can be everything or nothing.”127  Teleological thinking, of which Hegel is a prime 
example, helped to instantiate political realism and, consequently, to legitimize crime.  
Camus also addresses this in Combat: “terror can be legitimized only if one adopts the 
principle that the end justifies the means.  And this principle can be embraced only if the 
efficacy of an action is taken to be an absolute end . . . as in philosophies that take history 
as absolute.”128  This passage distills Camus’ argument against political realism.  As an 
outgrowth of teleology, political realism is defined by its resistance to limits.  Every 
encroachment upon reality is but a necessary step on the road to absolute freedom.  
Hence much of Camus’ political thought aims at discrediting this approach to action.  
When he condemns communism in Combat, for example, he expresses his solidarity with 
the collectivist vision but says explicitly that “their adherence to a very consistent 
philosophy of history justifies their acceptance of political realism as the primary method 
for securing triumph of an ideal shared by many Frenchmen . . . We do not believe in 
political realism.  Our method is different.”129  Fundamentally, Camus rejects political 
realism for the same reasons he rejects historical progressivism: it denies experience in 
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defense of abstract truths.  In this respect, Camus’ position is indistinguishable from 
Nietzsche’s.  Nietzsche, for instance, writes that “We should serve history only so far as 
it serves life; but to value its study beyond a certain point mutilates and degrades life: and 
this is a fact that certain marked symptoms of our time make it as necessary as it may be 
painful to bring to the test of experience.”130  In a 1947 notebook entry, Camus similarly 
asks: “Being in history while referring to values that go beyond history – is it possible?  
Does not the value of ignorance itself cover a convenient refuge?  Nothing is pure, 
nothing is pure – this is the cry that has poisoned our century.”131 For Camus, then, 
history was a source of nihilism, not of values or limits. 
Before continuing, it is worth noting that several commentators have questioned 
Camus’ reading of Hegel.132  However, it is of little consequence to this study whether 
Camus’ interpretation of Hegel was justified or not.  Here it suffices to note the degree to 
which Camus’ understanding of Hegel’s philosophy (and its enduring influence) was 
informed by Dostoevsky and Nietzsche.  Camus understood his century as one that “tried 
to live without transcendence.”133  For Camus, Nietzsche diagnosed the peculiar brand of 
nihilism that resulted from this effort.  Modern nihilism, he concludes in a footnote in 
The Rebel, “is still nihilism in the Nietzschean sense . . . to the extent that it is a calumny 
of the present life to the advantage of a historical future in which one tries to believe.”134  
The modern attempt to live without transcendence failed because it was still animated by 
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the “appetite for divinity,” which Camus considered the chief characteristic of the 
revolutionary mind.  Nietzsche (along with Dostoevsky) helped to crystallize the origins 
of this for Camus.  Dostoevsky’s contribution consisted more in his understanding of the 
political importance of foundations.  Indeed Dostoevsky was arguably the first modern 
writer to articulate the consequences of replacing religion with politics, God with History.  
He also understood, perhaps more than Nietzsche, the social utility of shared traditions 
tied to a web of transcendent beliefs.  While Nietzsche grasped this historical link, 
Dostoevsky (at least in Camus’ view) seems to have better understood the perils of 
egoism.  In any event, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky both saw Hegelianism as a 
manifestation of the human need for clarity and transcendence of one form or another.  
With Hegel, however, the desire for transcendence is concealed and expressed in terms of 
the flow of history.  That Camus also understands Hegel and his successors in this way 
shows to what extent he continued to develop his thought against the backdrop of 
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky. 
Freedom and Despotism  
There are sporadic references to Dostoevsky’s critique of despotic regimes in 
Camus’ fiction.  On at least two occasions in The Fall, Clamence invokes the Grand 
Inquisitor’s ideas concerning man’s preference for slavery over freedom.135  
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Commentators have also suggested that Chigalev’s “system” was a kind of blueprint for 
Camus’ Caligula.136  Certainly there is evidence for this, but Dostoevsky’s influence is 
arguably clearer in Camus’ State of Siege.  Performed in 1948, State of Siege is a 
theatrical exploration of totalitarianism.  Set in the Spanish city of Cadiz, it begins as the 
town is besieged by a mysterious plague.  Unlike Camus’ novel The Plague, however, 
State of Siege is not so much about the individual as it is the state.  Camus describes his 
intention thus: 
I did not seek to flatter anyone in writing the State of Siege.  I wanted to 
attack directly a type of political society which has been organized or is 
being organized, to the right or to the left, on a totalitarian basis.  No 
spectator can in good faith doubt that this play takes sides with the 
individual, in that which is noble in the flesh, in short, with terrestrial love, 
against the abstractions and the terrors of the totalitarian state, whether this 
be Russian, German, or Spanish.
137
 
 
The Plague is primarily about the ineradicability of evil and suffering in an absurd world.  
In State of Siege, however, the plague is human; it is born of ideas and reason.
138
  Hence 
a despot personifies the plague and the regime itself is seen as an organizational 
manifestation of absurdity.  The Plague, moreover, deals with lapses of attention and the 
tendency of individuals to retreat into routine.  State of Siege addresses this as well, but 
here such failures are worse because they perpetuate an evil that is human and therefore 
preventable.   
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In any event, there are some important parallels between the inquisitor’s social 
doctrine and the authoritarian regime in State of Siege.  To begin, in State of Siege the 
protagonist (named The Plague) functions as a theoretical defender of despotism.  He is 
opposed to the play’s hero, Diego, who leads the revolt against the regime.  The dramatic 
tension revolves around these two characters, and it is in their exchanges that The Plague 
reveals himself as a modern inquisitor.  For example, The Plague promises to simplify 
life by bringing “order, silence, and total justice.”139  Instead of uncertainty and “cheap 
emotion,” he offers “organization” and freedom from the irrational.140  He aims, 
moreover, to substitute the uncertainty of life with a self-imposed tyranny that is 
amenable to human control.  Even death, the ultimate symbol of absurdity, is made 
orderly and rational.
141
  The Plague also absolves the people of their thirst for answers by 
abolishing inquiry altogether.  We will “do all the thinking” for them, he proclaims.142 
The Grand Inquisitor adopts this approach as well: “The most painful secrets of their 
conscience, all, all they will bring to us, and we shall have an answer for all.”143  Also 
like the inquisitor, The Plague imagines himself a savior, a benevolent dictator who 
brings peace and stability to his subjects.  He says to the citizens of Cadiz that “I don’t 
ask you to thank me for this; it’s only natural, what I am doing here for you.”144  This is 
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reminiscent of the inquisitor, who “vanquishes freedom” in order to “make men 
happy.”145  In this way, the false and paternalistic humanism for which Dostoevsky and 
Camus condemned socialists appears in these works at the root of totalitarian regimes. 
 Dostoevsky’s influence on State of Siege can also be seen in the related theme of 
social isolation.  The Plague, for example, tries to atomize the populace, to destroy the 
bonds between people.  This is accomplished in several ways, most of which are 
prefigured in The Brothers Karamazov.  This is most apparent in the political use of 
hunger to stifle the seeds of revolt.  For instance, the inquisitor chastises Christ for the 
gift of freedom and says 
Thou wouldst go into the world, and art going with empty hands with 
some promise of freedom which men in their simplicity and their natural 
unruliness cannot even understand, which they fear and dread . . . But 
seest Thou these stones in this parched and barren wilderness?  Turn them 
into bread, and mankind will run after Thee like a flock of sheep, grateful 
and obedient, though forever trembling, lest Thou withdraw Thy hand and 
deny them Thy bread.
146
 
 
Near the end of the second act, Diego reproaches The Plague for precisely this sort of 
tactic: 
It’s true that you are lying and that you will go on lying until the end of 
time.  Yes, I’ve seen through your famous system.  You have imposed on 
men the pangs of hunger and bereavement to keep their minds off any 
stirrings of revolt.  You wear them down, you waste their time and 
strength so that they’ve neither the leisure nor the energy to vent their 
anger . . . which is what you want, isn’t it?  Great as their numbers, they 
are quite as much alone as I am.
147
 
 
                                                 
145
 The Brothers Karamazov, p. 260. 
146
 Ibid, p. 262. 
147
 Caligula and Three Other Plays, pp. 205-06. 
 154 
For The Plague and the inquisitor, then, cultivating dependency helps to shatter 
solidarity.
148
  However, in State of Siege, when Diego refuses to submit, The Plague 
proposes an inquisitor-like exchange.  Diego’s love, Victoria, falls ill.  The Plague offers 
to spare both of their lives if only he would cease revolting.  “Don’t you realize,” he 
urges, “that ten years of this girl’s love are worth far more than a century of freedom for 
those men?”149  The inquisitor also works to undermine communal bonds.  “Miracle, 
mystery, and authority,” he proclaims, suffice to “conquer and hold captive . . . the 
conscience of these impotent rebels.”150  For The Plague, the principal instrument of 
division is authority.  As the outbreak spreads, therefore, he issues a series of bizarre 
edicts that are designed to isolate.  The first edict forbids citizens from helping “any 
person stricken with the disease.”151  He then demands that each citizen “keep 
permanently in his mouth a pad soaked in vinegar.”  The stated purpose of these decrees 
is to teach “discretion and the art of silence.”152  But more fundamentally, they destroy 
dialogue and, consequently, the possibility for shared meaning and collective action.  I 
seek “to fix things up in such a way,” The Plague says, “that nobody understands a word 
of what his neighbor says . . . [Then] we shall be well on the way to that ideal 
consummation – the triumph of death and silence.”153  The Grand Inquisitor’s effort to 
diminish thoughtfulness and deconstruct the subject is thus apparent in the actions of The 
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Plague.  In the place of individual choice and freedom, moreover, both despots substitute 
the twin virtues of duty and obedience.  The Plague insists that what he desires of the 
people “isn’t comprehension but execution of their duties.”154  As seen above, the 
inquisitor similarly sought to stupefy the masses through the contrived use of “miracle, 
mystery, and authority.” 
In State of Siege and The Brothers Karamazov, alienating the populace also 
prepares the way for the rationalization of existence.  Isolated and deprived of 
community, the state becomes the sole locus of meaning and order for the individual. 
Totalitarian regimes capitalize on this need for direction by applying the principles of 
reason to the mechanization of society.  This can be seen in the use of ants as a kind of 
political model for humanity.  The inquisitor, for instance, aspires to reduce humanity to 
one “unanimous and harmonious ant-heap.”155  The bureaucrat in State of Siege, Nada, 
similarly announces The Plague’s efforts to ensure that the “world acquires that neat, 
nicely ordered layout whose template is the gibbet,” and is “shared between well-drilled 
ants and the placid dead.”156  In both texts, then, ants are exalted on account of their 
efficiency and order.  An ant-heap consists not of people but of parts, which act without 
regard for motive but which nevertheless fulfill their role.  To condition human action in 
this way is the chief aspiration of all totalitarian states.  Camus and Dostoevsky suggest 
that such an aspiration follows naturally from the fusion of nihilism and reason; that is to 
say, nihilism abolishes human telos, reality is seen as infinitely malleable, and reason 
emerges as the ultimate instrument of human mastery. 
                                                 
154
 Ibid, p. 181. 
155
 The Brothers Karamazov, p. 267. 
156
 Caligula and Three Other Plays, p. 186. 
 156 
Conclusion 
 The aim of this chapter was to understand the process by which reason and 
ideology emerged as totalizing political forces in the modern world.  In terms of Camus’ 
broader dialogue with Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, several developments are worth noting.  
First, Camus brings to his political analysis a fundamental lesson he absorbed from 
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, namely the psychological significance of guiding principles.  
In earlier absurdist inquiries, Camus affirmed man’s inability to justify traditional sources 
of meaning.  From a political perspective, however, transcendent beliefs acquire a new 
significance; they are standards through which man gleans meaning and on the basis of 
which he acts.  As Camus deconstructs historical ideologies, this lesson pervades his 
thought; specifically, Camus identifies scientism, which Dostoevsky and Nietzsche both 
understood as an extension of the will to totality, as the means by which such 
metaphysical aspirations are realized.  This is the sense in which Camus understood 
progressive ideologies, and in Camus’ analysis of Hegel’s revolutionary legacy, 
Dostoevsky and Nietzsche’s influence was apparent.   
Owing in part to Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, then, Camus approached reason (in 
his political thought, at least) not as an epistemological phenomenon but as an extension 
of metaphysical drives.  But Camus also appears to develop Dostoevsky’s thesis 
concerning the link between individual crime and societal disorder.  For Dostoevsky, 
political nihilism was the inevitable result of metaphysical nihilism.  As the previous 
chapter argued, Camus’ absurdist literature affirms this at the level of the individual. 
In The Rebel, however, Camus uses the destructive legacy of Nietzsche’s philosophy to 
corroborate Dostoevsky’s political hypothesis.  Dostoevsky’s fiction, for example, 
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anticipates the nihilism of political systems founded wholly on reason.  In his account of 
Marxism in particular, Camus implies Dostoevsky’s prophetic vision has been fulfilled.  
In this way, Camus uses Dostoevsky’s art as a framework for understanding the modern 
phenomenon of logical crime.  Indeed Camus extends the logic of Dostoevsky’s nihilists 
to account for the excesses of historical revolt.  Without foundations, Camus finally 
concludes, limits are abolished, expediency is exalted, and belief in the progressive 
power of reason guides action.  These developments defined the modern era, and Camus 
rightly identifies Dostoevsky as its leading political prophet.  
 The foregoing analysis also points to the increasing tension of Camus’ thought.  
In many ways, Camus is suspended between Nietzsche and Dostoevsky’s thought.  
Nietzsche, for instance, is a philosopher of freedom and doubt; he denies absolutes and 
urges acceptance of untruth.  Despite his ethical reservations, Camus is persuaded by 
Nietzsche’s epistemological critiques.  On the other hand, Dostoevsky appears to 
understand everything Nietzsche does, but insists on the moral necessity of transcendence 
and the Christ-ideal.  Dostoevsky argues that the loss of transcendent values will disturb 
the individual and upend the political order.  In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus defines 
absurdity in Nietzschean terms; transcendence is rejected and man is charged with 
creating value and meaning in this life.  In The Rebel, there is a subtle shift.  Camus does 
not abandon his absurd position, but he is forced to acknowledge the consequences of a 
world without God.  While Nietzsche was aware of the metaphysical struggles that would 
follow in the wake of God, his solution is politically inadequate in Camus’ view.  Rather 
than affirm values on individual terms, as Nietzsche hoped, men made a divinity of 
history and the future.  As Camus put it, sensing the absence of transcendence, men 
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decided to kill “so that it might exist.”157  With this insight, Camus aligns himself more 
with Dostoevsky than Nietzsche.   
 In the following chapter, Camus’ problematization of transcendence is seen as the 
impetus for his philosophy of revolt.  As Camus develops his conception of revolt, the 
tensional relation to Nietzsche and Dostoevsky is preserved, but Dostoevsky’s claims 
concerning transcendence remain paramount.  Camus refuses to adopt Dostoevsky’s 
religious hypothesis, but the need to affirm something beyond one’s self undergirds 
Camus’ thought.  The difference is that Camus replaces Dostoevsky’s Christ-ideal with 
the image of the rebel.  In doing so, Camus posits something experiential (and symbolic) 
in the name of which men can act and judge.  On his view, this undercuts the theoretical 
justifications for crime and violence – or at the very least imposes limits on actio
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE POLITICS OF REVOLT 
“Man can master in himself everything that should be mastered. He should rectify in 
creation everything that can be rectified. And after he has done so, children will still die 
unjustly even in a perfect society. Even by his greatest effort man can only propose to 
diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice and the suffering of 
the world will remain, and no matter how limited they are, they will not cease to be an 
outrage. Dimitri Karamazov’s cry of “Why?” will to continue to resound” - Camus 
 Following the positivist revolution in science, religious authority waned and 
ideologies emerged as the dominant forces in political life.  For Camus, the result of this 
shift was a new kind of politics, one in which abstract ideologies replaced religions as 
sources of identity and meaning.  As an artist, Camus struggled constantly against these 
sources of immoderation.  Indeed, this was the defining theme of his revolt writings.  In 
The Rebel, for example, Camus reacts against the nihilism of his age by seeking to re-
locate the ground for action in the realm of experience.  However, the theoretical basis of 
Camus’ philosophy of revolt can also be seen in his fiction, particularly in the evolution 
from The Stranger to The First Man.   
Beginning with The Stranger, Camus develops an increasingly broader 
conception of revolt, in which consciousness extends outward from the individual to the 
collective.  In The Plague and The Growing Stone, this collective consciousness has the 
potential to create a community of revolt as well as a basis for solidarity and limits.  And 
in his final novel, Camus represents the experience of revolt through the myth of the first 
man.  The aim here is to follow these movements as they unfold in Camus’ texts.  
Additional attention is paid to the role of antinomies in Camus’ thought.  In addition to 
clarifying the links between Camus’ absurd and revolt writings, this will allow for a 
clearer distinction between Camus’ mature thought and that of Nietzsche and 
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Dostoevsky.  I begin, however, with a brief explication of the problem of foundations, as 
conceived by Dostoevsky and Camus.   
One of the fundamental problems raised by Dostoevsky is that of foundations.  
Nietzsche grasped the critical link between foundations and values, but his aim was 
always to affirm the individual as the creative locus of meaning.  For Dostoevsky, 
individual meaning and social values could not be separated in this way; they were rooted 
in a common idea, and the cost of divorcing them was disorder.  Hence Dostoevsky 
addressed the problem of foundations in terms of the inseparability of values and 
transcendence.  Camus sensed the importance of foundations, but he opposed 
foundationalism as such.  Despite his admiration for Dostoevsky, then, Camus remained 
ambivalent towards Christianity.  At the same time, Camus was equally dissatisfied with 
the ideological alternatives to Christianity, particularly Communism.  In a letter to his 
mentor, Jean Grenier, Camus expresses his frustration: 
 And as for me, am I so confident?  If there are no eternal values, 
Communism is right and nothing is permitted, human society must be built 
whatever the price.  If it is wrong, then the Gospel and Christianity must 
be followed.  Never before has this dilemma been given an image more 
distressed and insistent than today.  And men like myself who dream of an 
impossible synthesis, who refuse violence and lies without having to 
justify their opposite, and who, nevertheless, cannot keep from screaming, 
are going crazy.
1
  
 
Camus is thus torn between Christianity and Communism, both of which denied the 
primacy of experience.  But Camus was similarly troubled by postmodernism, which 
eschewed foundations altogether.  As Cecil Eubanks has noted, Camus hoped to avoid 
                                                 
1
 Albert Camus, Correspondence, 1932-1969, trans. Jan F. Rigaud (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2003), p. 93. 
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“the essentialism of metaphysical thinking” while speaking “to a politics of value.”2  This 
captures Camus’ project well, and illustrates the sense in which he sought foundations 
without foundationalism.  For Camus, values and justifications for action had to be rooted 
in experience.  Jeffrey Isaac makes a similar point with regard to Camus’ project.  
Camus, Isaac claims, asserted human values in non-essentialist terms and denied 
unequivocally that reason could “apprehend the historical absolute.”3  To accept the 
relativity of values while affirming the dignity of human life was therefore a key tension 
in Camusian revolt. 
 The focus on foundations points to an important convergence between 
Dostoevsky and Camus, particularly as it relates to the link between order and ideas.  As 
mentioned, Dostoevsky refused to defend faith on epistemological grounds; instead he 
emphasized the centrality of ideas to human living.  For Dostoevsky, in fact, the loss of 
God (or more precisely, the loss of the idea of God) meant the loss of the source of order 
– at both the individual and the social level.4  The nihilists of The Possessed, for example, 
are preoccupied with new “ideas” in proportion to their uprootedness from God and 
tradition.  This is evident in a key passage in the text: 
"Not a single nation," he went on, as though reading it line by line, still 
gazing menacingly at Stavrogin, "not a single nation has ever been 
founded on principles of science or reason. There has never been an 
example of it, except for a brief moment, through folly. Socialism is from 
its very nature bound to be atheism, seeing that it has from the very first 
                                                 
2
 Cecil L. Eubanks, epilogue to Eric Voegelin’s Dialogue with the Postmoderns, ed. Peter 
A. Petrakis and Cecil L. Eubanks (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2004).   
3
 Jeffrey Isaac, Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1992), p. 109. 
4
 Here Dostoevsky is remarkably close to Nietzsche, who also argues in his essay on 
history that human beings require a conception of life for their survival. A thinking being 
requires a horizon of meaning, Nietzsche claims, and “if it is unable to draw one around 
itself . . . it will come to an untimely end” (Untimely Meditations, p. 101). 
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proclaimed that it is an atheistic organization of society, and that it intends 
to establish itself exclusively on the elements of science and reason. 
Science and reason have, from the beginning of time, played a secondary 
and subordinate part in the life of nations; so it will be till the end of time. 
Nations are built up and moved by another force which sways and 
dominates them, the origin of which is unknown and inexplicable: that 
force is the force of an insatiable desire to go on to the end, though at the 
same time it denies that end. It is the force of the persistent assertion of 
one's own existence, and a denial of death. It's the spirit of life, as the 
Scriptures call it, 'the river of living water,' the drying up of which is 
threatened in the Apocalypse. It's the aesthetic principle, as the 
philosophers call it, the ethical principle with which they identify it, 'the 
seeking for God,' as I call it more simply. The object of every national 
movement, in every people and at every period of its existence is only the 
seeking for its god, who must be its own god, and the faith in Him as the 
only true one. God is the synthetic personality of the whole people, taken 
from its beginning to its end. It has never happened that all, or even many, 
peoples have had one common god, but each has always had its own. It's a 
sign of the decay of nations when they begin to have gods in common.
5
 
The character Shatov utters these words, but they are consistent with Dostoevsky’s 
personal views.  In a very literal sense, then, as Bruce Ward has suggested, Dostoevsky 
held that “the sine qua non of human order is the possession of an idea of life.”6  To 
Dostoevsky, Christ was an idea in precisely this way.  Christ preserved order in society 
by presupposing the purpose of life.  Consequently, people were able to live by the light 
of a common idea, and to judge action by a common standard.  This is the sense in which 
Dostoevsky preferred Christ to truth and thought religion the foundation of societal order. 
 Although he rejects the church as a source of societal order, Camus’ search for 
foundations and values was prompted in part by Dostoevsky’s defense of faith.7  To 
                                                 
5
 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Possessed, trans. Constance Garnett (New York: Barnes & 
Noble Classics, 2004), p. 396. 
6
 Bruce Ward, Dostoevsky’s Critique of the West (Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier 
University Press, 1986),  p. 36. 
7
 Although he does not examine it at length, Phillip Rein points to this connection in his 
study of Camus.  “In much the same way that Dostoevski proves through Christianity that 
values do exist,” Rein argues, “Camus sets out to prove that revolt in its true meaning is 
man’s only recourse in a world void of religious faith” (Albert Camus, p. 79). 
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begin, part of Camus’ resistance to Christianity was practical.  He did not think it was 
possible to reconcile faith with modern knowledge.  To uphold the doctrines of 
Christianity, he wrote in a 1942 notebook entry, “we should have to act as if our acquired 
knowledge had ceased to exist, as if we had learned nothing, and pretend in short to erase 
what is inerasable.”8  Camus does not therefore reject the substance of Dostoevsky’s 
religious vision.  On the contrary, he argued, much like Nietzsche, that reason 
undermined faith and that such beliefs have consequently lost their motive force.  
However, viewed in conjunction with works such as The Fall, Camusian revolt can be 
seen as a foundational construct in much the same way the Christ-ideal was for 
Dostoevsky.
9
  That is to say, both function as guides for action and experiential sources 
of order – although Camus is concerned more with limits than order.   
The emphasis on experience is particularly significant.  At first glance, 
Dostoevsky’s Christ-ideal seems divorced from experience.  However, to understand 
Christ in this way is to miss Dostoevsky’s point altogether.  Dostoevsky held that one’s 
experience of reality was inextricably linked to one’s ideas concerning reality.  What one 
regards as real, in other words, is often a function of one’s ideas or beliefs.  Ward 
elucidates this Dostoevskyian concept nicely in the following passage: 
For Dostoevsky . . . human order . . . depends upon an idea of the ultimate 
meaning or purpose of existence – an idea which is not consciously 
perceived as ‘idea’ but is simply and unquestioningly accepted as ‘reality’ 
itself. In the ordered human being this fundamental, though largely 
implicit, idea of life seeks and finds outward expression in the concrete 
world. The human need for order is thus a two-fold need for an ideal of the 
                                                 
8
 Albert Camus, Notebooks 1942-1951, trans. Justin O’Brien (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 
2010), pp. 15-16. 
9
 See chapter three, pp. 15-36 for comparative analyses of The Fall, The Possessed, and 
Notes from Underground. In The Fall, Camus largely affirms Dostoevsky’s link between 
uprootedness and disorder.  
 164 
ultimate meaning of life, and a way of living out one’s daily life in accord 
with this idea.
10
 
 
Christ is thus not so much an idea as a mechanism by which to experience reality; 
through it one’s orientation to others and the world is fundamentally altered.  The idea of 
Christ is therefore secondary to the living faith made possible by belief in Christ.  
 Dostoevsky’s experiential account of belief is best expressed through Father 
Zossima of The Brothers Karamazov.  In a series of exhortations, Zossima laments the 
loss of foundations as well as the subsequent efforts to replace Christ with reason.  
Russian aristocrats, he claims, “want to base justice on reason alone, but not with Christ, 
as before, and they have already proclaimed that there is no crime, that there is no sin.  
And that’s consistent, for if you have no God what is the meaning of crime?”11  Here 
Zossima is implicitly referring to Ivan, whose internal love of mankind and justice 
founders without God.  Having lost the idea that bound him to others, Ivan’s experience 
of reality is marred by doubt and contradiction.  Zossima describes the torment of such 
thus: 
Unable to love . . . they live upon their vindictive pride . . . they are never 
satisfied, and they refuse forgiveness, they curse God who call them. They 
cannot behold the living God without hatred, and they cry out that the God 
of life should be annihilated, that God should destroy Himself and his own 
creation. And they will burn in the fire of their own wrath forever and 
yearn for death and annihilation.
12
 
 
Ivan Karamazov’s inertia thus follows from the absence of an idea concerning the 
meaning of life.  Affirming only what he can empirically verify, Ivan remains unable to 
understand himself as part of a whole. 
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 Dostoevsky’s Critique of the West, pp. 36-37. 
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 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Constance Garnett (New York: 
Randomhouse, 1996),  p. 244. 
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Ibid, pp. 338-39. 
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 In its essentials, Camusian revolt closely resembles Zossima’s active love.  Indeed 
both aim at the same thing, namely human solidarity.  There are, however, two key 
differences.  First, Camus replaces the symbol of Christ with the image of the Rebel and, 
second, as Avi Sagi claims, revolt aims at creating “a just world instead of a world of 
divine grace.”13  This is significant because, as Sagi also notes, divine grace requires an 
active God whereas “creating a just world is a human task.”14  Camus’ Rebel also 
represents the shared nature of experience.  In this way, Christ and the Rebel are symbols 
grounded in the reality of human experience.  They merely justify human solidarity and 
love in different ways.  In the case of Christ, solidarity is the result of man’s equality 
before God.  In the case of revolt, solidarity is born of a simultaneous denial and 
affirmation.  On the one hand, man protests his condition; at the same time, he affirms his 
desire to live.  In The Rebel Camus insists that the choice “to live is, in itself, a value 
judgment.”15  Furthermore, because the affirmation of life is a “collective experience,” 
revolt reveals a transcendent (and worldly) ground for value. 
 Zossima’s active love is thus different from Camusian revolt primarily in its 
religious dimension.  Yet it can be argued that Zossima’s ethical injunctions do not 
require external compulsion.  This is suggested in Zossima’s own remarks, which are 
cloaked in divine language but amount essentially to a worldly call to action.  Zossima, 
for example, holds that all love is but a reflection of divine love.  “Love a man in his sin,” 
he says, “for that is the semblance of Divine Love and is the highest love on earth.  Love 
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all God’s creation, the whole and every grain of sand in it.”16  Later, however, he urges 
men to 
 Seek no reward, for great is your reward on this earth: the spiritual joy 
which is only vouchsafed to the righteous man. Fear not the great nor the 
mighty, but be wise and ever serene. Know the measure, know the times, 
study that . . . Love to throw yourself on the earth and kiss it. Kiss the 
earth and love it with an unceasing, consuming love. Love all men, love 
everything. Seek that rapture and ecstasy.
17
 
 
Zossima’s decree contains nothing of the otherworldly and, in fact, is reminiscent of 
Camus’ momentist affirmations of nature.  Zossima says only that loving and acting is its 
own reward.  His statements reflect his (and presumably Dostoevsky’s) belief that God 
leads to an awareness of the reciprocal contact of things.  Since acknowledgment of such 
interconnections is the basis of Zossima’s active love, God is central to his vision; while 
Camus does not invoke God, he nonetheless appropriates much of Zossima’ ethos.  
Indeed both seem to affirm the interdependence of experience, self-transcendence, and 
value.   
The question we must ask is whether Camus achieves Zossima’s (Dostoevsky’s) 
aims on purely experiential terms.  For Zossima, divine love (symbolized by Christ) is 
manifested through individual acts of love.  In this way, the act of love is itself creative of 
value.
18
  Camusian revolt can be seen as a worldly extension of Zossima’s vision.  Just as 
Christ’s love becomes a basic reality through affirmative acts, in Camus’ thought the 
choice to side with man and life reveals the existence of a common value.  In an 
important study of Camus, Jean Onimus argues that transcendence is achieved through 
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things equally is to move “toward a whole and genuine way of life, a reciprocally 
confirming relationship with other men and with nature” (Problematic Rebel, p. 275). 
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the act of revolt itself, which “plays the role of the absolute.”19  By absolute Onimus does 
not mean dogmatic; rather, he means something akin to universality.  On this 
interpretation, universal value emerges out of the individual’s metaphysical revolt.  
Following Onimus, then, I trace the movement from individual to collective revolt in 
Camus’ fiction.  This will help to clarify two points.  First, it speaks to the broader 
development of Camus’ thought.  The sensual individualism of his early period is never 
refuted, but there is a clear shift towards a more inclusive, intersubjective reality.  
Second, it shows how Camus tries to locate a ground for solidarity and limits in the realm 
of concrete experience.  Before proceeding, however, it is important to explain the 
additional ways in which Camus engages Nietzsche and Dostoevsky in his formulation of 
the problems inherent in the act of revolt.    
Freedom and Morality Without God 
One of the core problems Camus’ theory of revolt sought to resolve was the 
conflict between the individual and the community (or between subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity).  More precisely, Camus struggled to reconcile Nietzsche’s individualist 
calls to self-affirmation with his desire to impose limits on action.  Camus’ engagement 
with Nietzsche on this front unfolds largely in his fiction, particularly in works such as 
Caligula, The Plague, and The Just Assassins.  In his non-fiction, Camus explores this 
problem in terms of values and limits.  In The Rebel in particular, Camus regards 
Nietzsche’s individualism as antithetical to communal life, which requires mutual 
understanding and dialogue.  Nietzsche, for example, enjoins the individual to create for 
himself, to become a lawgiver.  By empowering the individual in this way, however, 
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Nietzsche undermines the basis for shared values.  This was a central concern as Camus 
began to develop his philosophy of revolt.  In a 1946 letter to his mentor Jean Grenier, 
Camus states openly that his essay on revolt is in part a response to the destructive legacy 
of Nietzsche’s thought: 
I will use my essay on revolt to say that this cult of history and the will to 
power in which we live is both an insanity and a theoretical error.  It’s 
time to start the critique of Nietzscheanism (in its Hegelian aspect), not 
from the traditional viewpoint, but from a contemporary one.  Out of 
nostalgia, no doubt, I am turning more and more toward that side of 
mankind that does not belong to history.  If it’s true that we live in history, 
I know that we die outside history.
20
 
 
This passage is remarkable for at least two reasons.  First, it shows the extent to which 
Camus remains engaged with Nietzsche.  Even as Camus begins to diverge from 
Nietzsche, he is still confronting the implications of Nietzsche’s thought.  Second, it 
highlights Camus’ increasing concern with values and foundations.  As mentioned, 
Camus thinks Nietzsche is fundamentally right about nihilism and the limits of human 
knowledge.  But Nietzsche’s ideas, Camus concludes, helped to usher in the age of 
political nihilism.  This was partly a consequence of Nietzsche’s desire to hasten the 
crisis of nihilism, which was inevitable in any case.  As Alexander Nehamas and many 
other commentators have noted, it was this negative aspect of Nietzsche’s project that 
accounted for his unusually hyperbolic style.
21
  Nietzsche, of course, was well aware of 
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this, and consequently referred to himself as “dynamite.”22  Nietzsche expresses his intent 
quite clearly in one his final works, Ecce Homo: 
I am by far the most terrible man that has ever existed; but this does not 
alter the fact that I shall become the most beneficent.  I know the joy of 
annihilation to a degree which is commensurate with my power to 
annihilate.  In both cases I obey my Dionysian nature, which knows not 
how to separate the negative deed from the saying of Yea.  I am the first 
immoralist, and in this sense I am essentially the annihilator.
23
 
 
Nietzsche’s goal is thus to force a confrontation with nihilism.24  Camus finds this 
problematic, however.  By questioning the origins and foundations of prevailing values, 
Nietzsche comes perilously close to embracing a narrow and radical kind of limitless 
freedom.  With Nietzsche, Camus writes in a 1946 notebook entry, “liberty is an 
exaltation” – there is no concern whatsoever for limits.25  Camus is even more direct 
about this in his discussion of Nietzsche in The Rebel.   
From the moment that it is admitted that the world pursues no end, 
Nietzsche proposes to concede its innocence, to affirm that it accepts no 
judgment since it cannot be judged on any intention, and consequently to 
replace all judgments based on values by absolute assent, and by  a 
complete and exalted allegiance to this world.  Thus from absolute despair 
will spring infinite joy, from blind servitude, unbounded freedom.  To be 
free is, precisely, to abolish ends.
26
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Camus’ discussion of Nietzsche in The Rebel highlights the importance of 
Nietzsche to Camus’ search for values and limits.  Camus makes clear in several 
notebook entries during the years in which he wrote The Rebel that Nietzsche, whatever 
his intentions may have been, provoked a crisis that could no longer be ignored.
27
  In this 
way, Camus’ philosophy of revolt can be seen as a response to Nietzsche; it is Camus’ 
attempt to go beyond Nietzsche.  Camus hints at this in The Rebel when he writes that 
“Nietzsche did not formulate a philosophy of rebellion, but constructed a philosophy on 
rebellion [italics mine].”28  Camus appears to do precisely the opposite: he uses a 
philosophy on rebellion (Nietzsche’s) to construct a philosophy of rebellion. 
If Nietzsche helps to frame the conflict between the individual and community for 
Camus, Dostoevsky forces Camus to deal with the political problem of values without 
God.  In The Rebel, Camus examines this problem in terms of the evolution of revolt.  He 
begins by drawing a distinction between metaphysical revolt and historical revolution, at 
the center of which is Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov.  Camus describes metaphysical 
revolt as “the movement by which man protests against his condition and against the 
whole of creation.”29  Metaphysical revolt is best understood as the individual’s reaction 
against meaninglessness as the essence of life.  It is also, Camus suggests, an impulse for 
order that manifests itself politically in the refusal to submit.  In the context of this 
discussion, metaphysical revolt is significant for two reasons.  First, it is universal.  It is 
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common to all human beings who seek affirmation or resist oppression.
30
  Second, it is a 
step towards self-transcendence.  Metaphysical revolt, at its core, is “not an egoistic 
act.”31  It may, as Camus concedes, have egoistic motives, but its expression signals a 
demand for respect that transcends the individual.  Hence it begins the moment the 
individual “identifies himself with a natural community.”32   
For Camus, Ivan Karamazov marks a turning point in the history of revolt.
33
  Like 
Voltaire, Ivan challenges God’s moral sovereignty.34  But more importantly, Ivan 
subordinates truth to justice; he sums up his rebellious ethos to his brother Alyosha in a 
key passage: 
Is there in the whole world a being who would have the right to forgive 
and could forgive?  I don’t want harmony.  From love for humanity I don’t 
want it.  I would rather be left with the unavenged suffering.  I would 
rather remain with my unavenged suffering and unsatisfied indignation, 
even if I were wrong.  Besides, too high a price is asked for harmony; it’s 
beyond our means to pay so much to enter on it.  And so I hasten to give 
back my entrance ticket, and if I am an honest man I am bound to give it 
back as soon as possible.  And that I am doing.  It’s not God that I don’t 
accept, Alyosha, only I most respectfully return Him the ticket.
35
 
 
The novelty of Ivan’s rebellion is apparent here.  Ivan does not refute the possibility of 
truth or God; rather, he is compelled to face the reality of human suffering first, which 
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exists independent of God.
36
  This is critical for Camus because it is fundamentally an 
expression of solidarity.  “Ivan,” Camus writes, “is the incarnation of the refusal to be the 
only one saved.”37  Ivan’s refusal to accept salvation alone alters the dynamics of revolt.  
Revolt, which begins as a response to absurdity, becomes a kind of humanism; and 
although Ivan’s humanism remains vague and abstract, his defiance represents the initial 
“no” of Camusian revolt.38  It is therefore the impetus of Ivan’s refusal that interests 
Camus.  As Ray Davison writes, Ivan asserts the dignity of man and thereby “legitimizes 
the ultimate metaphysical rebellion: to murder God in the name of human justice and 
solidarity and to begin the work of building man’s kingdom on earth.”39  It is true that 
Ivan’s rebellion lacks positive content, but this does not diminish its significance.  His 
exaltation of justice over grace, whatever else it leads to, is a crucial step in expanding 
the consciousness of revolt.  
 Again, Ivan matters to Camus because he problematizes morality in the absence 
of God.  Thus it is with Ivan’s “everything is permitted” that “the history of 
contemporary nihilism really begins.”40  Ivan also anticipates Nietzsche’s prophetic 
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warning in The Gay Science about the consequences of losing God.
41
  The implications of 
such a loss appear to Ivan in a dream in which the devil warns that “As soon as men have 
all of them denied God . . . the old conception of the universe will fall of itself without 
cannibalism and what’s more the old morality, and everything will begin anew.”42  This 
realization is what lends Ivan’s revolt its moral seriousness.  On the one hand, Ivan’s 
rejection of God in the name of man creates the possibility of moral value; however, it 
can also result, as Fred Willhoite notes in his study of Camus, in “deification of the total 
rejection of what exists.”43  This concern with negation animated much of Camus’ 
thinking on rebellion.  Ivan’s inability to avoid this temptation helped to crystallize 
Camus’ conception of revolt – as well as his burgeoning opposition to Nietzsche.  
 In his biography of Camus, Olivier Todd notes a key disagreement between 
Camus and Dostoevsky.  Camus, he writes, “did not agree with Dostoevsky that if God 
did not exist, all was possible.  Certain acts, which are crimes, must be rejected.”44  
Ivan’s dilemma clarifies this dispute.  Ivan reasons fallaciously that without absolutes 
there is nothing to justify virtue.  There is “nothing in the world,” he claims, “to make 
men love their neighbors . . . no law of nature that men should love mankind, and that, if 
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there had been any love on earth hitherto, it was not owing to a natural law, but simply 
because men have believed in immortality.”45  Here Ivan articulates a (perhaps distorted) 
view of man’s fallen nature in the traditional Christian sense, which Camus refused to 
countenance.
46
  Ivan’s view of human nature appears to have been shared by Dostoevsky 
as well.  In Diary of a Writer, for instance, Dostoevsky asserts that “love of mankind in 
general, as an idea, is one of the most incomprehensible ideas for the human mind.”47  
This is largely why Dostoevsky defended Christianity.  God existed because He must, 
because men require an object of eternal love.
48
  There is little doubt that Camus was 
sympathetic to Dostoevsky’s religious impulse.  Camus, in fact, made no attempt to 
conceal his admiration for Christian thought.
49
  But as many commentators have noted, 
particularly Thomas Hanna, Camus believed critical reason (as well as absurdity) had 
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effectively undermined belief in Christianity.
50
  Camus is most forceful on this point in 
an early 1942 notebook entry: 
Modern intelligence is in utter confusion.  Knowledge has become so 
diffuse that the world and the mind have lost all point of reference . . . But 
the most amazing things are the admonitions to turn backwards.  Return to 
the Middle Ages, to primitive mentality, to the soil, to religion, to the 
arsenal of worn-out solutions.  To grand a shadow of efficacy to those 
panaceas, we should have to act as if our acquired knowledge had ceased 
to exist, as if we had learned nothing, and pretend in short to erase what is 
inerasable.
51
 
 
Camus thought it too late, then, to return to Christianity or to any transcendent source of 
meaning. 
For Camus, Ivan’s value problem also points to Dostoevsky’s failure to see the 
creative potential of rebellion.  Contra Dostoevsky, Camus approaches Ivan’s “everything 
is permitted” as a point of departure.  Hence he remarks in a notebook entry that “we 
must follow out all the consequences of his [Ivan’s] remark.”52  To declare that God is 
dead neither permits nor forbids anything.  Ivan’s declaration is only a beginning.  As 
Camus writes in The Rebel, the absence of eternal laws authorizes nothing, as “there must 
also be values and aims in order to choose another course of action.”53  Ivan carries us to 
a moral precipice of sorts, but that is all he does.  Camus’ task was to find an experiential 
alternative to Ivan that defended human dignity and supplied a ground for rebellious 
action.  To the extent that Camus formulates such an alternative, he does so in The Rebel 
and The Plague.  It is therefore to these texts that I now turn. 
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From Solipsism to Revolt 
In The Rebel Camus understands historical revolution as a form of collective 
action, but one in which action is divorced from experience.  For Camus, if revolt is to 
remain authentic, it must transition from the individual to the social sphere without 
denying its experiential origins.  Giving form to this transition is the aim of Camus’ The 
Plague.  Indeed, Camus indicated this in an interview shortly after The Plague was 
published:  
“Compared to The Stranger, The Plague does beyond any possible 
discussion, represent the transition from an attitude of solitary revolt to the 
recognition of a community whose struggles must be shared.  If there is an 
evolution from The Stranger to The Plague, it is in the direction of 
solidarity and participation.”54 
 
Viewed in conjunction with The Stranger, then, The Plague crystallizes the evolution 
from metaphysical protest to participatory action, and it presents a concrete extension of 
the theoretical account of revolt in The Rebel.  This section begins, therefore, by 
contrasting the opposing images of revolt in The Stranger and The Plague. 
First, it is important to situate The Plague in the larger context of Camus’ thought.  
Published in 1947, The Plague occupies a central place in the arc of Camus’ career; it is 
the point at which Camus the artist and Camus the moralist merge.
 
 Camus’ biographer, 
Olivier Todd, points to this in his observation of The Plague’s significance: “With The 
Plague the reader can observe the novelist’s changing attitude toward the absurd . . . 
Camus and his characters in The Plague would distance themselves from the absurd in 
order to find the pathway to revolt.”55  As Todd suggests, The Plague marks a shift in 
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Camus’ thought.  In previous works like The Stranger and The Myth of Sisyphus, 
absurdity was the dominant theme.  In The Plague absurdity persists, but it is examined 
from an ethical standpoint, and so there is a greater emphasis on responsibility.  In The 
Myth of Sisyphus, moreover, the guiding question is, how does one live in spite of the 
absurd?  In The Plague the principal question is, how does one wrest a moral imperative 
out of the absurd?  For this reason, The Plague is the first work of fiction in which the 
problems of revolt are dramatized. 
The Plague is pervaded by two themes: death and suffering.  Set in the Algerian 
city of Oran, it follows a small group of citizens as their town is beset by a plague.  As an 
allegory, the novel operates on a number of levels.  According to Camus, The Plague can 
be read in three different ways.  “It is at the same time a tale about an epidemic, a symbol 
of Nazi occupation, and, thirdly, the concrete illustration of a metaphysical problem, that 
of evil.”56  The third interpretation is particularly important in this context.  For Camus, 
the problem of evil was essentially the problem of suffering.  It was critical to move 
beyond absurdity because the absurd, as Camus wrote in his notebooks shortly after The 
Stranger was published, “teaches nothing” concerning suffering and evil.57  The question 
for Camus was thus how to conceive of suffering as a shared experience and, in so doing, 
give birth to a collective consciousness of revolt. 
 The hero of The Stranger is a rebellious but solitary figure.
58
  In The Plague, 
Camus departs from this image of revolt.  Indeed through the protagonist Rieux, Camus 
seems to counter the failed revolts of Mersault and Ivan Karamazov.  For example, 
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Rieux’s moral outrage rivals Ivan’s, but Rieux is able to channel that outrage into action 
because, as Camus writes in The Rebel, “Ivan’s drama . . . arises from the fact that there 
is too much love without an object.”59  For Ivan, humanity’s suffering is an abstraction 
rather than an immanent problem founded in a concrete other.  In a private letter to 
Grenier, Camus emphasizes his attitude toward suffering: 
Thank you also for what you wrote me about The Plague.  But I believe 
less and less that man is innocent.  The thing is, my basic reaction is 
always to stand up against punishment.  After the Liberation I went to see 
one of those purge trials.  The accused was guilty in my eyes.  Yet I left 
the trial before the end because I was with him and I never again went 
back to a trial of this kind. In every guilty man, there is an innocent part.  
This is what makes any absolute condemnation revolting . . . Man is not 
innocent and he is not guilty.  How to get out of that?  What Rieux means 
is that we must cure everything we can cure while waiting to know, or see.  
It’s a waiting situation and Rieux says, “I don’t know.” I came a long way 
to reach this admission of ignorance.
60
 
 
Two things distinguish Rieux from Ivan: his acceptance of ignorance and his devotion to 
action.  It is this devotion to action that I want to contrast with Mersault in particular.  A 
key theme of The Plague is the conflict between individual happiness and moral 
obligation.  Each character in The Plague, as Robert Solomon suggests, struggles “to 
come to terms not so much with imminent death as with their own happiness in conflict 
with their sense of obligation.”61  Rieux exemplifies the spirit of revolt because, unlike 
Martha of The Misunderstanding, he refuses happiness on individual terms; instead he 
devotes himself to resisting the plague and achieving solidarity with its victims.  Rieux’s 
happiness, in other words, consists in shared struggle and sacrifice.   
 As a model of revolt, Rieux resembles Camus’ absurd hero, Sisyphus.  In The 
Myth of Sisyphus, for instance, Camus writes that Sisyphus is heroic because he finds joy 
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in futility.  “Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises rocks.  
He concludes that all is well . . . The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a 
man’s heart.  One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”62  In the case of Rieux, however, the 
futile struggle is against the reality of evil and suffering.  Rieux’s revolt is thus Sisyphean 
insofar as it entails commitment without promise of reward.  This is apparent in the final 
passage of The Plague: 
And, indeed, as he listened to the cries of joy rising from the town, Rieux 
remembered that such joy is always imperiled.  He knew what those 
jubilant crowds did not know but could have learned from books: that the 
plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant 
for years and years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its time in 
bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day 
would come when, for the bane and enlightening of men, it would rouse 
up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.
63
 
 
Rieux’s revolt is meaningful precisely because he knows it is a losing struggle.  Just as 
Sisyphus raises himself above his condition by becoming “stronger than his rock,”64 
Rieux transcends his individual destiny by declaring his solidarity with those who share 
his fate.  Acknowledging the futility of one’s struggle is thus a critical step for Camus; it 
entails acceptance of suffering and a renewed commitment to the present.  The Stranger 
similarly explores questions of meaning and happiness, but from an individualist 
perspective.  Moral obligation is not problematized in this text, as Mersault’s awareness, 
much like Ivan’s, never extends beyond private experience.  With Rieux, however, the 
solipsism of Sisyphus and Mersault is transcended, and consciousness itself is changed.  
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The Cartesian “I,” as Sagi rightly notes, gives way to an “interpersonal we.”65  As I argue 
below, this shift in consciousness is a consequence of Rieux’s revolt.  Mersault’s 
indifference also helps to illustrate the ethical significance of human volition, which is a 
point of emphasis in The Plague.  Here, as Roger Quilliot argues, “characters are 
revealed to us as the scourge comes to them or they go to meet it.”66  By defining the 
characters in this way, Camus suggests that everything turns on our conscious response to 
absurdity.  As the characters eventually discover, no one escapes the torments of the 
plague.  But those who actively revolt against it, who reduce the suffering of others, are 
able to find meaning in their struggles.  Those who yield to diversions or abstractions or 
self-interest, on the other hand, only exacerbate matters.  
Camus also uses events in The Plague to awaken the collective consciousness of 
the Oranais.  Sagi has made a similar point regarding The Plague.  For this first time in 
this work, Saga writes, Camus explicitly suggests that a “solipsistic description of human 
experience does not exhaust the human condition, which is intersubjective by 
definition.”67  This is a critical point.  Confronted by crisis, the citizens of Oran suddenly 
understand their shared fate.  But the plague dramatizes a permanent (and universal) truth 
about the human condition, namely its susceptibility to suffering and death.  In The 
Plague, in fact, it is identification with the other’s suffering that leads to solidarity.68  
Like Dostoevsky, Camus sought to harness the power of pathos; he used the absurd 
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(symbolized by the plague) to communicate the proper orientation toward suffering.
69
   
Indeed as Camus notes in the foreword to his theatrical adaptation of The Possessed, it is 
“the thread of suffering and affection that makes Dostoevsky’s universe so close to us.”70  
As a symbol, then, the plague emphasizes the contingent character of human existence.
71
   
This is equally clear at the biological level.  A man is not responsible for his genes or 
intelligence, yet these factors shape much of his life.  To grasp this is to see man as a 
victim, rather than a cause, of his condition.  The ethical implications of this are 
significant.  First, it arouses compassion and a sense of the contingency of human life, 
which in turn points to a basic human equality.
72
  As Camus writes in his notebooks for 
The Plague, “People live according to different systems.  The plague abolishes all 
systems.”73  The plague is thus an equalizer.  Second, it stresses the importance of choice.  
Robert Zaretsky has referred to this as Camus’ “ethics of attention.”74  Zaretsky’s 
description is apt.  For Camus, the only meaningful choice one can make concerns the 
proper response to absurdity.  Indeed this is the principal lesson of The Plague.  Acting 
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justly is the work of attention and care.
75
  Rieux accepts the reality of the plague and 
consciously stands “with the defeated.”76  Mersault, on the other hand, has no concept of 
solidarity.  He pursues his happiness alone.  Consequently, he undermines the possibility 
of true revolt, which is fundamentally a collective experience.  As Camus concludes in 
The Rebel, “the first step of a mind overwhelmed by the strangeness of things is to realize 
that this feeling is shared with all men.”77  Mersault fails to do this, and as a result his 
revolt does not go beyond the bounds of the absurd. 
To further distinguish Rieux’s revolt, let us return to The Brothers Karamazov.  
This will help to clarify the dispute between Camus and Dostoevsky on the question of 
transcendence.  To begin, there is a shared impulse at the root of Ivan and Rieux’s revolt.  
Ivan, for example, rejects God on account of the injustice of innocent suffering, 
particularly the suffering of children: 
But then there are the children, and what am I to do about them? That’s a 
question I can’t answer. For the hundredth time I repeat, there are numbers 
of questions, but I’ve only taken the children, because in their case what I 
mean is so unanswerably clear. Listen! If all must suffer to pay for the 
eternal harmony, what have children to do with it, tell me, please! It’s 
beyond all comprehension why they should suffer, and why they should 
pay for the harmony.
78
 
 
Rieux likewise invokes the imagery of children suffering.  “I refuse to love a scheme of 
things,” he tells Father Paneloux, “in which children are put to torture.”79  The impetus 
for Ivan and Rieux’s revolt is thus hatred of suffering.  By pointing to the suffering of 
children, they highlight human innocence.  But the capacity to identify with another’s 
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suffering is paramount, and in fact becomes a precondition for the creation of a 
community of revolt. 
Although his ethical posture resembles Ivan’s, Rieux is not an abstract 
humanitarian.  Suffering is always a concrete problem for Rieux, not a theoretical 
paradox.  In this sense, Rieux is closer to Zossima, whose living faith inspires by 
example.  Ivan, however, appears to hate suffering more than he loves life.  Despite his 
moral outrage, Ivan’s rebellion remains internal and static.  This dichotomy between Ivan 
and Zossima is central to The Brothers Karamazov.  Ivan and Zossima present two ways 
of being.  Zossima goes the way of grace and love; Ivan revolts and condemns.  But the 
choice between Zossima and Ivan is crude.  It implies, as Maurice Friedman argues, that 
one must “choose between rebellion and submission, social and spiritual freedom, social 
and spiritual equality, individual consciousness and cosmic solidarity.”80  In the figure of 
Rieux, Camus destroys this dichotomy; that is, Rieux combines the moral outrage of Ivan 
with the living love of Zossima.   
Rieux thus presents an alternative to Dostoevsky’s binary choice.  It is common of 
Dostoevsky’s rebels, for example, to either deny transcendence altogether or to become 
mired in internal confusion.  Rieux is different in this regard.  He does not agonize over 
the existence of suffering; he accepts it without resigning himself to it, and he has no 
desire to anchor his actions in some higher metaphysical order.  Further, Rieux resists the 
attempts of others (notably Father Paneloux) to make a virtue of suffering.  For his part, 
this is an abnegation of one’s responsibility to heal and to pay attention to the sick.  Here 
Camus’ anti-Christian sentiment is most discernible.  Indeed Camus remarks in Carnets 
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that “there is an intoxication which is two thousand years old,” as a result of which men 
“are exasperated by evil or resigned to it, which amounts to the same thing.”81  For 
Rieux, one is obliged to engage and resist.  More importantly, though, Rieux implies that 
one can go the way of Christ (as Dostoevsky urges) without transcendent injunctions.  
His fellowship with men is rooted instead in the reality of human suffering and in his 
sympathy for the living.  To quote Friedman once more:  
In Doctor Rieux….Camus offers us a third alternative to his own - and to 
Dostoevsky’s - god-man and man-god. Rieux neither submits to reality as 
objectively meaningful, as does Paneloux, nor rebels against it on the 
ground of pure subjectivity, as does Tarrou. His rebellion is neither that of 
the Modern Promethean nor of the Modern Sisyphus, but of the Modern 
Job.
82
 
 
Rieux’s decision to act suggests that morality (and by extension, revolt) is neither a 
metaphysical nor a religious precept but rather an experiential injunction arising naturally 
out of life with others.  This can be seen in the following exchange between Rieux and 
Tarrou: 
It comes to this,” Tarrou said almost casually; “what interests me is 
learning how to become a saint.” 
“But you don’t believe in God.” 
“Exactly! Can one be a saint without God? – that’s the problem, in fact the 
only problem, I’m up against today.” Tarrou said in a low voice that it was 
never over, and there would be more victims, because that was in the order 
of things.” 
“Perhaps,” the doctor answered. “But, you know, I feel more fellowship 
with the defeated than with saints. Heroism and sanctity don’t really 
appeal to me, I imagine. What interests me is being a man . . . Yes, we’re 
after the same thing, but I’m less ambitious.83 
 
The desire to be only a man is especially important.  In Camus’ thought, to be a man 
means to live an absurd life and to share this condition with others.  Rieux is an authentic 
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rebel because he “knows it’s an absurd situation,” but insists that “we’re all involved in 
it, and we’ve got to accept it as it is.”84  Ivan falters because he deifies what he rejects.  
Rieux avoids the abyss of negation by focusing on the concrete and the immediate; the 
contradictions of an absurd existence are immaterial.  By means of this affirmation, 
Rieux moves beyond the exile of Ivan and Mersault’s individual revolt.   
The foundational implications of The Plague have been recognized by several 
commentators.  Most notably, David Sprintzen has argued that the outbreak of plague in 
Oran symbolizes “the social order” being put “to the metaphysical rack.”85  The people of 
Oran were “no longer able to take tradition as a self-evident guide to action, they had to 
reconstitute their sense of the meaningful . . . they were forced to attend to the present.”86  
Sprintzen makes an important point.  By dramatizing the universality of the human 
condition in experiential terms, Camus points to the primacy of the present.  The future 
and the past are dismissed as abstractions and only the present is seen as real and shared.  
Suffering, in turn, is removed from the theoretical realm and made concrete.  As a result 
of this shift in orientation, new values are born and solidarity emerges organically.  
Finally, as Cecil Eubanks has suggested, by grounding revolt in the realm of experience, 
Camus posits “a prototype for a politics of foundations without foundationalism.87  
Eubanks is correct to emphasize the undeveloped nature of Camus’ vision; however, 
insofar as The Plague represents Camus’ search for a secular alternative to Dostoevsky’s 
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religious foundationalism, it marks an important development in the authors’ dialogic 
relationship.  
The Growing Stone 
 The image of revolt depicted in The Plague is extended roughly a decade later 
when Camus released a collection of short stories entitled Exile and the Kingdom.  Here 
the exile of absurdity becomes the basis of a worldly kingdom, and solidarity emerges out 
of isolation.  Published in 1957, The Growing Stone is the concluding story in Camus’ 
Exile and the Kingdom.  The hero is D’Arrast, a French civil engineer who has been 
commissioned to build a dam in a remote Brazilian village.  Upon arriving in the village, 
D’Arrast befriends a young cook.  In a series of cryptic exchanges, the cook tells 
D’Arrast of a promise he made to God.  Having survived a recent shipwreck, the cook 
vowed to “carry a hundred-pound stone” to the church at the center of town. 88  Though it 
is not clear that D’Arrast understands, he tells the cook that “a man has to do what he has 
promised.”89  Surprised by his response, the cook asks D’Arrast if he has ever made a 
similar promise in a moment of desperation.  When D’Arrast says “no,” the cook insists 
that tomorrow “you are going to help me keep my promise, and it’s as if you had made it 
yourself.”90  The conversation ends as the two men part with something like a silent 
agreement.   
            The next day the procession proceeds as planned.  Seated on a balcony beside the 
church, D’Arrast awaits the cook.  As he approaches, the cook collapses in exhaustion.  
D’Arrast immediately tries to help him the rest of the way.  They walk together until, just 
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short of the church steps, the cook collapses again.  In a pivotal scene, D’Arrast then 
takes the stone onto his shoulders and continues marching toward the church.  Suddenly, 
however, he turns 
 away from the church, forcing the pilgrims to face. Behind him, he heard 
someone running . . . He didn’t understand what they were shouting . . . 
Suddenly Socrates appeared before him, rolling startled eyes, speaking 
incoherently and pointing out the way to the church behind him . . . Yet 
D’Arrast continued in the direction in which he was launched . . . He 
settled the stone firmly on its cork base and went down with a cautious but 
still steady tread toward the huts. When he reached them, his breath was 
beginning to fail, his arms were trembling under the stone. He hastened his 
pace, finally reached the little square where the cook’s hut stood, ran to it, 
kicked the door open, and brusquely hurled the stone onto the still glowing 
fire in the center of the room.
91
 
 
The interaction between D’Arrast and the cook can be interpreted in several ways.  Most 
significant in this context is the theme of solidarity.  In an insightful study of The 
Growing Stone, Irina Kirk points to the implicit link between solitude and solidarity.  “By 
taking up the burden of a man with whom he can have no possible communion,” Kirk 
writes, “D’Arrast saves himself from isolation.”  “Out of this seeming futility,” she 
concludes, “man creates his own meaning; and out of his inherent isolation, man creates 
solidarity among other isolated beings.  In the face of universal exile, the very basis of 
human solitude becomes the means for union.”92  Kirk’s emphasis on shared meaning is 
certainly justifiable.  But equally important is the experiential context.  Unlike The 
Plague, there are no crises in The Growing Stone.  Instead two men, divided by culture 
and language, encounter one another under mostly ordinary circumstances.  What they 
share is a common experience (exile) and a common desire for salvation.  This is a 
significant point for Camus.  In his universe,” as Lev Braun writes, “all differences – 
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racial, cultural, social – could be remedied if only the flickering light of human 
communion was preserved.”93  Though somewhat naïve, Camus persisted in his 
conviction that such communion was achievable through openness to shared experience.  
D’Arrast, then, may not understand the cultural significance of the stone or the church, 
but he can understand the experiential impetus behind it as well as the sense of honor 
attached to it.  Camus suggests that this suffices (or must suffice) as a means to cross-
cultural solidarity.  
            The experiential context of The Growing Stone is central to its thematic intent.  
As we have seen, Camus regards ideologies and even language itself as inherently 
divisive.
94
  Indeed anything abstracted from experience has the potential to separate 
action from meaning or, more importantly, symbols from their experiential origins.  In 
The Growing Stone, therefore, much like The Plague, individual as well as cultural 
differences are transcended through awareness of a common condition.  As a symbol, 
then, the stone represents the burdens of an absurd life, which everyone must bear in their 
own way.  It may be true, Camus implies, that exile follows from absurdity, but it is also 
true that an earthly kingdom is forged through acts of solidarity.  The cook carries his 
stone just as Sisyphus takes up his rock.  D’Arrast merely accepts the responsibility of the 
absurd man to ensure that no one carries his stone alone.
95
  Thus D’Arrast willingly takes 
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on the yoke of another, just as Christ or Father Zossima would do.  That he takes the 
stone not to the church but to the cook’s hut is also symbolically important; it reflects the 
true locus of revolt, namely the community.  As Camus emphasizes in The Rebel, revolt 
“acts on behalf of life . . . That is why it relies primarily on the most concrete realities – 
on occupation, on the village, where the living heart of things and of men is to be 
found.”96  This is consistent with The Plague, which similarly points to fellowship and 
shared suffering as the foundation of revolt.  In The Growing Stone, the hut represents 
“the living heart of things.”  It is a symbol of poverty.  By placing the stone there, 
D’Arrast expresses his solidarity with the villagers.   
            The vision of solidarity and revolt expressed in The Plague and The Growing 
Stone is further developed in Camus’ last known work, The First Man. The First Man 
occupies a unique place in Camus’ corpus.  Incomplete at the time of his death, the 
manuscript was not released until 1995.  As an unfinished text, it is difficult to make 
definitive claims about Camus’ intent.  However, as his most autobiographical work, it 
offers a rare glimpse into the author’s life and mind.97  It also helps to clarify the general 
direction of Camus’ thought.  Camus insisted that each of his works must be seen as 
“stages on the way to unrewarded perfection.”98  Each text must therefore be understood 
as part of a larger whole.  This is particularly true of The First Man.  Though incomplete, 
the meaning of the text becomes clearer when viewed alongside Camus’ previous works.  
In conjunction with The Stranger, The Plague, and The Growing Stone, The First Man 
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presents a fuller picture of Camusian revolt.  For this reason, it warrants a brief 
examination here.  
The First Man 
The hero of The First Man is Jacques Cormery, a French Algerian whose father 
died in combat shortly after he was born.  The novel begins as Jacques searches for his 
father’s burial site.  When he discovers it, Jacques is overwhelmed with compassion.  But 
his compassion is not for his father, a stranger for whom “he could not muster a filial 
devotion.”99  Instead, Jacques senses the larger injustice of a world in which the young 
and innocent die.  Camus describes the experience thus: 
And the wave of tenderness and pity that at once filled his heart was not 
the stirring of the soul that leads the son to the memory of the vanished 
father, but the overwhelming compassion that a grown man feels for an 
unjustly murdered child – something here was not in the natural order and, 
in truth, there was no order but only madness and chaos when the son was 
older than the father.
100
   
 
The sensation described above signals Jacques’ encounter with absurdity.   As Avi Sagi 
points out, “the confrontation with his father’s tomb forces Jacques to experience the 
limits of existence and its collapse.”101  Sagi’s account is confirmed in the text, 
particularly in the emphasis on disorder and chaos.  It can also be seen in the link 
between absurdity and finitude, a consistent theme in Camus’ absurd works, particularly 
Caligula and The Stranger.  But more importantly, Jacques’ experience at the graveyard 
symbolizes the movement from absurd awareness to conscious revolt.  This is evident in 
                                                 
99
 Ibid, p. 24. 
100
 Albert Camus, The First Man, trans. David Hapgood (New York: Vintage Books, 
1995), p. 26. 
101
 Albert Camus and the Philosophy of the Absurd, p. 31. 
 191 
Jacques’ initial reaction.  Confronted by the spectacle of death, Jacques’ first thought is 
not of himself or his father but of the finitude he shares with all men: 
He looked at the other inscriptions in that section and realized from the 
dates that this soil was strewn with children who had been the fathers of 
graying men who thought they were living in the present time. For he too 
believed he was living, he alone had created himself, he knew his own 
strength, his vigor, he could cope and he had himself well in hand. But, in 
the strange dizziness of that moment, the statue every man eventually 
erects and that hardens in the fire of the years, into which he then creeps 
and there awaits its final crumbling.”102 
 
Rather than revolt angrily against the absurd, as Ivan and Martha of The 
Misunderstanding do, Jacques affirms the universality of his experience.  As Camus 
writes in The Rebel, “the first step of a mind overwhelmed by the strangeness of things is 
to realize that this feeling is shared with all men.”103  Revolt begins, therefore, with 
awareness, and Camus dramatizes this experience in the graveyard scene. 
It is essential to understand Jacques – and his experiences – as symbolic of the 
human condition.  This is suggested in a crucial passage in which Camus implies that the 
first man is like all men in that “he had to bring himself up, without a father . . . and he 
had to grow alone, in fortitude, in strength, find his own morality and truth, at last to be 
born a man.”104  This reading also finds support in a concurrent notebook entry: “The 
First Man repeats the entire journey in order to discover his secret: he is not the first.  
Every man is the first man, nobody is.”105  Viewed in this light, Jacques’ indifference to 
his father is more intelligible.  Initially the reader understands Jacques’ reaction at his 
father’s grave as a function of the distance between them.  But this misses the symbolic 
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intent of The First Man, which is to understand Jacques not as a self but rather as a 
manifestation of the spirit of revolt.  Hence as the story progresses, it is increasingly 
unclear who is speaking or to whom the narrator is referring; indeed Camus’ larger aim 
does not crystallize until the text transitions from a historical narrative to a memoir.  
The shift to a memoirist account occurs as Jacques begins to reconstruct his 
father’s past.  Henceforth it is apparent that Jacques is based on fragments of Camus’ 
own life and that, more importantly, Jacques’ father is a symbolic representation of 
Camus’ ideal rebel.  The father, for example, is described as an attentive man who is both 
aware of absurdity and devoted to the values of revolt.  This can be seen in the exchanges 
between Jacques and various people who knew his father.  Describing an incident in 
which their patrol group encountered a desecrated body, a soldier recalls the moral 
outrage of Jacques’ father: 
But Cormery shouted as if crazed with anger: No, a man doesn’t let 
himself do that kind of thing!  That’s what makes a man, or otherwise . . . 
I’m poor, I came from an orphanage, they put me in this uniform, they 
dragged me into the war, but I wouldn’t let myself do that.106 
The demand for limits and humanity is implied here.  Later, however, it is emphasized.  
“He submitted to everything that could not be avoided,” the man continues, “but had 
preserved some part of himself where he allowed no one to trespass.”107  A recurring 
theme in Camus’ writings is that absurdity fails as a guide for action and a source of 
limits.
108
  For Camus, this was akin to Ivan’s “everything is permitted.”  That Jacques’ 
father refuses to transgress certain limits, even in war, is continuation of this same theme.  
It is also, as Robert Zaretsky suggests, a reflection of “Camus’ loyalty to the visceral 
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ethics expressed by his father – the intuitive conviction that humankind, if it wishes to 
preserve this status, must obey certain limits on its freedom.”109 
 The First Man has received comparatively little attention in the literature, which 
is unsurprising given the incomplete nature of the text as well as its delayed publication.  
Most recently, Ronald Srigley has argued that The First Man is Camus’ account of man 
before the fall.  It depicts human nature, Srigley writes, “before or in the absence of the 
corruption of the religious dogmas that have guided the west for some two thousand 
years.”110  Srigley’s account is partially true; here, however, I regard the first man as a 
kind of proto-rebel.  The image Camus crafts is one of man as he can and should be: 
honest, measured, attentive, compassionate, and grounded in experience.
111
  This is 
clearly the posture of Camus’ authentic rebel.  In his notebooks, Camus also emphasizes 
the theme of intersubjectivity.  Against the individual’s “desire for power,” he writes, the 
first man exalts the virtues of solidarity and self-transcendence.
112
  In the text Jacques’ 
solidarity can be seen in his denial of moral distinctions between men; instead all are 
regarded as “victims.”113  And the transcendence to which he aspires is not otherworldly; 
instead it is achieved the moment man imagines himself “reborn in the eyes of others.”114  
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This act of imagination, because it makes identification with the suffering of others 
possible, is for Camus the ground of revolt. 
From The Stranger to The First Man, then, there is a linear progression from 
solipsism to revolt.  In the course of this movement, men find something in the name of 
which to act and on the basis of which to judge.  In each of these texts, moreover, 
consciousness extends outward, culminating in a community of revolt.  And the impetus 
for revolt becomes increasingly commonplace.  In The Plague it is a mass epidemic; in 
The Growing Stone it is a man under duress; and in The First Man it is simply awareness 
of death.  These stories are linked, moreover, by a concern with alienation and 
beginnings.  In each case, by virtue of circumstance, men are alienated either from 
themselves, their loved ones, or the world.  Each time, however, their exile becomes an 
opportunity for renewal.  Absurdity remains a source of alienation, but the barriers 
between men give way.  And revolt becomes the mechanism through which the 
metaphysical demand for unity is transformed into an earthly kingdom.  This is what 
Camus means when he describes revolt as “a fabricator of universes.”115 
So far I have delineated the experiential origins of revolt.  To illustrate the 
foundational implications of revolt, the role of antinomies must be examined as well.  
Beginning with his sensualist period, Camus’ writings are replete with antagonisms.  Be 
it the tension between means and ends or between thought and action, Camus is 
constantly preserving tragic paradoxes.  This endures in his theory of revolt, which is 
similarly grounded in contradiction.
116
  At bottom, revolt seeks to balance competing 
claims – freedom and justice, immanence and transcendence, being and becoming.  
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Reconciliation between these demands is impossible, Camus insists; they must instead 
find their limits in each other.  The way to absolute unity is always through the 
“suppression of all contradiction.”117  Revolt resists the excesses of revolution through 
the preservation of this tension; to abandon it, to drift too far in either direction, is to 
exceed the limits of revolt – this is the danger to which Camus refers above.  Thus Camus 
insists that revolt “is nothing but pure tension.”118 
Revolt as Tension 
In many ways, tension is the crowning concept of Camus’ thought.  Indeed as 
Camus’ thought progressed, he understood life in increasingly dialectical terms.  He 
refers to this in the final chapter of The Rebel: 
Where could one perceive essence except on the level of existence and evolution? But 
nor can it be said that being is only existence. Something that is always in the process of 
development could not exist – there must be a beginning. Being can only prove itself in 
development, and development is nothing without being. The world is not in a condition 
of pure stability; nor is it only movement. It is both movement and stability.
119
 
 
Camusian revolt is a reflection of this dialectic.  Just as the world is suspended between 
being and becoming, revolt is the resulting tension between man’s assertion of value 
(life) on the one hand and the silence of the world on the other.  Camus describes this 
tension as “an irregular pendulum, which swings in an erratic arc because it is looking for 
its most perfect and profound rhythm.”120  Revolt is rhythmic because it is neither pure 
flux nor constant stability; instead it is a harmony of opposites.  On the basis of this logic, 
Camus holds that there are no absolutes; “there are only limits.”121 
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Acceptance of contradiction remains a dominant theme in Camus’ work from the 
absurdist period onward.  As argued below, Camus’ contradictory thoughts concerning 
the legitimacy of violence is a notable example of this.  The concept of absurdity is also 
rooted in contradiction.  In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus makes no effort to resolve this 
paradox; on the contrary, he asks whether one can live with or in spite of it.  In The Rebel 
Camus accepts the relativity of values and the necessity of limits precisely because the 
contradictions of life demand it.  This is a significant point of contrast between Camus, 
Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky.  As noted, for Nietzsche relativity is liberating.  In a world of 
pure becoming, values are impermanent and thus non-binding.  Hence Camus argues that 
Nietzsche’s philosophy eschews limits.122  Dostoevsky similarly associated relativism 
with the loss of limits.  The logic of this is best expressed through Ivan’s “everything is 
permitted.”  For Camus, however, “the absurd does not liberate; it binds.”123  If anything, 
by revealing the tension between man and the world, absurdity demands the assertion of 
human value.  At the same time, it commands moderation, as the absence of eternal 
values sanctions nothing.  “There must also be values and aims,” Camus argues, “in order 
to choose another course of action.”124  Camus maintains, furthermore, that if man 
decides to live, it is because he has judged life valuable.  By extension, “if we decide to 
rebel, it must be because we have decided that a human society has some positive 
value.”125  Revolt is thus a natural progression from absurdity in that it makes a universal 
value of the individual’s affirmation of life.  But revolt does not supply definitive rules 
for action; rather, it marks a limit.  To revolt is to agree to live in tension, and to 
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continually re-affirm the dignity of human life.
126
  The moderating values of revolt are 
therefore held together by a tension born of man’s contradictory condition.127 
Before continuing, it is essential to explain in what sense revolt (and its 
conception of tension) crowns Camus’ thought.  As the quote above demonstrated, 
Camus conceived of his work as a series of “stages on the way to an unrewarded 
perfection.”  The best way to track the development of Camus’ thought is to correlate the 
symbols he uses with their corresponding themes and cycles.  As Robert Zaretsky 
recently noted, Camus was constantly mining symbols and Greek myths “not only to 
make sense of his life, but also to make sense of our lives.”128  In an important study of 
Camus, Pete Petrakis focuses exclusively on this aspect of Camus’ work, identifying 
exile, judgment, and kingdom as the defining symbols of his thought.  “Exile,” argues 
Petrakis, “is a more personal and evocative experience of the absurd; judgment is the 
fundamental ground of revolt; and kingdom building . . . embraced the limits of human 
endeavors.”129  Exile, judgment, and kingdom are thus correlated with the themes of 
absurdity, revolt, and limits.  Petrakis’ thesis is consistent with the evolution of Camus’ 
thought, and Camus seems to corroborate it in a 1947 notebook entry, in which he 
associates these themes with the first three stages of his work.
130
  In the context of this 
study, Camus’ conception of limits is significant for two reasons.  First, it speaks to the 
larger coherence of Camus’ thought.  In his transition to absurdity, Camus does not 
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negate his early sensualist commitments; instead they are subsumed under his absurdist 
thought.
131
  Likewise, as Camus progresses from absurdity to revolt, he is careful not to 
abandon previous insights.  Hence when he seeks a ground for value in The Rebel, he 
does not exceed the bounds (existentially or epistemologically) marked by absurdity.  
Having acknowledged the impossibility of absolute certainty, he looks to common 
experience as a ground for revolt.  And because absurdity imposes limits on reason, he 
turns to symbols as means of examining contemporary life and of universalizing the 
truths of experience.  
 Camus’ call to moderation can also be seen as the culmination of his dialogue 
with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  To begin, Camus’ philosophical disposition was largely 
a product of his rootedness in Mediterranean culture.
132
  A native of Algeria, Camus tried 
constantly to reconcile what he considered the defining conflict of the century, namely 
the battle between “German dreams and Mediterranean traditions.”133  This was a conflict 
between ideas and experience, between divine nostalgia and an active love of life.  The 
origins of this internal struggle could be seen already in Camus’ early sensualist 
literature.  Camus’ biographer, Herbert Lottman, refers to Camus’ dilemma in a key 
passage:  
Camus explained that the Mediterranean divided him from most of his 
fellow French writers, who had been nourished on German literature while 
he had been raised on Greek. Plato was more important to him than Hegel. 
But he admitted the influence of Pascal, Tolstoy, and Nietzsche: ‘This 
choice will seem strange to you, and I myself agree that they don’t go 
together. To tell the truth I haven’t managed to work out my own internal 
contradictions.’134 
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Camus’ uneasiness with his European and Mediterranean roots is important 
because it helps to explain his tensional relation to Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  Camus is 
clearly influenced by these thinkers, but he remains suspended between their 
incompatible visions.  With his philosophy of limits, however, Camus comes closest to 
striking a middle path.  As we have seen, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky disagree about the 
proper response to the human condition.  Nietzsche’s solution springs from his ontology 
of power; Dostoevsky’s to his understanding of the sources of order in society.  Although 
Camus diverges from both of these solutions, his theory of revolt is fundamentally a 
product of both.    
The Nietzschean roots of Camusian revolt can be seen in its Hellenic antecedents.  
Near the end of The Rebel, for example, Camus invokes Heraclitus as a model for his 
dialectical view of experience: 
Heraclitus, the discoverer of the constant change of things, nevertheless 
set a limit to this perpetual process. This limit was symbolized by 
Nemesis, the goddess of moderation and the implacable enemy of the 
immoderate. A process of thought which wanted to take into account the 
contemporary contradictions of rebellion should seek its inspiration from 
this Goddess.
135
 
 
It was thus within a Heraclitian framework that Camus developed his conception of 
tension and limits.  However, Camus likely borrowed his interpretation of Heraclitus 
from Nietzsche.  As Samantha Novello has noted, Camus consumed Nietzsche’s writings 
on the Greeks between the years of 1938 and 1941, and “Nietzsche’s early pages on 
Heraclitus are likely to have captured Camus’ attention and to have been interpreted in 
light of the criticism of reason that the German philosopher expresses in his later 
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works.”136  Novello’s claim is more than justified, particularly her emphasis on reason.  
Camus embraces contradiction, in part, because he was convinced of the fundamental 
unintelligibility of the world.  When he develops his notion of revolt, tension is posited as 
a concomitant of this disunity.  A close reading of Nietzsche’s texts also supports 
Novello’s claim.  In Twilight of the Idols, for instance, Nietzsche identifies Heraclitus as 
the first philosopher to understand the importance of “plurality and change” as well as the 
illusoriness of “duration and unity.”137  While Camus clearly departs from Nietzsche, it is 
significant that he sought to ground revolt within this Nietzschean and Heraclitian 
framework.
138
  And in light of the broader importance of Nietzsche’s metaphysics to 
Camus, I regard Camus’ emphasis on tension as emblematic of Nietzsche’s enduring 
influence.
139
 
To the degree that Dostoevsky influences Camus, he often does so at the expense 
of Nietzsche.  This is particularly true on the subject of limits.
140
  In many of his writings, 
Camus articulated the problem of limits in terms of foundations.  Rather than embrace the 
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religious foundationalism of Dostoevsky, however, Camus tries to establish foundations 
on his essentially Nietzschean edifice.  Camus’ aim is to reconstruct the experience of 
limits by reinvigorating the classic Greek symbol of moderation, Nemesis.  In a critically 
important essay, Helen’s Exile, Camus contrasts the Greek sense of balance with the 
modern thirst for totality: “The Greeks, who for centuries questioned themselves as to 
what is just, could understand nothing of our idea of justice.  For them equity implied a 
limit, whereas our whole continent is convulsed in its search for a justice that must be 
total.”141  Camus uses the symbol of Nemesis to represent the Greeks refusal to carry 
“anything to extremes, neither the sacred nor reason, because it negated nothing, neither 
the sacred nor reason.”142  This fidelity to limits, Camus argues, has been lost in the 
modern world, and can only be recovered by a return to nature and lived experience.  
Camus even links Nietzsche and the absence of God to the total embrace of “history and 
power.”143  At the same time, however, Camus insists that we must live in the world of 
uncertainty unmasked by Nietzsche while also cultivating a sense of the sacred as 
Dostoevsky constantly urged.  In this way, Camus tries to avoid the religious 
transcendentalism of Dostoevsky while preserving his sense of order and limits.  
Similarly, Camus remains committed to Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism but he condemns 
Europe’s Nietzschean rejection of values.  “Nietzsche is outdistanced,” he writes, 
“Europe no longer philosophizes by striking a hammer, but by shooting a canon.”144 
  For Camus, the only way to communicate the core and eternal truths of 
experience is to evoke them through myth.  “Myths,” he wrote, “have no life of their own 
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. . . They wait for us to give them flesh.”145  As a symbol, Nemesis represents not just 
moderation but also the dangers of excess.  In his notebooks, Camus refers to Nemesis as 
“the goddess of measure . . . All those who have overstepped the limit will be pitilessly 
destroyed.”146  For the Greeks, moreover, Nemesis was a distributor of divine retribution.  
She exemplified the resentment aroused in men by those who disrupted the natural 
equilibrium.  As a foundational symbol of limits, then, Nemesis was ideal. 
Camus does not reference Dostoevsky in his brief discussions of Nemesis, so 
there is no explicit connection in that sense.  However, Nemesis was the symbol Camus 
correlated with the third phase of his work, which was unfinished at the time of his death.  
What little Camus did write, then, was incomplete.  Had Camus lived to develop this 
phase of his thought, Dostoevsky would likely have figured prominently.  In any event, 
given Dostoevsky’s more general influence, Camus’ initial concern with limits likely 
stemmed from his intense reading of Dostoevsky.  As noted previously, Camus’ view of 
the nihilistic consciousness was deeply influenced by Dostoevsky’s Notes from 
Underground, The Brothers Karamazov and The Possessed.  In these works, Dostoevsky 
traced political nihilism to its origins in human consciousness; there is little doubt that 
Camus’ political thought was transformed as a result of this.  Along with the political 
crises of his time, moreover, Dostoevsky’s art illuminated the Promethean excesses of 
Nietzschean rebellion.  Camus explains in The Myth of Sisyphus why he sides with 
Nietzsche over Dostoevsky on the philosophical question of transcendence.
147
  Despite 
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his refusal “to conjure away one of the terms” of the absurd problem, however, 
Dostoevsky’s existential defense of the transcendent loomed large in Camus’ subsequent 
thought.
148
  By grounding revolt in tension and by symbolizing the experiential source of 
foundations, Camus bridges – or at the very least aspires to bridge – the gap between 
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  This is the sense in which revolt both crowns Camus’ early 
thought and represents the culmination of his dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  
Thus far the practical implications of Camusian revolt remain unclear.  Previously 
I concluded that revolt does not admit of definitive standards for action.  The question is 
therefore what would an ethics of revolt look like without such standards?  What, in other 
words, does Camus concretely advocate?  Furthermore, if the act of revolt is creative of 
value, in what sense are those values universal or binding?  If Camus’ thought is to have 
any practical relevance, these questions must be answered in the clearest of terms.  Here I 
present a provisional response by first addressing some of the common objections to 
Camus’ political theory and then looking to Camus’ fiction for illustrations of authentic 
revolt.  To help clarify the practical import of Camus’ conception of limits, I also 
delineate his notion of legitimate political violence. 
Revolt in Practice 
Several commentators have suggested that Camus’ thought is too vague or 
unsystematic to guide action in the world.  Ronald Srigley, for example, recently argued 
that Camus’ “methodological skepticism” constrained his analysis because it prevented 
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philosopher and an artist, Camus refuses to do this. 
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him from exploring “experiences that went beyond the limits they prescribed.”149  Srigley 
is right to emphasize Camus’ skepticism, but it is untrue that Camus was prevented from 
exploring such experiences.  Camus does not go beyond the limits of his presuppositions 
because that would exceed the bounds of absurdity.  Again, Camus’ aim is to impose 
limits on political action.
150
  He advocates an epistemological skepticism because it is 
ideas (of God, of history, of human nature) that give intellectual cover to violent actions.  
Hence he resists all claims to ultimate truths concerning reality or purpose.  But this does 
not mean that Camus was closed to experiential truths.  Instead he sought to reinvigorate 
those truths through the medium of art and fiction.   
Critics have also claimed that Camus’ unwillingness to commit politically 
rendered his thought practically insignificant.  A recent example of this critique can be 
found in Tony Judt’s The Burden of Responsibility, which treats Camus as an important 
but largely unpolitical thinker.  “Not unconcerned with public affairs or uncaring about 
political choices,” Judt writes, Camus was nevertheless “by instinct and temperament an 
unaffiliated person.”151  For Judt, then, Camus’ reluctance to take sides reflected the 
ambiguity of his thought.  Camus’ most vociferous critic, Jean-Paul Sartre, condemned 
Camus on similar grounds.  Following the publication of The Rebel, Sartre dismissed 
Camus’ thought as unclear and ahistorical.  On Sartre’s view, a political philosophy that 
failed to address historical conditions amounted to “an abstract, introspective search for 
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principles to solace our metaphysical unhappiness.”152   Whereas Camus looked to the 
metaphysical origins of revolt, Sartre approached the problem from the perspective of the 
worker.  Against Camus’ metaphysical analysis of revolt, Sartre argued: “The 
circumstances which bring about the crystallization of the masses into revolutionary 
mobs can with good reason be called historical: they arise from the social, economic and 
political transformations of the continent.”153  Sartre rejected Camus’ call for limits 
because of the rebel’s asymmetrical relation to the power structure.154  Indeed, for Sartre, 
a moderate revolt was a contradiction in terms.  By virtue of his circumstance, the rebel 
confronts an order he cannot defeat conventionally.  Andre Breton, a prominent poet and 
surrealist of the era, proffered a similar objection to Camus: 
What is this phantom of revolt that Camus is trying to credit, and behind 
which he takes shelter, a form of revolt into which moderation has been 
introduced? Once the revolt has been emptied of its passionate substance, 
what could possibly remain? I have no doubt that many people will be 
duped by this artifice: it is a case of keeping the word and eliminating the 
thing itself.
155
 
 
Though hyperbolic, Breton’s (and Sartre’s) appraisal raises an important question.  
Without a willingness to take extraordinary action, what becomes of revolt?  Is it possible 
to retroactively impose upon revolt the kinds of unclear limits Camus propounds in The 
Rebel?  
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 To begin, it must be remembered that Camus’ concern was to undermine 
theoretical justifications for violence.  As the discussion of Hegel demonstrated, Camus 
was sensitive to the totalizing tendencies of movements obsessed with change and justice; 
and he was particularly disturbed by the capacity of intellectuals to justify crime on 
ideological grounds.  Critics like Sartre and Breton misunderstand (or deliberately 
neglect) this aspect of Camus’ thought.  Revolt should not be seen as an attempt to 
explain reality or prescribe political action.
156
   Camus was drawn to figures like Ivan 
Karamazov because he understood metaphysical revolt as a negation of reality.  
However, as Eubanks and Petrakis observe, such negation can lead “to a form of exile in 
which human beings are fundamentally unable to make judgments.”157  This inability to 
make judgments (impose value) was the cardinal problem of revolt for Camus.  To 
historicize action, as Sartre urges, is to separate it from immediate experience; it also 
divorces the rebel from absurdity – indeed it forces him into a position in which his 
rebellion is contingent upon his non-recognition of reality; he must live in and constantly 
reorder the false world he has created.  This has disastrous consequences for human life.  
It sets up a conflict between reality and the system purporting to explain it; and too often, 
Camus believes, it is reality that must give way.  This is the point at which “rebellion, 
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forgetful of its origins . . . denies life, dashes toward destruction, and raises up the 
grimacing cohorts of petty rebels.”158 
 Camus is thus not so much interested in defining revolt as he is in moderating its 
effects.  He begins with the observation that revolt, whatever its origins, can lead either to 
solidarity or suffering.
159
  In defense of solidarity, Camus sought a proximate form of 
rebellious politics that acknowledged the limits of human action.  Jeffrey Isaac has 
offered what seems to me a much better understanding of Camus’ political aims.  
According to Isaac, it is a mistake to accuse Camus of ignoring history or of treating 
revolt as a purely metaphysical undertaking.  Responding to critics who charge Camus 
with misrepresenting the nature of political struggle in The Plague, Isaac writes 
They correctly saw that the rebellion depicted in The Plague is not a class 
struggle, that it involves no political parties or mass movements and has 
neither grandiose ideological ambitions nor any deep interest in state 
power. But they were wrong to conclude that it therefore represents a kind 
of pristine and moralistic political withdrawal. Rather, it depicts new kind 
of politics . . . In no way does it abandon history. But it refuses any kind of 
grand historical justification like that found in Marxism . . . Rieux lives 
thoroughly in the present. This does not make him indifferent to 
consequences. It is just that he chooses his ends and means soberly, and 
justifies them not in terms of a grand narrative but in terms of an active 
solidarity.
160
 
 
Here Isaac captures the essence of Camusian revolt.  From an ethical perspective, Camus 
aims only to establish a pluralistic framework within which actions can be measured and 
judged.
161
  It lacks the certainty of metaphysical systems because this is what life with 
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others demands.  Values are self-constituted products of a political community; to be 
binding they must emerge from and be guided by dialogue and experience.  This is what 
it means to participate in political life, and Camusian revolt cannot be understood apart 
from this fact.   
The Just Assassins 
 In the play The Just Assassins, Camus offers a practical example of political 
action guided by a rebellious ethics.  Here revolt is seen from the perspective of the 
revolutionary.  Camus draws on historical events to show that even under extreme 
circumstances, we cannot speak of just and unjust action but only of action that 
recognizes limits.  The Just Assassins is not a paean to pacifism, however.  Violence is 
accepted as a necessary and indefensible reality.  But at the same time Camus tries to 
establish a sense of measure and illustrate how the totalizing impulses of revolutionary 
action can be moderated by an authentic politics of rebellion.   
 Performed for the first time in 1949, The Just Assassins is the story of an 
insurrectionist group that aims to assassinate the Russian grand duke.  It includes a small 
cast of three characters, each of whom represents a different rebellious attitude.  Stephan 
is the absolutist; his devotion is total and he refuses to impose limits on action.
162
  
                                                                                                                                                 
action; ethics is not mathematics or even law. Rather, we grasp limits to humane action 
and recognize that certain commitments cannot go together with others. This approach 
reveals limitations intrinsic to the realm of values, establishing binding hypotheticals, 
constraints of action within particular frameworks. Thus value claims should take an if-
then form: if that is wished, then this must be taken into view. But the need to act in 
accordance with any specific ethical or human framework – with the if-clause of the 
hypothetical – can never be deduced” (131).  
162
 Stephan represents the ethic of efficacy, which I discussed in chapter two. He 
embodies the kind of means-ends thinking that Camus constantly opposed. This can be 
seen in the ease with which Stephan is willing to kill. “I don’t suffer from a tender heart,” 
he proudly claims, “that sort of nonsense cuts no ice with me . . . Not until the day comes 
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Kaliayev is the compassionate and authentic rebel; he opposes all attempts to rationalize 
murder.  “When we kill,” he says, “we’re killing so as to build up a world in which there 
will be no more killing.  We consent to being criminals so that at last the innocent . . . 
will inherit the earth.”163  Kaliayev is continually troubled by the potential consequences 
of his actions.
164
  Dora is the conscience of the characters; she is perpetually reminding 
them that there are moral limits that cannot be transgressed.
165
  The tension that results 
from the interactions of these characters reflects the dynamic between rebellion and 
revolution; that is, it highlights the balance the rebel must strike between his demand for 
justice and his refusal to justify murder. 
 The key struggle in the play revolves around Stephan and Kaliayev.  These men 
exemplify the opposing attitudes of rebellion and revolution.  Stephan is the cocksure 
revolutionary.  His world is simple and free of ambiguity.  Exasperated by the group’s 
unwillingness to sacrifice children, Stephan explains his philosophy in clear terms: 
 There are no limits! The truth is that you don’t believe in the revolution, 
any of you. No, you don’t believe in it. If you did believe in it sincerely, 
with all your hearts; if you felt sure that, by dint of our struggles and 
sacrifices, some day we shall build up a new Russia, redeemed from 
despotism, a land of freedom that will gradually spread out over the whole 
earth; and if you felt convinced that then and only then, freed from his 
masters, and his superstitions, man will at last look up toward the sky, a 
god in his own right – how, I ask you, could the deaths of two children be 
weighed in the balance against such a faith? Surely you would claim for 
                                                                                                                                                 
when we stop sentimentalizing about children will the revolution triumph, and we be 
masters of the world” (256). 
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yourselves the right to do anything and everything that might bring that 
day nearer!
166
 
 
There are several things worth noting here.  First, Stephan has no regard for the present.  
When Camus speaks of revolutionary ideologies as “frustrated religions,” this is precisely 
what he has in mind.
167
  Stephan rejects God but he cannot let go of transcendence.  For 
him “the future is the only transcendent value.”168  Stephan devalues life by using the 
nobility of his ends as justification for murder.  Second, he eschews limits.  At no point 
does Stephan consider the consequences of his actions.  He is prepared to sacrifice 
anything in service to the revolution.  Stephan is the sort of pseudo-humanist that Camus 
often associated with socialism: he “rejects the man of today in the name of the man of 
the future.”169  Finally, Stephan’s aspirations are utopian.  Against an absolute despotism 
he seeks to impose an absolute freedom, which is as undesirable as it is unattainable.  
Stephan’s actions reflect the “all or nothing” attitude of which Camus writes in The 
Rebel.”170  Interestingly, Stephan’s attitude is mirrored in The Possessed by 
Verkhovensky, who issues an analogous defense of unlimited action: 
I ask you which you prefer: the slow way, which consists in the 
composition of socialistic romances and the academic ordering of the 
destinies of humanity a thousand years hence, while despotism will 
swallow the savory morsels which would almost fly into your mouths of 
themselves if you’d take a little trouble; or do you, whatever it may imply, 
prefer a quicker way which will at last untie your hands, and will not let 
humanity make its own social organization in freedom and in action, not 
on paper.
171
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Verkhovensky exhibits the same revolutionary mindset as Stephan; both advocate 
unlimited action in the name of a future freedom.  
 If Stephan is defined by certainty, Kaliayev is defined by doubt.  Kaliayev affirms 
life and is prepared to act, but he will not blindly accept murder.  In a revealing exchange 
with Stephan, Kaliayev says  
Quite likely you are right. But those I love are the men who are alive 
today, and walk this same earth. It’s they whom I hail, it is for them I am 
fighting, for them I am ready to lay down my life. But I shall not strike my 
brothers in the face for the sake of some far-off city, which, for all I know, 
may not exist. I refuse to add to the living injustice all around me for the 
sake of a dead justice . . . Killing children is a crime against a man’s 
honor. And if one day the revolution thinks fit to break with honor, well, 
I’m through with revolution.172 
 
Kaliayev’s desire to act is moderated by his conscience.  Unlike Stephan, Kaliayev is not 
immersed in utopian fantasies of absolute freedom and justice.  To be sure, he recognizes 
injustice, but he is faithful to the impulses of rebellion in a way that Stephan clearly is 
not.  Rebellion remains for him both a declaration of human innocence and a protest 
against death.  “I have chosen death,” he declares, “so as to prevent murder from 
triumphing in the world.”173  Hence he will not consent to crime unless it can be justified 
in present experience.  Kaliayev’s revolution is only a means – to justice, to peace, to life.  
He refuses to countenance Stephan’s rationalizations of murder. 174   Kaliayev is 
constantly questioning himself and the group as to their motives and aims.  “Kaliayev 
doubted to the end,” Camus writes, “but this doubt did not prevent him from acting; it is 
for that reason that he is the purest image of rebellion.”175 
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 The third character, Dora, mediates the moral struggle between Stephan and 
Kaliayev.  Her insistence on limits helps to balance the tension between them.  She is the 
embodiment of Camus’ ethical attitude.  Like Kaliayev, Dora is continually burdened by 
the necessity of violence.  Mindful of what they have done, she wonders whether their 
actions will ultimately prove self-defeating.  “Nobody,” she worries, “will want to look 
justice in the face again.”176  Dora is willing to adopt violence but only up to a certain 
point.  She believes that to go too far, to try to achieve too much, is to betray the people 
in whose name they fight.  Just as Ivan thinks the acceptance of suffering too high a price 
for salvation, Dora deems the acceptance of murder too high a price for justice.  If you 
are willing to accept this, she says, it means “you have gone about it too fast . . . you are 
no longer men.”177  At its core, rebellion is an affirmation of life; to unconditionally 
accept murder is to abandon the entire project.  This is the moral measure of revolt for 
Camus, and Dora’s duty is to ensure that her fellow rebels do not exceed it.   
Conclusion 
Let us conclude by restating Camus’ aims during this final period of thought.  
Camus is seeking a philosophy of politics that imposes limits and is consistent with the 
demands of absurdity.  By this measure, his conception of revolt is perfectly coherent.  In 
The Myth of Sisyphus, for example, Camus invokes absurdity to establish the 
impossibility of absolute knowledge.  He then rejects suicide as a consequence of the 
absurd.
178
  In doing so, Camus lays the groundwork for a meaningful response to 
absurdity.  Life is said to have meaning and value if it is lived within the limits of the 
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human condition.  The ethical implications of this, while initially unclear, are quite 
significant.  For one, Camus’ absurdism nullifies the epistemological basis of ideologies.  
As I argued above, this undercuts the ideologue’s moral certitude.  The absurd is also a 
declaration of human innocence; as the discussion of The Plague suggested, it defines the 
human condition.  For Camus this is a source of communion as well as an imperative to 
serve those with whom this condition is shared.
179
   
 In The Rebel Camus extends his absurdist vision to include a positive philosophy 
of revolt.  In The Myth of Sisyphus, suicide was rejected, but murder was not.  At this 
stage, Camus’ metaphysics remain solipsistic, and there is not yet an ethics of 
responsibility and solidarity.  This is no longer the case in The Rebel and The Plague.  In 
these texts, Camus maintains his concept of the absurd, but, as Sagi notes, he develops “a 
metaphysics of human unity” within that very framework.180  The limits marked by the 
absurd, moreover, are transferred to the political realm and action is constrained by 
experiential factors.  Such grounds for action are hardly definitive, but again this is 
precisely Camus’ point.  Foundations must maintain their relative and provisional 
character, as they exist only insofar as they are continually re-affirmed in experience.  
Camus’ meaning here is perhaps better expressed by the French sociologist Raymond 
Aron, who claimed that “Relativism is the authentic experience of politics.”181  At any 
rate, to criticize Camus for failing to offer a practical guide to revolutionary action is to 
misunderstand his intent.  After all, Camus is responding to the plague of nihilism.  In his 
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view, it was important to, first, reclaim the value of human life and, second, to establish 
moral limits on the basis of that claim.  This is what the specter of nihilism in the 
twentieth century demanded.  “The world that people like me are after,” Camus wrote, “is 
not a world in which people don’t kill each other . . . but a world in which murder is not 
legitimized.”182  
In terms of Camus’ interaction with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, the revolt period 
is arguably the most significant.  During his sensualist and absurdist periods, Camus is 
largely converging with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.   In his revolt works, Camus 
develops their insights in an effort to move beyond them.  The worldliness of Nietzsche is 
translated into an experiential ground.  Indeed because of its rootedness in reality, Camus 
writes, revolt “tries to realize itself . . . from bottom to top.”183  The primacy of 
experience and the denial of transcendentals are thus key Nietzschean influences on 
Camus.  At the same time, Nietzsche’s rejection of idealism (as well as his exaltation of 
becoming) committed him to a philosophy of action without apparent limits; as we have 
seen, Camus reacts strongly against this.  Hence as Camus’ conception of revolt 
progresses from The Stranger to The First Man, there is an increased concern with limits.  
These limits were marked in The Rebel, but the medium of fiction allows Camus to 
concretize them in dramatic fashion. 
Although it is never explicit, Camus’ critique of revolution seems to follow 
directly from his critique of Nietzsche.
184
  Camus objects to Nietzsche’s emphasis on 
becoming because it negates being and therefore the source of living tension.  Deprived 
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of a moral counter-force, Nietzsche’s world is propelled perpetually by affirmations of 
power and will.  The result of this is a kind of circularity without limits or direction.
185
  In 
the political realm, this circularity imperils the course of revolution.  Here, as Camus 
writes, “the word revolution retains the meaning that it has in astronomy.  It is a 
movement that describes a complete circle.”186  Revolutionary action thus turns endlessly 
upon itself as it seeks to impose form on the world.  In this way, it begins in the realm of 
ideas and ends by translating those ideas onto the historical plane.  Revolt is distinct from 
revolution in that it reverses this movement; that is to say, “it leads from individual 
experience into the realm of ideas.”187  Well beyond his sensualist and absurdist periods, 
then, Camus continues to take his philosophical bearing from Nietzsche.  That Camus 
does so while rejecting Nietzscheanism only confirms the fundamental importance of 
Nietzsche to Camus’ thought. 
Lastly, one of the primary claims of this study is that Camus’ thought is often 
suspended between Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  This is most evident in Camus’ revolt 
period.  In The Rebel, for instance, Camus’ divergence from Nietzsche is almost inversely 
proportional to his convergence with Dostoevsky.  Indeed Camus invokes Ivan 
Karamazov’s “everything is permitted” in order to highlight the problematic nature of 
Nietzsche’s logic.188  Thus when Camus announced to Grenier that he would use his 
essay on revolt to “start the critique of Nietzscheanism,” it was in part because of 
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philosophy, but he rejects it is as potentially destructive of political order. 
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Dostoevsky.189  This juxtaposition suggests, furthermore, that Dostoevsky’s arguments 
concerning values and foundations influenced Camus’ mounting concern for limits.   In 
The Rebel, therefore, there is a sustained emphasis on foundations, and the agonism of 
revolt functions as a tensional source of order.  While it is not clear that Camus is able to 
preserve the unifying force of Dostoevsky’s Christ-ideal, he does posit an experiential 
basis for limits, values, and solidarity.  In view of Camus’ resistance to essentialism, this 
is the most his political thought could hope to accomplish. 
                                                 
189
 Correspondence, 1932-1960, p. 90. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 “If the duration of history is not synonymous with the duration of the harvest, then 
history, in effect, is no more than a fleeting and cruel shadow in which man has no more 
part. He who dedicates himself to this history dedicates to nothing and, in his turn, is 
nothing. But he who dedicates himself to the duration of his life, to the house he builds, to 
the dignity of mankind, dedicates himself to the earth and reaps from it the harvest and 
sows its seed and sustains the world again and again.” – Camus 
 
 Camus was never content with theorizing about justice and suffering.  Indeed he 
was one of the few French intellectuals to risk his life in service to the resistance.  This 
won him a considerable amount of praise and admiration.  It also exasperated his 
contemporaries, many of whom decried his high-mindedness.  But Camus’ commitment 
to action was quite sincere.  He tried desperately to avoid the ideological posturing on all 
sides.  Instead he sought to serve justice at the most concrete level.  In the ideological 
climate of post-World War II Europe, this was extraordinarily rare.    
Despite the criticism he endured in the latter part of his life, Camus’ humanist 
legacy has grown steadily since his early death in 1960.  In France and much of the world 
his works are continually published and consumed.  In addition to his literary success, 
many of Camus’ political ideas, particularly his insights into ideology and revolt, have 
proven increasingly prescient.  The task of this final chapter is threefold: to summarize 
what Camus takes from his dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky; to explain how he 
transforms these insights; and to clarify the lasting significance of his project.  
Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky orbited around two problems: 
nihilism and foundations.  During his early sensualist period, Camus’ ideas on these 
matters are latent or undeveloped.  His writings are highly stylized and his concerns are 
mostly aesthetic and existential.  However, Nietzsche’s influence is already apparent.  As 
chapter three demonstrated, Camus’ sensualist works engage a number of Nietzschean 
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themes, including aestheticism, foundationalism, and worldly affirmation.  Although the 
absurd dilemma is not formally articulated, Camus is clearly interested in the problems of 
an absurd existence.  And while he has not yet considered the political implications of 
absurdity, he is already exploring its significance at the level of the individual.  This is 
evident in Camus’ early essays and notebooks, where happiness in an absurd world is the 
central theme.  In Nuptials, for example, Camus praises sensual living and denounces 
other-worldliness in explicitly Nietzschean terms.  The Nietzschean roots of these 
convictions are confirmed in Camus’ notebooks, where Nietzsche is often quoted and 
referenced.
1
   
 In Camus’ early fiction, Nietzsche’s influence persists.  In A Happy Death, 
Nietzsche’s doctrines of eternal recurrence and amor fati are dramatized and affirmed.  In 
Caligula, however, which was completed near the end of Camus’ sensualist period, there 
is a tonal shift.  Whereas in A Happy Death Camus seems to echo Nietzsche’s 
momentism, in Caligula a tension emerges between absurdity and sensualism.  The kind 
of self-affirmation Nietzsche advocated is carried to its logical conclusion and the result 
is political nihilism.  Caligula is thus the first work in which Camus begins to explore the 
social consequences of Nietzsche’s affirmative response to nihilism. 
 When Camus’ absurdist period begins around 1942, the dialogue with Nietzsche 
continues, but the primary focus is meaning and values.  This is first apparent in The 
Myth of Sisyphus.  Here Camus grapples with the epistemological implications of 
absurdity and appears to embrace Nietzsche’s perspectivism.  Nietzsche’s account of 
truth also forms the basis of Camus’ metaphysics of ideology, which is not fully 
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 See chapter two (pp. 5-8) for an extensive analysis of Camus’ interaction with 
Nietzsche during this period. 
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developed until The Rebel.
2
  As suggested above, The Myth of Sisyphus is also the text in 
which Camus’ dialogue with Dostoevsky emerges in earnest.  Although he does not 
abandon Nietzsche’s anti-essentialism, Dostoevsky’s critique of nihilism (in works such 
as The Possessed and The Brothers Karamazov) problematizes absurdity in new ways for 
Camus.  The connections Dostoevsky draws between absurdity and alienation awaken 
Camus to the individual’s struggle for meaning in a world without transcendence.  In The 
Myth of Sisyphus Camus engages Dostoevsky directly and examines suicide.  For Camus, 
in fact, suicide emerges as an absurd theme in Dostoevsky’s works.3  While Camus 
challenges Dostoevsky’s claim that absurdity renders life meaningless, the force of 
Dostoevsky’s arguments seem to undermine the worldliness of Camus’ early writings.  
 Another problematic in Camus’ mature thought concerns the tension between 
nihilism and transcendence.  This question recurs throughout Camus’ absurdist writings.  
As the dialogue between nihilism and transcendence is personified by Nietzsche and 
Dostoevsky, these are the works in which Camus’ dialogue with both thinkers begins to 
crystallize.  Having adopted Nietzsche’s perspectivism in The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus 
remains committed to an anti-essentialist position.  However, by the time he publishes 
The Plague and The Rebel, Camus appears to question the logical outcome of Nietzsche’s 
radical skepticism.  In particular, Nietzsche’s individualist calls to self-affirmation 
conflict with Camus’ burgeoning desire to impose limits on action.4  Initially appealing, 
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 As chapter five argues, Dostoevsky’s account of historical nihilism and logical crime is 
also inform Camus’ understanding of totalizing ideologies. 
3
 See The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 108. 
4
 As I argue in chapter four (pp. 8-10), this conflict is at the center of Camus’ play 
Caligula. 
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Nietzsche’s individualism is now seen as antithetical to communal life, which demands a 
shared basis for values.    
Camus’ critique of Nietzsche reaches its climax in The Rebel.  Here Camus 
clarifies his rejection of Nietzscheanism and the implicit link between metaphysical angst 
and political nihilism is articulated.  For the first time, moreover, Camus applies 
Dostoevsky’s psychological insights to his analysis of revolt, and the connections 
Dostoevsky makes between individual and societal disorder (notably in The Brothers 
Karamazov and The Possessed) are affirmed.  This is most apparent in Camus’ 
engagement with Dostoevsky’s literary character, Ivan Karamazov.  As mentioned, with 
Ivan metaphysical revolt leads to a moral impasse, and the problem of individual 
meaning becomes a question of virtue for society as such.  Using Ivan as a model, Camus 
traces the movement from metaphysical revolt to historical revolution.  Although Ivan’s 
revolt gives way to nihilism, his example shaped Camus’ subsequent thought in two 
ways.  First, Ivan poses the problem of relativity and limits without God.  For Camus, this 
clarified the political implications of a world without transcendent standards.  Second, 
Ivan’s subordination of truth to justice as well as his concern for human suffering 
constituted a positive ground for human solidarity.  Indeed much of Camus’ revolt-era 
fiction articulates an experiential alternative to nihilism and transcendence on the basis of 
Ivan’s moral declaration.  
 Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky culminates during the revolt 
period.  As the previous chapter concluded, Camus’ political thought ends with a call to 
dialogue and moderation.  This is informed in different but equally important ways by 
Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  On the one hand, Camus’ commitment to uncertainty, 
 221 
present experience, and creative engagement are functions of his early embrace of 
Nietzsche.  These are principles which emerge in Camus’ youthful writings and which 
appear to follow from Camus’ initial encounter with Nietzsche’s works.  On the other 
hand, Dostoevsky’s emphasis on foundations, guiding principles, and order are preserved 
in Camus’ politics of revolt.  From at least The Plague onward, Camus defines these 
problems in distinctly Dostoevskyian terms, and there is little doubt that his solutions are 
informed by Dostoevsky’s literature.  The question we must now ask is to what extent 
does Camus succeed in his synthesis of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky?  And what, if 
anything, does Camus’ success or failure suggest about the possibilities for an 
authentically absurd politics? 
Between Nihilism and Transcendence 
 Much of Camus’ political thought seeks to bridge the gap between nihilism and 
transcendence.  This work has argued that Nietzsche and Dostoevsky personify Camus’ 
dialogue with these phenomena.  As a diagnostician, Nietzsche identifies nihilism as the 
crisis of modernity; he traces its origins to various human pathologies and points a way 
forward for the creative individual.  However useful it may have been, Nietzsche insisted 
that the positing of transcendent ideals was no longer justifiable.  The metaphysical 
suppositions on which those ideals were based had collapsed, and the consequences of 
this were already apparent.  Hence he urges mankind (philosophers in particular) to create 
new values rooted in worldly affirmations of life and will.   
Dostoevsky seems to understand all that Nietzsche does (particularly at the level 
of the psyche), but Dostoevsky defends transcendence on existential grounds.  Unlike 
Nietzsche, Dostoevsky regards transcendence as essential for human flourishing.  On his 
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view, belief in a higher idea of life was both a moral and a political imperative.  The 
metaphysical and epistemological foundations of faith were always secondary to its 
practical benefits.  For Dostoevsky, moreover, a shared conception of the meaning of life 
was the true locus of order in society.  Divorced from such a conception, individuals 
became alienated from their communities and the result was political nihilism.  
Camus’ thought is properly situated between these two poles.  Fundamentally, 
Camus agrees with the spirit of Nietzsche’s “God is dead” remark.  That is to say, he 
agrees that God as a source of meaning and value has lost its motive force.  He also 
concedes and laments that enlightenment thought has emptied the world of transcendent 
meaning.  For Camus, in fact, the nihilism of twentieth century politics is a consequence 
of this loss of meaning, and Nietzsche was among the first to awaken him to this fact.  
Indeed Nietzsche’s diagnosis is the starting point for Camus’ absurdist inquiries.  
Despite agreeing with Nietzsche, Camus appears to be influenced (if not 
convinced) by Dostoevsky’s affirmation of the idea of God.  As mentioned in chapters 
four and five, Camus’ references to Dostoevsky as well as his choice of literary motifs 
suggest that Camus grappled constantly with Dostoevsky’s defense of transcendence.  
This was not apparent until his revolt period, but from The Plague onward Camus is in 
constant dialogue with Dostoevsky in this regard.  We have seen the complicated form 
this takes in Camus’ works, now we can evaluate Camus’ broader thought in terms of this 
struggle between nihilism and transcendence. 
In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus appears to reject a transcendent ground for 
values.  As noted, Camus even criticizes Dostoevsky for betraying the absurd by holding 
forth on transcendence.  In The Rebel, however, Camus notes the persistence of the 
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transcendent impulse in the various ideologies and scientific systems that followed “the 
theological era.”5  In historical Marxism and Auguste Comte’s system in particular, 
Camus sees models of “the horizontal religions of our times.”6  Although it is never 
explicit, Camus’ analysis implies that the hunger for transcendence (of which religions 
and ideologies are manifestations) is perhaps irrepressible in the human soul.  Nietzsche 
reached a similar conclusion in his thought, which is why he insisted that we must choose 
our mask of transcendence wisely.  Likewise for Camus, the question was how to satisfy 
this desire for transcendence without sacrificing the truth of absurdity.    
Camus’ experiential alternative emerges in his revolt-era writings, particularly 
The Rebel and The Plague.  Together these works locate a ground for values that is 
beyond the individual but not transcendent in the conventional or religious sense.  This 
ground is experiential insofar as it begins with the act of revolt; it is transcendent in the 
sense that it affirms life and value while also imposing limits on action.  The kind of 
transcendence that Camus seeks, therefore, is neither vertical (religious) nor horizontal 
(historical); it is a universal experience that transforms the isolated individual into a 
member of a community of revolt.  As the preceding chapter explained, Camusian revolt 
is about awareness – of the value of life, of the universality of suffering, and of the 
absurd condition which all men share.  In The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel, 
transcendence is said to escape the problem of life by giving it a false solution.  Worse 
still, it removes human beings from concrete sources of meaning – nature, suffering, 
friendship, and the kinds of individual action that lead to a sense of community; these are 
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6
 Ibid, p. 196. 
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the sources of an earthly kingdom in Camus’ works.  Ultimately, Camus sees revolt as 
the basis for an intersubjective consciousness; it uses experience-symbolizations to 
inspire a kind of imaginative identification with others.  At bottom, Camus tries to 
cultivate man’s capacity to think from the standpoint of another.  Hence the movement 
from individual to collective revolt in Camus’ novels (notably The Stranger and The 
Plague) is marked by the outward expansion of the individual’s consciousness. 
Although sympathetic to Dostoevsky’s Christ-ideal, Camus rejects it as a product 
of man’s metaphysical rearing; it is tethered to what Nietzsche often called “idols.”  
Perhaps because of his Nietzschean roots, Camus never wavers in his commitment to 
anti-essentialism.  Thus Camus does not conceive of revolt as an ideal in the traditional 
sense; rather, it is an experiential symbol that points to man’s embeddedness in a 
common situation.  Participation in the community of revolt does not require adherence 
to particular doctrine, nor does it demand that one commit to the absolute truth of an idea.  
For Camus it is essential to adhere to values and practices that are both contingent and 
binding.  The values born of revolt (life, limits, compassion, dialogue), though relative, 
are affirmed continually through collective action.   
In many ways, Camus rejects the language of absolutism and relativism, as both 
categories presuppose that values require foundations in the traditional sense.  Indeed, as 
Nietzsche often noted, nihilism was an inevitable consequence of this model.  Camus’ 
philosophy of revolt escapes this problem by carrying Nietzsche’s perspectivism to its 
proper conclusion.  That is to say, Camus relinquishes the idea of absolute truth and 
advocates an experiential pragmatism in which values are collectively acknowledged and 
mutually reinforced.  The source of limits and values, he insists, cannot be reduced to a 
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unified principle.  For this reason, a community of revolt is held together not by a 
common conception of truth but rather by a commonly recognized experience and a 
commitment to active dialogue.  In the end, Camus sought a ground for solidarity that 
recognized distinctions and embraced the tensional quality of human existence.  This is 
why Camus does not so much resolve the problem of foundationalism as reject its 
underlying assumptions.  
In On Human Conduct, Michael Oakeshott argues that a “morality is neither a 
system of general principles nor a code of rules . . . It is not a device for formulating 
judgments about conduct or for solving so-called moral problems, but a practice in terms 
of which to think, to choose, to act, and to utter.”7  Revolt is a political morality in 
precisely this sense; it eschews abstractions and embraces the tensions of a shared and 
absurd life.  Rather than demand unity, revolt tolerates difference and affirms those 
things which all human beings share, namely a desire to live and an aversion to suffering.  
In this way, revolt is above all a reorientation toward the world, a renewed commitment 
to present experience.  
The question of whether Camus succeeds in his synthesis of Nietzsche and 
Dostoevsky is difficult to answer.  To address it we might also ask whether Camus 
successfully bridges the gap between nihilism and transcendence.  Even the most astute 
critics, such as David Sprintzen, have argued that Camus’ alternatives are vague and 
“tend to be little more than moralisms.”8  Like Sartre and others, Sprintzen claims that 
Camus fails to appreciate the individual’s relation to historical processes and, 
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consequently, fails to understand humans “as the product of their own natural, historical, 
collective self-creation.”9  As illustrated in chapter five, however, it is untrue that Camus 
ignored man’s historical situation.10  Indeed Camus was deeply attuned to the historical 
and institutional origins of human suffering.  As to the claim that revolt is impractical and 
unappreciative of humanity’s “collective self-creation,” I believe this error arises from a 
failure to understand the radical nature of Camus’ project.  As the Oakeshott quote above 
suggested, the ethics of revolt are non-prescriptive by design.  Camus’ goal is not to posit 
a definitive ground for judging and deciding; for that is what foundationalist systems 
have done.  Instead he tries to identify the preconditions for a new kind of intersubjective 
politics, one in which the body and the present moment are supreme.  Experience and 
authentic communication are fundamental because they provide a general framework 
within with to judge action, but only on a provisional basis.  The acceptance of 
uncertainty is a product of Camus’ desire to impose limits on action.  Given the eruption 
of nihilistic violence in Europe, it is not surprising that Camus thought imposing limits 
the most urgent problem of his time.  As Roger Quilliot observes, Camus believed the 
best way to do this was to purge politics of “the prophetic spirit and the romantic sense of 
mission” which came to dominate revolutionary politics in the twentieth century.11  
Judged in this light, Camus’ notion of revolt is of greater value than many of his critics 
suggest, particularly Sprintzen and Sartre.  
It is also inaccurate to claim that Camus fails to account for the role of “collective 
self-creation.”  Indeed the mythology of the rebel and the first man are attempts to re-
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interpret the meaning of metaphysical revolt, to transform it into a collective experience.  
By collective experience I do not mean collective action involving the use of a party or 
movement to effect political change; this is precisely the sort of action against which 
Camus is reacting.  In Camus’ writings, particularly his late fiction, individual revolt is 
based upon and brings about a collective sense of the human condition.  Out of this 
collective sense a genuine community of revolt can emerge.  Revolt is thus a creative act 
whose symbolic significance transcends the individual.  Camus does not, therefore, deny 
that historical conditions shape human life and consciousness; rather, he is evoking the 
classical symbols of exile, judgment, and kingdom to awaken human beings to the reality 
of suffering and loss.  For Camus, these symbols have the capacity to alter human 
consciousness, even in the face of historical necessity and material scarcity.  To be sure, 
Camus does not present a scheme whereby political institutions or decisions can be 
categorically judged.  However, as Pete Petrakis concludes, Camus’ “analysis does allow 
for a thorough evaluation of social, cultural, and ethical foundations.”12  This is all 
Camus intends to do with his theory of revolt, and its significance must be judged on this 
basis alone.  
It is easier to grasp what Camus is trying to accomplish if it is seen in the larger 
context of his thought.  Fundamentally, Camus sees nihilism and transcendence (be it 
religious or historical) as equally problematic.  Nihilism either obliterates standards 
altogether or it leads to the exaltation of power.  In novels like The Possessed, 
Dostoevsky illustrates this problem with astonishing clarity.  Alternatively, because they 
are often rooted in abstractions, transcendentals divorce judgment (theory) from 
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experience (praxis) such that any action is in principle justifiable.  This is more or less 
the problem of idealism as defined by Nietzsche – although Nietzsche was concerned 
with the life-denying implications of idealist thought.  For Camus, transcendent 
foundations are beyond the realm of human understanding.  More importantly, because 
they are divorced from experience, they often fail to impose limits on action. 
In the final analysis, Camus’ philosophy of revolt seeks to accomplish two things.  
First, it establishes a ground for human judgment beyond metaphysics or transcendentals.  
By doing so, Camus avoids the epistemological traps of nihilism and transcendence.  
Second, revolt identifies ethical boundary conditions on the basis of which certain actions 
(murder, for example) can be deemed illegitimate.  Camus’ success on these two fronts is 
a matter of legitimate debate, but that debate must begin by acknowledging the impetus 
and intent of Camus’ political project.  Here I have defined this project in terms of 
Camus’ dialogue with Nietzsche and Dostoevsky.  In addition to crystallizing the 
problems against which Camus was reacting, this approach has also clarified the novelty 
of Camus’ efforts.  Whereas many political thinkers have sought to establish what human 
beings can and cannot know, Camus rejects this epistemological method.  Instead he 
accepts the impossibility of certainty and tries to reconnect knowledge and meaning to its 
proper ground in experience.  In this sense, Camus posits something akin to virtue ethics, 
according to which the question is not what shall I do, but who shall I be? 
That there are limitations to Camus’ approach is undeniable; however, this is not 
surprising given the scale of his ambitions.  Ultimately Camus wants to modify our 
expectations of politics and truth.  This process begins in The Myth of Sisyphus, where 
the limits of human knowledge are marked by absurdity.  In The Rebel, Camus builds a 
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political philosophy on the basis of these absurd revelations.  Untruth and doubt are 
affirmed, but meaning is preserved (and nihilism is rejected) on account of human 
volition.  In his fiction, Camus aims to evoke a sense of solidarity and limits.  His efforts 
may not achieve the sense of awe that can be inspired by foundationalist pleas, but this is 
a necessary concession Camus makes to absurdity.  A witness to the political horrors of 
the twentieth century, Camus believed that rejecting doctrinaire thinking required that we 
also reject the consolations of transcendent meaning.  To compensate for this loss and to 
resist nihilism, Camus engaged various experience-symbolizations in order to recover a 
sense of value and community in the modern world.  While this effort does not achieve 
the explanatory depth or prescriptive power of historical ideologies or transcendent 
religions, it does address the alienation and excesses of modern life.  For Camus, this was 
a necessary first step in the pursuit of an authentic politics of revolt. 
Camus’ Legacy 
Camus’ controversial position on Algeria reflects his lasting concern with 
suffering and limits.  The choice between competing certainties was anathema to his 
thinking, mostly because it neglected the complexities of political life and discouraged 
productive discourse.  This is no less true today.  Further, while Camus’ moderation was 
condemned by many of his contemporaries, his obstinacy now seems remarkably 
prescient.  In the case of Algerian War of Independence, for example, Camus was widely 
criticized for his inability to side either with France or the Algerian rebels.  Yet Camus’ 
silence was not the result of paralysis.  Indeed he worked feverishly behind the scenes on 
behalf of many political prisoners.  Camus refused to choose sides because he believed 
that neither faction had a monopoly on justice.  “I want Arab militants to preserve the 
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justice of their cause by condemning the massacre of civilians,” he wrote, “just as I want 
the French to protect their rights and their future by openly condemning he massacres of 
the repression.”13 
Fundamentally, Camus was not interested in a meaningless victory for France or 
the Algerian independence movement; that is, one that failed to break the cycle of 
violence and retaliation plaguing Algeria.  Hence, as a recent article concludes, Camus 
continued to hold that “a third way between colonial oppression and Algerian 
independence was possible.”14  This third way involved a commitment to dialogue and 
non-violent resolution.  In “Letter to an Algerian Militant,” Camus explains his reasoning 
quite well: 
But I know from experience that to say these things today is to venture 
into a no-man’s-land between hostile armies. It is to preach the folly of 
war as bullets fly. Bloodshed may sometimes lead to progress, but more 
often it brings only greater barbarity and misery. He who pours his heart 
into such a plea can expect only laughter and the din of the battlefield in 
reply. And yet someone must say these things, and since you propose to 
try, I cannot let you take such an insane and necessary step without 
standing with you in fraternal solidarity . . . The crucial thing is to leave 
room for whatever dialogue may still be possible, no matter how limited. 
It is to defuse tensions, no matter how tenuous and fleeting the respite may 
be. To that end, each of us must preach peace to his own side. The 
inexcusable massacres of French civilians will lead to other equally stupid 
attacks on Arabs and Arab property.
15
 
Camus thus foresaw that a victory – for either side – won through terror would result not 
in freedom but in further destruction.
16
  Such was the cyclical nature of violence without 
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limits.
17
  Instead Camus pushed for a more pragmatic and peaceful resolution, one that 
secured political and economic justice for Algerians and respected the rights of the 
French settlers.  In another letter on the crisis, Camus issues a final plea:  
I therefore propose that both camps commit themselves publicly and 
simultaneously to a policy of not harming civilian populations, no mater 
what the circumstances. For the time being, such a commitment would not 
change the situation. Its purpose would simply be to make the conflict less 
implacable and to save innocent lives.
18
 
 
These are not the words of a disconnected moralist.  Camus was never blind to the 
political realities in Algeria; on the contrary, he accepted the necessity of violence and 
struggle.  He merely enjoined each side to recognize certain limits, and to do so not for 
moral reasons but because the alternative was interminable conflict.  “How can one 
condemn the excesses of the repression,” he argued, “if one ignores or says nothing about 
the extremes of the rebellion?”19  Camus’ moderation was thus a response to the poverty 
and hopelessness of either-or approaches to political conflicts.  In his writings on Algeria, 
it is clear that Camus’ intent was to end the escalation and to establish the basis for a third 
way.  Unlike so many of his contemporaries, Camus’ fidelity to a measured justice 
prevented him from adopting the totalizing attitudes that defined his historical moment.  
This is evident in his comments on Algeria just as it is in his critique of historical revolt 
in The Rebel.  While this position alienated Camus from many of his intellectual peers, 
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his moral clarity continues to resonate in our own time, particularly with those seeking 
justice in a world without apparent meaning.  
 Camus’ enduring significance can also be attributed to his understanding of the 
incompatibility of violence and dialogue and, more generally, to his critique of ideology.  
In a controversial speech in Algeria, Camus explains his view of the former in the 
clearest terms: 
The struggle has taken on an implacable character that arouses on both 
sides irrepressible rage and passions that can be slaked only by escalation.  
‘No further discussion is possible.’  This is the attitude that kills any 
chance of a future and makes life impossible.  What follows is blind 
struggle, in which the French decide to ignore the Arabs, even if they 
know deep down that the Arab demand for dignity is justified, and the 
Arabs decide to ignore the French, even though they deep down that the 
French of Algeria also have a right to security and dignity on the land we 
all share.  Steeped in bitterness and hatred, each side finds it impossible to 
listen to the other.  Every proposal, no matter what is nature, is greeted 
with suspicion and immediately twisted into a form that renders it useless.  
Little by little we become caught in a web of old and new accusations, acts 
of vengeance, and endless bitterness, as in an ancient family quarrel in 
which grievances accumulate generation after generation to the point 
where not even the most upright and humane judge can sort it out.  It 
becomes difficult to imagine how such an affair can end.
20
 
 
Certainly Camus is not the first to draw this connection.  As an artist, however, Camus 
was able to articulate these ideas using traditional symbols and pathos in a far more 
powerful way.  Indeed that Camus resisted injustice via art is itself an important part of 
his legacy.  In his fiction, Camus describes in existential and symbolic terms what is 
often inexplicable in historical or empirical terms.  In “The Growing Stone,” for example, 
he shows how language conceals important commonalities between individuals and 
cultures.  While reason often fails to bridge these divisions, Camus uses various 
symbolisms to emphasize their origins in a common experience.  Thus in “The Growing 
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Stone” and other works, authentic dialogue begins paradoxically with a silent recognition 
of a shared fate and condition.  This dialogic communion is impossible, Camus suggests, 
when men seek either to submit or persuade each other.  Perhaps there is a naïveté to this 
aspect of Camus’ thought, but it points to a deeper truth, namely that solidarity must be 
grounded in experience, not in ideas or a misguided belief that differences are to be 
reconciled rather than affirmed. 
 Camus understood intuitively that human beings are often divided not by reality 
itself but by their ideas concerning reality.  He does not deny that there are just material 
reasons for conflict, however.  Camus is quite clear about this in The Rebel.  Instead he 
points to the uncertainty of our knowledge to emphasize the need for limits.  It is the 
fusion of unchallengeable principles and legitimate material grievances that typically 
produces the most bloodshed.  “For what strikes me amid all the polemics, threats, and 
eruptions of violence,” he writes, “is everyone’s good intentions.  Everyone . . . believes 
that his truth is likely to make men happy.  And yet the conjunction of all these good 
intentions leads to this infernal world, in which men are still being killed.”21  For Camus, 
extremism takes hold when people cease to doubt their “own certitudes and 
knowledge.”22  This is tied to the larger problem of ideology.  Ideologies are destructive 
not because of their content but because of their justificatory power.  Absolutely certain 
of his convictions, the ideologue sacrifices present life and experience in service to some 
future end.  This is a peculiar form of nihilism, which Camus often referred to as political 
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realism.  “The errors of both the Right and the Left,” he lamented, “define the nihilism of 
our times.”23   
Despite its utility, Camus did not think critical reason a reliable check against 
such ideological distortions.  As conceptual tools, Camus believed that reason and logic 
were too often handmaidens to ideology.  Owing to Nietzsche’s early influence, Camus 
viewed reason as a prop used to rationalize a particular perspective or narrative.  Hence 
Camus sought to close the gap between theory and action.  Human action had to be 
justified in terms of values rooted in experience and awareness, not in ideas concerning 
history or the future.  Whatever his theoretical shortcomings, this is a valuable 
contribution.  That Camus was able to formulate these concerns in such universal terms 
only adds to his continued importance. 
Camus’ aversion to ideological abstractions is related to his broader concern with 
the monologic quality of political disputes.  As explanatory narratives, ideologies are 
quite useful; they order the world; they situate an individual or a group within a larger 
historical context; and they justify interpretations of reality.  For Camus, however, 
ideologies also undermine authentic communication.  To bind one’s political identity to a 
particular ideology is to be invested in the truth of that ideology.  This determines how 
individuals interpret the world and, more importantly, how they interact with one another.  
In the political realm, this carries enormous implications.   
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Most obviously, it reduces political discourse to a struggle amongst competing 
and irreconcilable worldviews.  Camus spoke directly to this in an article for Combat:  
We have witnessed lying, humiliation, killing, deportation, and torture, 
and in each instance it was impossible to persuade the people who were 
doing these things not to do them, because they were sure of themselves 
and because there is no way of persuading an abstraction, or, to put it 
another way, the representative of an ideology.
24
 
For Camus, then, ideologues are not engaged in honest conversation about reality; they 
are defending fixed doctrines.  In The Rebel, Camus describes this as the vain attempt “to 
fit the world into a theoretic frame.”25  Facts matter only insofar as they correspond to a 
pre-determined narrative.  As a result, political exchanges are monologic rather than 
dialogic, and reality itself is an ancillary concern.  Camus felt that the consequences of 
this were truly calamitous.  Besides diminishing the role of experience, it obscured the 
origins of political disputes and denied the fundamental commonalities among human 
beings.  To the extent that Camus was able to identify this aspect of ideology, his writings 
remain vitally important. 
Taken together, Camus’ thought and art offers a nascent picture of our political 
natures, the origins of which recent scholarship has begun to illuminate.
26
  To begin, as a 
philosopher of the absurd, Camus develops a psychology of revolutionary politics, 
according to which ideologies are reactions against meaninglessness.  Like the religions 
they replaced, ideologies impose order onto the world.  But this is precisely why 
absurdity is essential to Camus’ political thought.  One has to accept the absence of given 
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meaning in order to appreciate the responsibility of human beings to act and judge on 
their own terms.  This responsibility includes the imperative to create and affirm ethical 
values.  By undermining the metaphysical origins of ideology, Camus also reorients 
human beings to experience.  While Camus does not suppose that inherent political 
differences can be reconciled, he argues persuasively that sustained awareness of their 
common roots is a critical first step.  Dr. Rieux’s cry that “there are more things to 
admire in men than to despise” is an expression of this theme; it implies that there is a 
nobility to human life that transcends our deepest divisions.  But only an extraordinary 
mindfulness is capable of grounding the sort of virtue ethics advocated by Camus.  
Finally, Camus points to the need for an experiential politics of revolt.  Far from 
advocating a Utopian scheme in which human solidarity trumps concrete differences, 
Camus demands only that we think differently about the world and others.  His choice to 
articulate this via the symbolism of revolt may indeed limit him as a political scientist.  
As an artist, however, he remains among the most important moral voices of his and our 
time.  And although Camus does not ground any fixed or transcendent values, he does, as 
Lev Braun notes, provide “an incentive to those who have preserved the integrity of the 
rebel’s initial experience.”27 
Camus’ thought is best seen as a reaction against the extremism of ideological 
politics.  This is most powerfully expressed in his essay, Helen’s Exile.  In a passionate 
defense of moderation, Camus praises the Greek sense of beauty and measure: 
“Admission of ignorance, rejection of fanaticism, the limits of the world and of man, the 
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beloved face, and finally beauty – this is where we shall be on the side of the Greeks.”28  
Camus admires this attitude for two essential and related reasons.  First, he thinks it more 
humane.  Only a fidelity to limits (epistemological and otherwise) can resist the totalizing 
temptations of nihilism and foundationalism.  Second, as an artist, Camus finds the Greek 
conception of limits and balance more beautiful.  Acknowledging the antimonies of 
nature and life, Camus argues, the Greeks “could understand nothing of our idea of 
justice,” which is necessarily total.29  For Camus, the modern historical spirit stands in 
opposition to the Greek spirit, which was fundamentally artistic.  Modernity, on the other 
hand, preferring history to beauty, “steels itself to attain the absolute and authority; it 
wants to transfigure the world before having exhausted it.”30  This view is consistent with 
Camus’ early embrace of Nietzsche as well as his appreciation for Plotinus, which is 
expressed in his dissertation and reaffirmed in Helen’s Exile.  In the end, Camus’ moral 
vision was inseparable from his aestheticism.  To see the world from the perspective of 
the artist was, in some sense, to see it as both impermanent and as an invitation to create 
within the limits of the human condition.  Hence he writes in the final passage of Helen’s 
Exile that the future of humanity “lies in the struggle between creation and inquisition.”31 
 Ultimately, Camus’ honesty and eloquence have established him as an important 
figure in the rich tradition of French moralism.  His popularity beyond France is no less 
surprising.  Camus’ works confront humanity’s most enduring questions and concerns.  
However problematic his solutions may be, Camus offers critical guidance to those who 
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want to live and act justly in an absurd world.  Camus also matters because he appeals to 
our noblest impulses.  He enjoins us to share our struggles insofar as we can, and to 
reduce the suffering of others at all costs.  Undoubtedly these are lofty aims, but for 
Camus they are the preconditions for a humane politics. 
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